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COPYRIGHT DEPOSED 




















CHRISTIAN FAITH 
AND 

THE MODERN STATE 


OXFORD CONFERENCE BOOKS 


Church and State on the European Continent 

By Adolf Keller 

Christianity in the Eastern Conflicts 

By William Paton 

The Church and Its Function in Society 

By W. A. Visser ’t Hooft and J. H. Oldham 

Christian Faith and the Modern State 

By Nils Ehrenstrom 

(Other Titles to Follow) 


CHRISTIAN FAITH 
AND 

THE MODERN STATE 

AN ECUMENICAL APPROACH 

by 

NILS EHRENSTROM 

Translated, by 

DENZIL PATRICK and OLIVE WYON 



Willett, Clark & Company 

CHICAGO NEW YORK 


1937 



Copyright 1937 by 
WILLETT, CLARK & COMPANY 


Manufactured in The U. S. A. by The Plimpton Press 
Norwood, Mass.-La Porte, Ind. 



English edition published by 
Student Christian Movement Press 


APR U 1938 

©Cl A 11 5841 



PREFACE 


his volume has been written in connection with the 



-L World Conference at Oxford on Church, Community 
and State. It had its origin in several small continental 
conferences. Some of the important papers contributed 
to these conferences have already been published in Ger¬ 
man in two volumes, Die Kirche und das Staatsproblem in 
der Gegenwart and Totaler Stoat und christliche Freiheit* 
Mr. Ehrenstrom has referred to this material, and in addi¬ 
tion to most of the important works published on the con¬ 
tinent of Europe in recent years that bear on the subject, 
as the basis for the survey presented in this volume of some 
of the main tendencies of thought concerning the new 
issues that are arising in the relations between church and 
state. His knowledge of English and American literature 
is less wide, but just because the volume is written from 
the continental standpoint and in the light of what is being 
thought and written in Europe it has an exceptional in¬ 
terest for Anglo-Saxon readers. 

It was intended to publish this volume before the Ox¬ 
ford Conference. But various causes delayed publication, 
and though advance sheets were in the hands of delegates 
to the conference to help in its deliberations, the volume 
appears not as part of the preparatory work, but as an aid 
in the process of thought, study and education which will 
follow the conference. For this purpose it is admirably 
suited. It illuminates from many fresh and important 

* Edited by the research department of the Universal Christian Council, 
41 avenue de Champel, Geneva. 


v 


VI 


Preface 


points of view the question of the relations between the 
church and the state which is emerging in new forms as one 
of the acute problems of our time. Mr. Ehrenstrom is in¬ 
tensely aware of the grave and urgent realities of the pres¬ 
ent situation and realizes that they demand a fresh effort 
of thought on the part of the church. It must re-examine 
the foundations of its faith and consider in the light of con¬ 
ditions today the ways in which Christian conceptions of 
the relations between church and state have shaped them¬ 
selves under the pressure of history. As his book shows, 
Mr. Ehrenstrom has a profound sense both of the need for a 
growing mutual understanding between the different 
branches of the Christian church throughout the world, 
and of the formidable difficulties in the way of achieving 
it. He has made an important contribution to the over¬ 
coming of these difficulties. 


July, 1937 


J. H. Oldham 


CONTENTS 


Preface, by J. H. Oldham v 

I. The Challenge of the Modern State i 

II. The Christian View of the State as an Ecu¬ 
menical Issue 7 

III. Different Methods of Approach 18 

IV. The Roman Catholic Doctrine of the State 23 

V. An Eastern Orthodox View 39 

VI. Anglican Theories of the State 47 

VII. Continental Protestantism: The Doctrine of 

the Orders 61 

VIII. Lutheranism and the State 91 

IX. Calvinistic Views of the State 113 

X. The Functions and the Limits of the State 138 

Bibliography 155 














CHRISTIAN FAITH 
AND 

THE MODERN STATE 


AUTHOR S NOTE 

The author desires to express his gratitude to Dr. J. H. 
Oldham and Dr. H. Schonfeld for their continuous en¬ 
couragement and help; to Miss Olive Wyon, who has ren¬ 
dered generous assistance in various ways; and to Miss 
Wyon and Reverend Denzil Patrick for the skill and care 
with which they have performed their task of translation. 

N. E. 


I 


THE CHALLENGE OF THE MODERN STATE 


The great extension of the functions of the state everywhere 
in recent times, and the emergence in some countries of the 
authoritarian or totalitarian state, raise in a new and often an 
acute form the agelong question of the relation between the 
church and the state. The gravity of the modern problem lies 
in the fact that the increasing organization of the life of the 
community, which is made possible by modern science and 
technique and is required for the control and direction of eco¬ 
nomic forces, coincides with a growing secularization of the 
thought and life of mankind. ... No question, therefore, 
more urgently demands the grave and earnest consideration of 
Christian people than the relation between the church, the state 
and the community, since on these practical issues is focused 
the great and critical debate between the Christian faith and 
the secular tendencies of our time. 

hese words are taken from the statement in which the 



A Universal Christian Council for Life and Work gave 
the reasons for its decision to hold in 1937 in Oxford a 
World Conference of Churches on the subject, “ Church, 
Community and State.” 1 They explain succinctly why the 
issue of the nation and the state has in recent years claimed 
the attention of the widest circles, and why it has become, 
especially for Christians and for the churches, a question 

1 For further information regarding the general situation which has 
led to this decision, the issues involved, and the concrete plans for the 
Oxford Conference the reader may be referred once for all to the admirable 
booklet by Dr. J. H. Oldham, Church, Community, and State (S.C.M. 
Press). Cf. also Program of Work in Preparation for the World Confer¬ 
ence of Churches in 1937, on Church, Community, and State (published by 
the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work, 41 avenue de Champel, 
Geneva). 


1 


2 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

which demands an authoritative answer and responsible 
decision. 

Without involving oneself in intricate discussions of the 
question whether there were pre-political stages in the 
history of human civilization, one may say in general that 
the state is as old as humanity itself. With unwearying 
acumen, and certainly not without success, human thought 
has labored to make clear the manifold transformations of 
the state in the course of history, its sociological and ju¬ 
ridical structure, its philosophical implications. There is, 
however, one event, indeed the decisive event in the his¬ 
tory of that phenomenon in human communal life which 
we call the state, which political science has not grasped 
and cannot grasp upon its own presuppositions. This de¬ 
cisive event happened “ in the fullness of time/’ when the 
Word became flesh and the church of Christ was founded. 

In the years before Christ a distinguishing characteristic 
of the state was the close connection between, and indeed 
frequently the identity of, politics and religion — the com¬ 
munity of the state and the community of worship. The 
fact that the state was consecrated and permeated by re¬ 
ligion gave it that metaphysical and even divine dignity 
and absoluteness of which the Caesar worship of the 
ancients affords so signal and at the same time so warning 
an example. Since the days of Christ, and until the end 
of history, the church stands over against the state as a 
token that the Father of Jesus Christ is the sole Lord and 
King of the whole world, and that the state possesses no 
ultimate and omnipotent authority but derives its dignity 
from the fact that it is an instrument in the hand of the 
sovereign God. 

Hence a tension has arisen. The history of the past two 
thousand years bears unbroken testimony to the continual 
endeavors of the state — sometimes open, sometimes con- 


The Challenge of the Modern State 3 

cealed — to gain control of the church and to reconquer 
its throne of omnipotent and all-embracing sovereignty. 
The history of the Christian attitude toward the state bears 
equal testimony to the existence of this tension by its fre¬ 
quent oscillation between the two radical extremes of 
idolizing the state and of regarding it as satanic. 

Thus the state always presents Christians with an urgent 
problem which they find it impossible to evade. To re¬ 
ligion the sphere of politics is never neutral ground. The 
state is an exposed sector of that mysterious struggle be¬ 
tween civitas Dei and civitas diaboli which is the central 
issue in world history. That is why it must always remain 
a Christian obligation to grapple ceaselessly with the prob¬ 
lem of the state, whatever particular form and emphasis 
that problem may assume under different historical skies. 
That is also the reason why the attitude of any religious 
interpretation of life toward the state is a sure indication 
of its depth and realism. 

The words quoted at the beginning of this chapter take 
us to the heart of the present situation. After a period in 
which the state was subject to widespread depreciation and 
tended to be emptied both theoretically and practically of 
any real content, the post-war generation is witnessing a 
mighty swing of the pendulum in the other direction. The 
special significance of this development is the fact that it 
must be interpreted as a revealing illustration of the pro¬ 
found revolution that is taking place in man’s understand¬ 
ing of himself and in his attitude toward life as a whole. 
Once again the claim is being advanced that the state is the 
ultimate aim and center of gravity of human life. Once 
again we see unmistakably the tendency of the state, in¬ 
herent in it by reason of its unique authority, toward abso¬ 
lute sovereignty and all-embracing totality. This tendency 
is all the more dangerous at the present day because it is 


4 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

now a post-Christian phenomenon and consequently has a 
demonic urge entirely different from that of the pre-Chris¬ 
tian worship of the state. Politics has become once more, 
in the most real sense, a matter of faith. 

The aggressive totalitarianisms of the present moment, 
in which the agelong issue of the sanction and purpose of 
the state is put before men in a form more acute than 
perhaps ever before, lay on the members of the Church 
Universal a new responsibility demanding momentous de¬ 
cisions and deeply considered action. In this grave situa¬ 
tion they are called, not to the defense of traditional posi¬ 
tions, but to a new missionary undertaking, fraught with 
perils but also with opportunities, in a sphere of human 
life where few hitherto have listened to the voice of Christ, 
namely, that of politics. They are called to reinterpret, in 
that attitude of obedient listening which is at the same time 
the highest activity, what is God’s will for man and for 
the state, and to rededicate themselves and their whole 
political life to God in prayer and intercession, in active 
cooperation and, if need be, in suffering and persecution. 
They are called to bear witness to the King of kings before 
the rulers and the ruled of the world, to give guidance, 
warning and consolation in unswerving loyalty to God and 
in profound sympathy with the world and its distress. 
They are called to a trust, springing out of self-despair, 
that whatever may be the results of this mission they are in 
the hand of God. 

Thus Christians all over the world are becoming in¬ 
creasingly concerned over the fact that the church has today 
no clear grasp of the political implications of its divine 
message, no clear vision of its responsibilities and oppor¬ 
tunities in face of new national and political movements 
that are changing profoundly the life of humanity. It is 
this situation that has led the Universal Christian Council 


The Challenge of the Modern State 5 

for Life and Work to devote itself for a number of years 
to the study of these problems, and to call the churches to 
reconsider their attitude toward the issues involved. 

This ecumenical study of the political implications of 
Christianity, by the intrinsic logic of the subject matter 
itself and under the influence of present world conditions, 
has developed along two converging lines. The general 
uncertainty and confusion of tongues, the acute conscious¬ 
ness of the utter inadequacy of the catchwords and vague 
generalizations which govern current Christian practice 
and theory in relation to politics, have made it imperative 
to re-examine the traditional teaching on the subject and 
to reformulate it afresh, from the Christian point of view, 
on the firm foundations of faith. In a patient attempt to 
discover the basic themes behind the bewildering diversity 
of variations it sets out to bring what is fundamental in 
Christian faith to bear on what is fundamental in politics. 
But the historic situation in which we are living calls for 
immediate decisions on pressing questions and demands 
concrete guidance. The vital process of clarifying the es¬ 
sential issues must, therefore, go hand in hand with a com¬ 
prehensive analysis of the actual situation, its deeper forces 
and conflicting aims, its realities and ideologies, and the 
ensuing responsibilities for the Christian church and for 
all its members. These studies have centered round the 
totalitarian tendencies in contemporary history, not only 
in politics but also in economics, education and cultural 
life. 2 

2 Some preliminary results of this ecumenical process of thought are 
published in Die Kirche und das Staatsproblem in der Gegenwart and 
Totaler Staat und christliche Freiheit, which contain the papers submitted 
to, and reports on the discussion at, two international study conferences in 
Paris, 1934, and in Holland, 1935, held under the auspices of the Universal 
Christian Council for Life and Work. These two volumes form the nucleus 
of the reference material used in preparing the present essay. 


6 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

It would therefore be a correct interpretation of this 
whole undertaking to say that its inner dynamic is nothing 
less than the great concrete alternative of the present hour: 
the uniqueness and universality of the message of the 
church versus all modern totalitarian claims, both secular 
and pagan. 

As one of many stages in this ecumenical exchange of 
thought, the present volume aims at giving a brief survey 
of some predominant issues and tendencies of thought — 
more particularly on the continent of Europe 3 — in the 
contemporary Christian struggle to gain a fresh under¬ 
standing of the state. It is specially concerned with the 
deeper assumptions which determine, or should determine, 
the Christian attitude toward the state — the prolegomena 
and first principles of a political ethic. Hence it does not 
enter into the vast field of the empirical relations between 
church and state, nor does it attempt to describe and evalu¬ 
ate the political tendencies and developments in individual 
countries. 4 But in spite of its restricted range such an 
“ ecumenical synopsis ” may have a certain instructive 
value insofar as the positions and views expounded un¬ 
doubtedly are illustrative of fundamental issues which are 
the common concern of all, and may thus serve to stimu¬ 
late thought among those who belong to traditions other 
than those which receive chief attention here. 

3 The considerable space given in this essay to Roman Catholic political 
philosophy is justified by the great influence which this view has exercised 
in history, and still exercises, not only within but also outside the bound¬ 
aries of the Roman Church itself. Any discussion that claims to be 
ecumenical must give it due consideration. 

4 The proper setting for the present more theoretical treatment of the 
subject is supplied by Professor Adolf Keller’s recent book, Church and 
State on the European Continent, which gives an excellent description of 
the present relations between church and state, and of dominant political 
ideologies and myths. 


II 

THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF THE STATE 
AS AN ECUMENICAL ISSUE 


I s there a distinctive Christian conception of the state? 

And if so, what are its characteristic features? The aim 
of this description of Christian thought on the state as an 
ecumenical issue is to draw attention at the outset to an un¬ 
deniable fact which influences even the details of every in¬ 
terpretation of political reality which lays claim to be 
Christian, and confronts it with peculiar difficulties. The 
fact is that there is no single Christian view of the state; 
there are many. 

The conflicts of view which divide the different denomi¬ 
national traditions from one another and not infrequently 
cut across these divisions, tending to obscure not only 
the more peripheral questions of the interpretation of the 
world and of moral conduct but also the essentials of the 
faith itself, are today a cause of distress to many Christians. 
They are felt too as a call to deeper reflection upon that 
which Christians have in common, upon that which unites 
them. It is a deepened understanding of the fundamental 
unity of the universal church, and a new consciousness of 
responsibility in relation to the social and political dis¬ 
tresses of the world, that has led the ecumenical movement 
to issue its call for united Christian witness and action. 

We cannot here consider at length how this inalienable 
conviction of the profound unity of all who confess Christ 
as Lord has been pressing for historical realization, espe¬ 
cially during the past ten years, and has found its expres- 

7 


8 


Christian Faith and the Modern State 


sion within the ecumenical movement. However, one 
marked result of recent activity in this direction, which has 
far-reaching implications, must be kept in mind. The ex¬ 
perience of genuine fellowship and the sincere endeavor 
to find common Christian solutions and guidance in ques¬ 
tions of social and political life have had the effect of re¬ 
vealing, to a surprising degree, the extent and depth of the 
differences in the various ecclesiastical traditions and pro¬ 
fessions of faith. Ecumenical cooperation has resulted in 
a clearer understanding of the divergences of view, both 
between and within the denominations, which constitute 
distinct hindrances to that Christian fellowship of thought 
and action for which we hope and pray. But while the 
answers which are being given to the burning issues of hu¬ 
man existence differ widely both in fundamentals and in 
details, the necessity for a united front in the struggle with 
the anti-Christian forces of this generation becomes more 
urgent every year and every month. A resigned acceptance 
of the diversity of conflicting views, whether individual or 
denominational, resulting in the weakness of division and 
disintegration, would therefore be treason against the 
divine commission of the church. 

In face of this problem of inter-confessional and intra¬ 
confessional disagreement versus ecumenical cooperation 
and common witness two attitudes are possible, and both 
are found within church circles. In the one view the exist¬ 
ing differences are variations of the same fundamental 
Christian teaching, variations which can be explained by 
the historical, psychological and religious development of 
the various traditions and are consequently merely relative 
and accidental differences of emphasis. The multitude of 
voices is regarded as a richly orchestrated harmony; that is 
to say, the divisive denominational element is conceived as 
wholly subordinate to the ecumenical or is regarded as the 


The Christian View of the State 9 

surviving remnant of an obsolete theological controversy. 
Another form of the same fundamental attitude, while it 
admits the far-reaching and unavoidable differences in the 
realm of doctrine, draws a distinction between religion and 
morals and regards the differences in question as of little 
account for the practical realization of Christian motives 
in the realm of social and political ethics. It holds that a 
certain unity already exists in this field, or with good will 
can be achieved, and that this agreement in practice may 
be counted on to pave the way for the desired unity in the 
more fundamental questions of dogma. The goal, on this 
view, is a supra-confessional body of social teaching round 
which Christians of all churches can unite, one which will 
furnish inspiration and guiding principles for a common 
attack by the whole of Christendom on the world-wide 
wrong, injustice and oppression of the present day and of 
the immediate future. In many cases the common basis is 
found — whether as a fully worked-out theological doc¬ 
trine or as an unconscious and unexpressed presupposition 
— in a conception of natural law as universally evident 
and universally binding. 

The second view, on the other hand, regards the differ¬ 
ences in question as involving the ultimate questions and 
convictions of faith. Indeed the question is raised whether 
the existence of such radically opposed convictions within 
historical Christianity does not compel us, in terms of the 
metaphor already used, to regard the multiplicity of Chris¬ 
tian voices not as the harmony of a sublime symphony, but 
as the irreconcilable disharmony of many symphonies 
played at the same time. Further, the separation of faith 
and ethos, which is presupposed in the quest for a supra- 
confessional social ethic, is rejected as theologically impos¬ 
sible, since every Christian judgment upon any question 
of social life insofar as it claims to be genuinely Christian 


io Christian Faith and the Modern State 

must be derived from the very center of the faith. Any 
Christian conception of the state and its concrete problems, 
for example, is definitely related to a particular interpreta¬ 
tion of the essence of Christianity. To speak as a Christian 
about the state is to make assertions about God and man, 
creation and sin, the significance of Christ or the kingdom 
of God, even when these remain unexpressed or are taken 
for granted. Since there is no consensus of Christian belief 
on these matters of faith, but rather division and conflict, 
it follows that there will be a corresponding divergence of 
view on matters of social and political ethics; and this dis¬ 
sension, as church history shows, does in fact dominate the 
situation. 1 

It is sometimes urged as a way of escape from this dis¬ 
tressing dilemma that the difficulties resulting from the 
differences between and within the denominations would 
be overcome by a common return to the Bible. But not 
even this measure would in the end lead to the desired 
goal. Every church and every individual Christian in¬ 
evitably brings to the interpretation of the biblical word of 
revelation a definite, preconceived understanding of Chris¬ 
tianity conditioned by a particular historical and religious 
situation, and this is a determining factor in the interpre¬ 
tation of the biblical word. It is an all too familiar fact 
that the most diverse views have sought to legitimize their 
claim to be Christian by appealing to Holy Scripture. 
We are thus compelled to face the hard and distressing 
fact that not even Holy Scripture provides a common 
basis for determining the Christian attitude toward the 
crucial issues of human existence. 2 This fact, however, 

1 For confirmation one need only run through the pages, for example, 
of Troeltsch’s Social Teaching of the Christian Churches (Eng. trans., Allen 
and Unwin, 1931). 

2 Cf. the totally different authority which the Bible has in the Roman 
Church, and in contemporary Protestantism inspired by the Reformation. 


The Christian View of the State 11 

makes it not less but more necessary — in the attempt to 
reach ecumenical understanding and fellowship — to ask 
and answer the crucial question of the significance of the 
Old and New Testaments as the critical norm of all eccle¬ 
siastical traditions, including their doctrine of the state. 

In the course of the last few years it is the second of the 
fundamental attitudes which have been mentioned that 
has gradually come to dominate the ecumenical field and 
has decisively influenced the conception of its task and 
method. Undoubtedly, too, this point of view corre¬ 
sponds more closely with the general tendency in Christian 
thought today. Its emphasis on the necessity of recogniz¬ 
ing the differences based upon central convictions does not 
spring from an academic interest in theological subtleties 
or from the lack of a sense of responsibility in relation to 
the tremendous needs of the present. The attitude in ques¬ 
tion is based rather upon a sober realism which is con¬ 
vinced that the living ecumenical forces of the church will 
be able to exercise a wide and profound healing influence 
on the needs and confusions of the modern world only in¬ 
sofar as, on the one hand, they have a firm and living con¬ 
viction of the church’s unity, and, on the other hand, do 
not cloak the empirical reality of the church by creating 
illusions about its actual disunity, but accept the real situa¬ 
tion as a serious task and problem. To ignore the diver¬ 
gent convictions which separate the churches in ultimate 
matters, or to conceal them by ingenious verbal compro¬ 
mises, would be a betrayal of the truth which is being 
sought in ecumenical fellowship. 

The aim of the ecumenical inter-confessional debate 
which is needed and is indeed already in its initial stages, 
is not to reconcile and synthesize the private opinions of 
individual Christians in different countries, however im¬ 
portant and worthy of consideration these may be. Its aim 


12 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

is rather to foster an interchange of thought on religious 
and moral questions between the different Christian com¬ 
munions, mediated by representative and responsible 
members of these communions, with reference to the dis¬ 
tinctive mission of the one universal church in the world 
today. This process of mutual question and answer is far 
removed from all confessional wrangling and self-suf¬ 
ficiency. It is an attempt to take our neighbor seriously in 
his individuality and to understand him as he desires to be 
understood in his central convictions. 

Such an approach as has here been suggested might ap¬ 
pear to lead us far from “ practical Christianity ” and to 
have little to do with the particular subject which concerns 
us here, the Christian view of the state. Nevertheless, the 
experience of the past few years affords evidence that this 
working hypothesis — some might prefer to call it so — 
provides the most promising approach and, at the same 
time, is likely to prove in the long run the most effective 
in leading to practical action, since it takes account both 
of the empirical reality of the many churches and of the 
una sancta of faith. So long as we continue to have such a 
confusing variety of opinions about the special task of the 
church in social life it is singularly ineffective to call the 
church as a whole to united and energetic action now in 
this direction and now in that. We need first of all to gain 
a wider and deeper understanding as to what “ actions ” 
are really proper and fitting for the church, what possibili¬ 
ties of cooperation in the social and political sphere are 
permitted, and what limits are set by the inmost self-con¬ 
sciousness of the various individual churches. 

It may perhaps be assumed that there is one presupposi¬ 
tion common to all churches and therefore “ ecumenical,” 
the presupposition namely that it is not the business of the 
church to pursue all kinds of worldly aims foreign to its 


The Christian View of the State 13 

own nature, but that its best contribution to the elucida¬ 
tion and solution of the world’s problems is to set them in 
the light of its unique message. The church exerts its 
strongest influence upon the life of the human community 
in all its various spheres when it clearly and forcefully pro¬ 
claims the uniqueness and the divine authority of the mes¬ 
sage entrusted to it. But just because this divine message 
is so variously interpreted the quest for common Christian 
witness and action cannot evade the stumbling block of 
confessional differences but must find some way of over¬ 
coming it. There is therefore no easy fulfillment of the 
task which confronts the ecumenical movement in the pres¬ 
ent gigantic struggle between Christianity and secularism 
— the task of providing Christian direction and inspira¬ 
tion in spite of all differences of view. Without attempting 
to escape from the vital tension between the ecumenical 
and confessional elements — a tension inseparable from 
the existence of the empirical church — the ecumenical 
debate between the confessions is forced to penetrate more 
and more deeply into the ultimate significance of the divine 
message for this world; and in that very fact lies a great 
hope for a more united and dynamic Christian witness 
through the church — when and where it pleases God! 

After these general observations, which are essential for 
the understanding of the issues to be examined in the fol¬ 
lowing chapters, we return to our subject — the Christian 
view of the state. If the thesis put forward is correct — 
that there is an intimate relation between man’s ultimate 
convictions on the one hand and his moral and political 
attitudes on the other — it follows that where there are dif¬ 
ferent types of religious faith we must reckon also with dif¬ 
ferent, and indeed opposing, conceptions of the state. 

At this point it may be useful to give a brief outline of 
the field we are about to consider. 


14 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

The Roman Catholic Church presents in a unique form 
the combination of a tradition of faith which is complete in 
itself and has been thoroughly thought out in the light of its 
initial assumptions, and a detailed political and legal phi¬ 
losophy which has been authoritatively interpreted in 
several papal encyclicals of the last few decades — although 
in making this statement we should not lose sight of the 
well known description of Catholicism as a complexio op- 
positorum. To use the words of a Roman Catholic writer: 

Actually, apart from the Roman Catholic Church no Chris¬ 
tian communion exists which could lay down the law, in the 
form of fixed dogmas, on questions of faith and morals, and 
thus also on questions affecting the moral foundations of the 
life of the state, if for no other reason than that none of these 
communions pretends to lay claim to such a degree of doctrinal 
infallibility as not to have to admit divergences of opinion . 3 

It is characteristic of the Anglican and the Orthodox 
communions that within them there exist side by side va¬ 
rious religious types which cannot be reduced to a single 
basic conception. Both in Anglicanism and in Orthodoxy 
the need for a doctrinal explication of the content of faith 
does not exist in the same w^ay as it does, for example, and 
preeminently, in Roman Catholicism. The elasticity and 
the comprehensiveness, which in no way exclude, but on 
the contrary include, the consciousness of being securely 
and instinctively rooted in the Christian tradition as a 
whole, are felt to be an advantage and a strength. Thus 
the differences in the attitude toward the state of the mem¬ 
bers of these churches are usually regarded as an expression 
of the wealth of their vital heritage. The question, how¬ 
ever, may be raised whether in these churches too there do 
not exist behind the diversities of thought certain constant 
characteristics, the disclosure and comprehension of which 
3 Riither, Der katholische Staatsgedanke, p. 9 . 


The Christian View of the State 15 

might be definitely promoted by means of ecumenical 
debate with other types of Christian faith. 

The churches which came into being as the result of the 
Reformation have undergone such a varied process of 
transformation in the course of their history that, in view 
of their present condition, it is rather pointless to ask 
whether there is a distinctive Protestant view of Christian¬ 
ity as well as of the state. On the European continent 
Protestantism is now being profoundly influenced by a re¬ 
vival of the spirit of the Reformation. The writings of the 
Reformers and the Protestant Confessions are the common 
source of an active debate on the essentials of Christianity 
and of a Christian political ethic. It must, however, be 
recognized that within Protestantism as a whole the neces¬ 
sity for a connection with the heritage of the Reformation, 
and the nature of this connection, are highly controversial 
issues. Therefore, as has already been indicated, the ques¬ 
tion remains open whether there are any common fixed 
points which can guide us in looking for a Protestant an¬ 
swer to political questions. 

As has become evident, and as will appear in more detail 
in the following chapters, our subject matter brings us face 
to face with an almost unlimited and extremely confusing 
variety of views and opinions. It is the recognition of this 
diversity that brings home to us the tremendous signifi¬ 
cance and immense potential fruitfulness of an ecumenical 
exchange of thought on Christian faith and the modern 
state. An effort of this kind must not ignore the differences 
which actually exist. But it must endeavor to make more 
flexible the traditional ways of stating the issues and of 
looking at things. It must try to see the genuine contrasts 
and similarities as they actually are, and to discover the 
deeper religious motives which underlie attitudes that may 
have caused misunderstanding and concern among Chris- 


16 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

tians of other traditions. In the process of comparing and 
contrasting various controversial opinions it will attempt 
to reduce them to those fundamental types of belief which 
ultimately determine the Christian position in political 
matters. This discussion, therefore, will not be merely 
theoretical and academic, without relation to the task of 
the church in the catastrophic situation of the modern 
world. It will help the individual churches to understand 
one another better and to learn from one another’s 
thought, experience and failure. It will also fulfill an in¬ 
dispensable work of preparation in the great enterprise of 
world-wide ecumenical cooperation, since it endeavors to 
discover and formulate those crucial issues in the field of 
national and international politics to which the Christian 
church everywhere has to find a fresh answer, and suggests 
spheres and methods of common action in spite of all fun¬ 
damental divergences of belief. Thus, humanly speaking, 
it may help to create new possibilities of a vigorous and 
concerted Christian witness in face of political and inter¬ 
national developments which challenge everything for 
which Christianity stands. 

This ecumenical exchange of experience and thought 
cannot, however, take the existing divergences of funda¬ 
mental belief for granted. When differing views confront 
one another fundamental questions of truth are involved 
and the need of a common reformation becomes plain. 
The ecumenical movement cannot rest content with the 
mere juxtaposition of traditional views; it raises the vital 
question of the authentic Christian message concerning the 
political order. The conflicting positions in regard to a 
political ethic which divide Christians are a searching chal¬ 
lenge to the self-sufficiency of the divided churches and 
traditions, and a humiliating reminder of their lack of 


The Christian View of the State 17 

unity. Thus the ecumenical issue of a Christian political 
ethic which furnishes a practical example of Christian dis¬ 
unity, becomes a powerful incentive to a fuller realization 
within the many churches of that una sancta which already 
exists in the one Christ. 


Ill 

DIFFERENT METHODS OF APPROACH 


B efore we discuss our subject in detail, we must at least 
briefly indicate some important and complicated 
prolegomena of Christian political thought: its general 
frame of reference, its sources of knowledge, its method, 
and its relation to political philosophies and realities. It 
is no exaggeration to assert that the predominating uncer¬ 
tainty and lack of clarity in these questions of approach and 
method are largely responsible for the prevailing confusion 
with regard to our subject. In what does the distinctive 
character of the Christian view of political life consist? 
How are its standards and criteria gained? Can a definite 
body of politico-moral principles, which should be advo¬ 
cated by Christians, be derived from the Bible? Or is there 
perhaps no specifically Christian conception of politics at 
all, and are there only individual Christian interpretations 
of the concrete political situation, in which the material 
factors of the situation itself supply the guiding principles 
of judgment? The issues are complex and the methods of 
approach are extraordinarily various even among those 
who have devoted much labor and thought to this question 
of Christianity and the state. 

It is sufficient for our purpose to present some such types 
of approach in schematic form. According to one concep¬ 
tion, human reason gains the knowledge of the structure 
of a true political order from the nature of things and of 
man. This knowledge is not denied by the Christian faith, 
but is affirmed as the true and valid apprehension of an 

18 


Different Methods of Approach 19 

order which is at once the natural and the Christian one 
and which is overarched and sanctified by the kingdom of 
grace. It is possible to construct a normative ideal of the 
state, to which all political theories and realities have to 
approximate. From this point of view, therefore, it be¬ 
comes possible to deliver a Christian judgment not only 
upon the motives of human action within any given po¬ 
litical institution, but also upon the institution itself; and 
this judgment is not merely in the form of a negative re¬ 
pudiation, but it also gives constructive direction. And 
since this picture of the true state is inherent in the nature 
of man as such, and is merely brought into prominence by 
revelation, it can claim not only to be binding for the po¬ 
litical conduct of Christians but also to be universally rele¬ 
vant and practicable. 

From a second point of view, there is no specifically 
Christian conception of the divine purpose of the state 
outside the actual course of political history. The Chris¬ 
tian interpretation of political phenomena is like every 
other interpretation in that it finds its norms through a 
scientific study of political history and a careful analysis of 
any given situation, and recognizes in the results of this 
conscientious evaluation of the political data an indication 
of the will of God in political life. There can, in conse¬ 
quence, be no competition between Christian views and 
those of serious political science. The ultimate truths of 
the political reality itself correspond with the eternal prin¬ 
ciples of all human conduct — such as the sacredness of 
personality, the fact of fellowship, the duty of service and 
the promotion of justice — which have found their crown¬ 
ing incarnation in Jesus Christ. Thus these principles 
afford no substantially new element of knowledge for the 
thought of Christians about the state. They are, however, 
an invaluable corrective and supplementary element in 


20 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

the concrete decision in the ever changing political situa¬ 
tion, and give to this decision its Christian and truly hu¬ 
man character. 

A third view sees the fundamental and valid revelation 
concerning the meaning of the state in the biblical mes¬ 
sage as a whole, and finds valuable guidance in its various 
utterances regarding political matters. The theological 
exposition of the Christian faith includes, as an integral 
element, a “ theology of the state ” which provides the doc¬ 
trinal frame of reference for every Christian political ethic. 
The Christian doctrine of the state is thus conceived not 
as a detailed, rival political science, but as a distinctive 
contribution to the general understanding of things politi¬ 
cal which indicates especially the ultimate sanction and the 
divine purpose of all state authority. The continual inter¬ 
play between these basic affirmations and political facts and 
theories can produce a concrete political ethic which, in 
the spirit of evangelical freedom, not in that of legalistic 
casuistry, tries to formulate the necessary criteria and 
standards which will provide guidance for Christian con¬ 
duct in the flux of political life. 

A fourth view, starting from quite different premises, 
would come to almost the same conclusions as the second, 
namely, that there is no particularly Christian conception 
of political life apart from the affirmation that the tran¬ 
scendent message of the Gospel relegates all temporal af¬ 
fairs to the relative plane. All political thought and action, 
including that of the Christian, takes place in the secular 
sphere and is a matter of political wisdom and political 
expediency. The question of the foundation and method 
of Christian political ethics accordingly becomes pointless. 

It is obvious that all these and similar considerations 
about the right approach are in every case determined by 
a certain view of the relation between revelation and 


Different Methods of Approach 21 

reality. The problem of approach and procedure thus 
leads us directly to the question of the significance of Chris¬ 
tian faith and its implications for politics. 

“ Every great political issue always involves a theological 
issue.” This utterance of Donoso Cortes describes a con¬ 
viction, always present as a dynamic in the history of Chris¬ 
tianity, which has taken on a new vitality and urgency in 
our own day. All political practice and philosophy pre¬ 
suppose a definite faith and definite assertions concerning 
God, man, the world — however inarticulate and uncon¬ 
scious these may be. In the vast and chaotic struggles of 
the present between political movements and ideals which 
fill men with glowing enthusiasm and the bitterest hate, 
ultimately it is problems of faith which are at stake. But 
the decisive question for humanity is: What faith? The 
church answers by professing its faith in the God who has 
revealed himself in Jesus Christ, and maintains that this 
good news of God’s redeeming love has unique significance 
for all men and for every sphere of human life. It pro¬ 
claims this faith in its fullness as the only relevant answer 
to the complex of problems raised by politics. 

An effective Christian witness, however, is greatly hin¬ 
dered by the prevailing uncertainty and confusion about 
the actual implications of this message. This situation is 
all the more humiliating and depressing since humanity is 
now seeking desperately for new answers to the question of 
end and means in political life, and in so doing is urged for¬ 
ward by an instinctive feeling that any valid solution must 
arise out of religious depths, out of some kind of faith. 
The widespread belief that it is possible to proclaim the 
Christian attitude toward the tremendous political ques¬ 
tions of the present day without first making clear what is 
the distinctive significance of the small but all-important 


22 


Christian Faith and the Modern State 

word “ Christian,” has proved a tragic delusion. It is 
therefore scarcely surprising that a growing number of 
people within the churches are deeply convinced that the 
whole traditional Christian doctrine concerning politics 
requires a fundamental re-examination and a courageous 
reformulation. It needs to be set free from unchristian 
assumptions and motives and from illegitimate identifica¬ 
tions with all kinds of tenets which have their spiritual 
home in secularism and paganism both old and new. It 
must be anchored more consciously in the essentials of liv¬ 
ing faith and true doctrine. 

At the present time Christian thought stands on the 
threshold of such an inquiry into the fundamental prin¬ 
ciples which should control its political attitude. The 
questions with which it is concerned lie at the very heart 
of the Christian faith: the uniqueness and universality of 
the revelation of God in Christ as Creator, Redeemer and 
Sanctifier; the status and destiny of man; the victorious 
sovereignty of God in the mysterious course of history; the 
significance of inter-human relationships; and the function 
of the church in social and political life . 1 The bearing 
of such issues on political ethics being our particular con¬ 
cern, we turn in the following chapters to the great tradi¬ 
tions in contemporary Christianity and see, in a few illus¬ 
trative instances, what they teach on the sanction, nature 
and purpose of the state. 

i For the treatment of these more theological problems in connection 
with the Oxford Conference under the four headings: The Christian Doc¬ 
trine of the Church, of Man, of History, and of the Common Life, cf. 
Church, Community and State, by J. H. Oldham, and Program of Work 
in Preparation for the World Conference of Churches in 1937 on Church, 
Community and State. 


IV 

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC DOCTRINE 
OF THE STATE 

R oman Catholic political philosophy is based upon the 
. Catholic view of the world as an organic hierarchy of 
beings and ends, a view which has found classic expression 
in the Thomist synthesis of medieval ecclesiastical tradition 
and Aristotelian-Stoic philosophy. In all the various stages 
of this hierarchy of being the world is controlled and in¬ 
spired by the divine reason and bound into a harmoniously 
consistent whole. In this comprehensive order of being 
every part is related to every other in the mutual relation of 
means and ends; at the same time all are related to the true 
Being and the highest End: God. The boundary between 
the two great realms, the natural and the supernatural, 
runs through this hierarchy of being. The apprehension 
of the right distinction between these two orders, and the 
way in which they are related to each other, is the cardinal 
point in Catholic faith and is essential to its philosophy 
of the state. Different schools of thought vary in their un¬ 
derstanding of the mutual relation between the orders of 
nature and supernature, and in their estimate of the effect 
of sin in the realm of nature; but all schools of thought 
presuppose the close relation between these orders and the 
subordination of the natural to the supernatural. Noth¬ 
ing is further from Catholic thought than a radical separa¬ 
tion between these two spheres of being. Rather, its con¬ 
cern is to relate the two as closely as possible without 
removing the boundaries between them. 

23 


24 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

Man, as a psycho-physical being, in his individual and in 
his corporate existence is related both to the natural and to 
the supernatural order. It is true, of course, that, owing to 
the fall, man has forfeited his supernatural inheritance; 
yet he still retains, though in an imperfect and distorted 
form, his faculty of free will and his connection with di¬ 
vine reason. The eternal law of God, which springs from 
the divine reason, is the creative principle of the universe, 
the ultimate source of all norms. This law manifests itself 
to the human reason in the natural moral law, which, 
within the complicated variety of all historical life, exhibits 
the essence, meaning and purpose of nature as a whole, 
both human and subhuman. 

Here there is no room for anything arbitrary or subjec¬ 
tive, or for any idea of radical sinfulness and incapacity for 
the good. Just as every man participates in the divine rea¬ 
son, so natural law also is evident to and binding upon 
every rational man qua man, at all times and in all places. 
The law of nature provides man with a reliable and uni¬ 
versally valid criterion for all ethical truth and conduct. 
What, however, is the content of natural law? Its cardinal 
proposition is suurn cuique, that is, to every man his due. 
Thus through a closer process of definition it is possible to 
deduce a rich and well articulated system of concrete norms 
which can be applied to all the various situations of human 
life. It is of course true that, owing to the fact that man’s 
reason has become clouded and his will power weakened, 
only the most general moral principles are directly evident 
and universally valid; and the more concrete the principles 
become the greater grows the possibility of erroneous 
knowledge and false action. But taking its moral prescrip¬ 
tions as a whole, natural law offers man a wonderfully 
stable principle of action and a criterion for distinguishing 
between good and evil. 


The Roman Catholic Doctrine of the State 25 

The vault of this great kingdom of nature — as a pre¬ 
paratory and preliminary stage — is overarched by the 
kingdom of supernature, whose earthly and visible form is 
expressed in the church, the sacramental institution of 
grace. Despite its autonomy, the natural order receives its 
final raison d'etre and orientation only from the realm of 
supernature. The knowledge of God given in natural law 
is supplemented by the knowledge, mediated through the 
church, of the new law; the natural ethos is perfected by 
supernatural grace — gratia non detruit naturam sed sup- 
ponit et perficit. Within the church alone does the natural 
order of existence, and the position of man within it, find 
its clear and final interpretation; here alone does every¬ 
thing find its allotted place within the cosmic hierarchy. 
When the church, in a harmonious combination of moral 
effort and supernatural grace, leads man to his true end 
— the vision of God — she confirms the peculiar dignity 
of nature, but at the same time she reveals its relative char¬ 
acter, the fact that it is disposed for a world which tran¬ 
scends it. This means that it is an integral part of the 
great task of the church not only to proclaim supernatural 
truth and to mediate eternal salvation, but also to be the 
guardian and the infallible expositor of the divine truth 
concerning the ends of the life of nature as a whole. 

Against this background of metaphysics and theology — 
which of course could here be indicated only very briefly — 
the questions must now be put: What, in the Roman Cath¬ 
olic view, is the place of the state in God’s saving purpose 
for mankind? What are its essential elements? How is it 
related to social life as a whole? 

The fact that the law of nature constitutes the point of 
departure for the Roman Catholic doctrine of the state, 
and indeed indicates the social nature of man as the onto¬ 
logical ground of the state, is in full accord with the above 


26 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

exposition of Catholic thought . 1 Catholicism as a whole 
has adopted, as an adequate expression of its own concep¬ 
tion of natural man, the Aristotelian proposition that man 
is both a rational and a social animal, a zdon politikon. All 
social life has grown organically out of the impulses and 
powers implanted by the Creator in the nature of man, 
with the free cooperation of his rational will. Since man is 
imperfect and needs to be supplemented in various direc¬ 
tions he naturally requires all kinds of social contacts in 
order to develop and perfect his capacities aright. The 
family, the clan, the nation, the economic order, culture 
and so on, represent forms of corporate life which support 
and promote man’s endeavor to realize his varied purposes, 
above all that of his supernatural destiny. Community 
therefore is not something which is added by chance to the 
private existence of the individual; it does not consist of a 
number of essentially isolated monads; it is something 
natural, already implanted in germ in the very nature of 
man. Human community, in all its various forms, is as 
natural as man himself. The community therefore in¬ 
cludes a whole series of associations, existing by natural 
right, which freely supplement and complete one another. 
But the principle which impels men into these forms of 
community also impels them toward the creation of an 
ultimate order which possesses supreme authority and thus 
watches over and guarantees the interdependence and rela¬ 
tive independence of all the other forms of social life. The 

i The most authoritative documents for the official interpretation which 
the Roman Church gives to its own philosophy of the state are the en¬ 
cyclicals of Leo XIII: Diuturnum illud (1881), on civil power; Immortale 
Dei (1885), on the Christian constitution of states; and Sapientiae Chris- 
tianae (1890), on the chief duties of Christians as citizens. Among other 
encyclicals which are important in relation to the problems of the state 
are Libertas praestantissimum (1888), on human liberty; and Rerum 
novarum (1891) and Quadragesimo anno (1931), on the Christian social 
order. 


The Roman Catholic Doctrine of the State 27 

guardian which subordinates them all to the common weal 
is the “ perfect natural society ” of the state. The state is 
the natural institution which secures the just balance be¬ 
tween all social impulses and purposes, and sees that each 
has its due. 

This conception of the natural origin of the state must 
not, however, be understood to imply that the divine right 
and authority of the state is denied. As we have already 
seen in our discussion of the Catholic doctrine of natural 
law, it implies the exact opposite. As a coordinating insti¬ 
tution, which guarantees and promotes the relative inde¬ 
pendence and the free development of the different forms 
of corporate life in accordance with the law of their own 
nature, the state issues from, and indeed forms part of, the 
moral world order and constitutes a very valuable instru¬ 
ment in the hand of the Creator for the creation and main¬ 
tenance of order. Leo XIII has clearly formulated this 
view in the following words: 

Man’s natural instinct moves him to live in civil society, for 
he cannot, if dwelling apart, provide himself with the neces¬ 
sary requirements of life, nor procure the means of developing 
his mental and moral faculties. Hence it is divinely ordained 
that he should lead his life — be it family, social or civil — with 
his fellow men, among whom alone his several wants can be 
adequately supplied. But as no society can hold together un¬ 
less someone be over all, directing all to strive earnestly for the 
common good, every civilized community must have a ruling 
authority, and this authority, no less than society itself, has its 
source in nature, and has, consequently, God for its author. 
Hence it follows that all public power must proceed from God. 2 

In its clear and decided emphasis upon the view that the 
state is a divine institution the whole Catholic tradition, 
with few exceptions, is in harmony with the words of St. 
Paul in Romans 13 (the Magna Charta of every Christian 

2 Encyclical Immortale Dei. 


28 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

view of the state) that “ the powers that be are ordained of 
God.” 

The implication follows that it is impossible to hold that 
the nature of the state and its sanctions are derived from 
evil. This point of view is well expressed in the statement 
made by certain Roman Catholic philosophers that even 
if man had not fallen into sin a state would have been re¬ 
quired to direct the common life of human beings. The 
state, like the other ordinances of community, belongs by 
nature to the creation. In this actual historical sphere in 
which the original harmony has been transformed into 
strife and in which there is constant friction between sub¬ 
jective interests and objective purposes, the state is obliged, 
if necessary, to impose its authority by force in order to 
establish and maintain justice and peace. But since man 
is by nature a political animal the sanction for political 
order does not depend upon the fact that society has been 
perverted and corrupted by sin; this fact only introduces a 
new element: the authority to use force. Those who hold 
this view, therefore, are emphatically opposed to any view 
of the state which regards force as one of its constitutive 
elements; they consider such a view a misinterpretation of 
reality and a dangerous degradation of the divine authority 
of the state. 3 

The state is ordained by God. The civil authority also, 
which in its own sovereign right directs the affairs of the 
politically organized community, possesses a “ divine 
right.” In the political sphere ruler and subject, command 
and obedience, the imposition and the acceptance of au¬ 
thority, necessarily confront one another. Civil authority 
is not a foreign and brutal power imposed upon the citi¬ 
zens from without; it is a moral power which is binding on 

3 It may, however, be pointed out that within the medieval tradition 
the view was sometimes held that the state was derived from the reign of sin. 


The Roman Catholic Doctrine of the State 29 

the conscience because it is based upon natural law and is 
ultimately a reflection of the majesty of God. This positive 
obligation to obedience on the part of every citizen, and 
especially of every Christian, is not altered in principle 
by the possibility that those who wield political authority 
may be non-Christians. Even St. Paul’s exhortation, “ Let 
every soul be subject unto the higher powers,” referred not 
to a Christian power but to a heathen one. According to 
the general Catholic view, it is always a moral duty to 
render obedience to every legitimate political authority in 
its appropriate sphere of competency and to give loyal and 
willing cooperation to those who guide the ship of state. 
The two words “ legitimate ” and “ appropriate ” indicate, 
however, significant qualifications and open up issues 
which we shall have to discuss in a later chapter. 

Some of the chief elements in the Catholic philosophy of 
the state are now clear to us: The state is based upon the 
social nature of man, that is, ultimately it is based upon 
the divine creative will itself; it is the final organ of co¬ 
ordination in social life; it imposes order — if need be by 
the use of force — in virtue of its unique divine authority; 
and it demands the obedience of the citizens in this its 
legitimate office. We must now go a step further and bring 
out in greater detail some of the vital elements in the Cath¬ 
olic doctrine of the state. In order to do so we must try to 
answer the following question: What is the distinctive 
characteristic of the work of the state as a social institution, 
and what is its real purpose? This leads us to a rather more 
detailed discussion of the definition (already mentioned) 
of the state as an order of justice. If the state were regarded 
as the supreme order which coordinates the social functions 
and aims of man, it would doubtless be possible to con¬ 
ceive this definition so broadly that it could include any 
and every way of creating and preserving order in human 


30 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

life. It would be possible to maintain that the state would 
still be the state even if it were merely the bare, formal 
capacity for creating order and the expression of a selfish 
despotic will to power. Catholic philosophy, on its prem¬ 
ises of natural law, would unhesitatingly oppose such an 
empty definition of the meaning of the state. Since the 
state is part of the moral world order, the content of the co¬ 
ordinating work which it accomplishes is determined, and 
at the same time limited, by natural law. The body of con¬ 
crete moral and legal principles deduced from the norm of 
the suum cuique constitutes the objective criterion and the 
inner content of political rule. To divorce it from natural 
law by limiting its action to the promotion of social sta¬ 
bility is regarded as a secularization of the state which de¬ 
taches it from God and tends toward Machiavellianism. 4 
The fact that the state is defined as an institution of justice 
does not mean, however, that it is exactly the same as a 
“ law-state ” in the traditional sense. It is no mere police¬ 
man watching over the rights of the individual and of the 
group to liberty. Neither must its law be simply the ex¬ 
pression of the varying utilitarian party interests of a social 
majority. Nor does the state create law. 5 Rather, the state 
is an instrument of the divine world order which, as such, 
has to organize the various functions of social life accord¬ 
ing to the prescriptions of natural law. This justice, which 
constitutes the essence of the state, is therefore no formal, 
equalitarian, unidimensional faculty for creating order and 

* The Lutheran conception of the state is often included in this con¬ 
demnation because of its supposed dissolution of objective moral order in 
a subjectivist ethos of individual autonomy. 

s This fundamental tenet of the Roman Catholic doctrine of the state 
— that the state is not the source of law but that law is pre-ordinate to the 
state — acquires, as is well known, special significance in regard to the re¬ 
lation between church and state: the church has a law which possesses dis¬ 
tinctive and supernatural dignity. 


The Roman Catholic Doctrine of the State 31 

avoiding friction; but it is an articulated objective order 
which is operative in all the dimensions of social life and is 
the reflection of the metaphysical order of all things. From 
this view of the political order and of justice as correlative 
concepts it follows, as an obvious corollary, that every at¬ 
tempt to conceive irrational, nonethical power as forming 
an equally essential element of the state is repudiated. At 
this point the inward connection between a particular inter¬ 
pretation of the state and particular ultimate theological 
presuppositions becomes very evident. For the fact that 
the Roman Catholic doctrine of the state conceives the state 
in the positive way just described as an institution of jus¬ 
tice, and also tends to rationalize and to moralize the state 
both in theory and practice, can only be explained from 
the point of view of the law of nature. The conception of 
the state is both based upon and bounded by natural law. 
The traditional Roman Catholic theory of the state stands 
and falls with the Thomist doctrine of the law of nature. 

Finally, we must discuss the further question of the 
Roman Catholic definition of the purpose of the state, in 
order that we may see still more clearly the precise char¬ 
acter of the Catholic view of the nature of the state and its 
right to exist. In accordance with the teleological point of 
view which is essential to Thomist thought, we may expect 
that this question concerning the purpose of the state will 
lead us to the heart of the Catholic doctrine of the state. 
And, in fact, this is the case. The Roman Catholic defini¬ 
tion of the aim of the state has already been mentioned: the 
common good. The encyclicals of Leo XIII and the ex¬ 
plicit statements of Catholic political philosophers have 
emphasized again and again the dominant significance of 
this definition of its aim for the interpretation and adop¬ 
tion of an attitude toward political life as a whole. The 
common good is the directive goal, the creative principle, 


32 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

the sustaining force of the political community. As it 
is the guiding principle of the political community it is also 
the end and the norm of the civil power, which derives its 
moral sanction and its authority from this very necessity of 
protecting and of promoting the common good. For only 
thus is it elevated above the mere possession of power as 
such to the rank of a moral authority binding on the con¬ 
science of the citizen. The common good, as the highest 
criterion of political life, integrates the various activities 
and interests of citizens and social associations, and has a 
sovereign and inalienable right to assert itself which should 
never be sacrificed to particular interests and party aims. 
For the common good is not only quantitatively or nu¬ 
merically superior to any kind of private good; qualita¬ 
tively also it takes the first place in the hierarchy of values 
and ends. Summed up in a compact formula: In the di¬ 
vine intention the common good is the first and the last law 
in the political community. 6 

What, however, is the content of the term “ the common 
good ” ? It is only when this term is defined in a very con¬ 
crete way that we become fully aware of the special char¬ 
acteristics of the Roman Catholic conception of the pur¬ 
pose of the state. First, what does the term “ common ” 
mean? In putting this question we touch upon an issue 
which is fundamental in all Christian interpretation of life, 
the issue, namely, of the relation between the individual 
and society. It is characteristic of Catholic thought that it 
regards this relation as a problem of adjustment or balance: 
on the one hand, Catholic thinkers reject theories which 
conceive man as an absolute individual; on the other, they 
reject all interpretations of man as a social being who is 
merely absorbed in the whole. Thus Catholic thought 

6 Cf. Leo XIII in the encyclicals Au milieu and Notre consolation 
(1892). 


The Roman Catholic Doctrine of the State 33 

seeks to pursue a golden via media . 7 Catholic political 
philosophy is vigorously opposed to any theory which 
would dissolve the common good into an aggregate com¬ 
posed of the welfare of a number of private individuals 
conceived as isolated atoms. The common good is quali¬ 
tatively more than the sum of the welfare of all the indi¬ 
vidual citizens, and it takes a higher place than they in the 
hierarchy of values — in accordance with the proposition 
of Aquinas, that “ the good of the whole is more than the 
good of the part.” The common good, therefore, as the 
end of the state, determines the function of the state as 
the guardian of the stability and progress of the community 
as a whole — a function which may, in case of need, involve 
setting aside the interests of individual citizens and social 
groups. But, on the other hand, the common good does 
not exist apart from, or indeed in essential contrast to, the 
good of the individual. The state ought not, it is true, to 
concern itself directly with the good of the individual, nor 
is it able to do so; but owing to the fact that the end of the 
state integrates the welfare of each individual, indirectly 
the citizens receive a share in the good of the whole. The 
activity of the state in ordering everything with a view to 
the common good creates the general conditions and pre¬ 
suppositions for a due development of the individual good. 
To quote the French Neo-Thomist Mari tain: 

This common good ... is a different thing from the mere 
aggregation of particular goods, and is not the peculiar good of 
a whole which . . . relates only to itself and sacrifices the parts 
to itself; it is the common good of the whole and its parts, a 
good which integrates particular goods in the whole so far as 
they are communicable . . . and as it is itself communicable 
to the parts — whether the material prosperity of the state be in 

7 We must not overlook the fact, however, that the so-called “ or- 
ganological ” and “ solidarist ” schools of thought present points of view 
which, in the last analysis, are fairly close to these extremes. 


34 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

question or its intellectual and moral patrimony. And this 
whole not being a substantial whole like a living organism, but 
a community of persons and families, ought to have regard for 
the more fundamental rights which natural law confers on hu¬ 
man personality and domestic society. Otherwise it corrupts 
its own good. 8 

In the closing words of this passage Maritain indicates a 
further characteristic of the Catholic conception of the 
common good. The common good is related directly and 
indirectly, not only to the good of the individual citizens, 
but also to the good of the supra-individual units within 
the community, such as the family, the clan, and associa¬ 
tions and institutions of the most varied kinds. According 
to the differing significance of these bodies for the com¬ 
mon good the state is related in an unequal way to the citi¬ 
zens as members of these bodies. The relation between 
state and citizens is accordingly exceedingly varied, and the 
acts of the state which proceed from its aim preserve and 
promote the good of the individual citizens in a very varied 
manner, according to their group-membership. The com¬ 
mon good as the aim of the state both transcends and in¬ 
cludes the good of the individual citizens and of the social 
groups. 

The private good of the citizen is incorporated in and 
subordinated to the common good. To infer from this 
that the Catholic philosophy of the state absorbs the indi¬ 
vidual man into the political community would be a wholly 
wrong conclusion. Man is more than a citizen! To quote 
Maritain again: 

Although formally considered as part of the state every act 
of his can be referred to the common good of the state, man, 
considered in the absolutely peculiar and incommunicable 
quality of his liberty and as ordered directly to God as to his 

8 The Things That Are Not Caesar’s, p. 139. 


The Roman Catholic Doctrine of the State 35 

eternal end, himself enjoying therefore the dignity of a whole 
(to a more eminent degree than the entire physical universe, 
because God is much more intimately the end of a soul than 
of the whole universe of bodies), under this formal aspect es¬ 
capes inclusion in the political ordination: Homo non or- 
dinatur ad communitatem politicam secundum se totum et 
secundum omnia sua [man is not related to the political com¬ 
munity according to his entire being and according to all that 
he has]. 9 

This fundamental conception is also clearly expressed in 
the definition of the kind of good at which the state aims. 
Of course the state must concern itself with securing and 
promoting the material good of the community, with see¬ 
ing that the natural rights of individuals and groups are 
duly maintained. This statement however describes only 
one, and by no means the most important, aspect of the 
common good which justifies the existence of the state and 
gives it its aim. In the Catholic doctrine of the state the 
main accent falls necessarily upon the cultural and espe¬ 
cially the moral and religious aspects of the common good; 
and the special character of this conception of the state 
comes out most clearly in the way in which it relates the 
state to the concerns of morality and religion, and thus to 
the reality of the church. Leo XIII has formulated this 
conception in a pregnant phrase which has already been 
quoted: the aim of the state is nothing less than to “ pro¬ 
cure perfect sufficiency of life.” The state is the perfect 
natural society which makes possible for the community a 
life truly moral and in every respect worthy of man. Here, 
indeed, its task does not consist, as has already been em¬ 
phasized, in prescribing the aims of the cultural life of its 
citizens or in molding that life by methods of education; 
rather its task consists in protecting the highest interests of 
its subjects. The state has no right to intrude upon the 
9 Ibid., p. 125. 


36 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

moral and spiritual life of the individual, but its duty is to 
create the natural conditions which enable men to strive 
unhindered and freely toward their temporal and their 
supernatural goals. “ Nature, in fact, has given us not only 
physical existence, but moral life likewise. Hence, man 
expects that the tranquillity of public order, whose immedi¬ 
ate purpose is civil society, may be able to secure all his 
needful well-being, and still more supply the sheltering 
care which perfects his moral life, which consists mainly 
in the knowledge and practice of virtue.” 10 

The fact that the common good of the community is re¬ 
garded as related to man’s ultimate and supernatural end, 
which extends far beyond the political sphere, leads quite 
logically to the view that ultimately the aim of the state 
can be apprehended and correctly defined only from the 
point of view of the supernatural good. It is the state’s 
own interest and at the same time its absolute duty to afford 
protection and encouragement to religion and to observe 
and obey religion’s precepts. The true dignity of the aim 
of politics resides in the very fact that it is subordinated to 
the supra-political and supernatural aim. The salvation 
of souls, the supernatural good, is not given to the state, 
but is entrusted to the church alone as the guardian of 
supernatural truth and the dispenser of divine grace. The 
church alone has “ been invested with such power of gov¬ 
erning souls as to exclude altogether the civil authority.” 11 
The common good, which is the guiding principle of the 
state, accordingly includes as its highest element not the 
indiscriminate encouragement of any kind of religion, but 
a necessary relation of public life to the only true religion, 
that is, the Roman Catholic religion. Thus the (Catholic) 
state can fulfill its purpose aright only when, recognizing 

10 Leo XIII, encyclical Sapientiae Christianae. 

11 Ibid. 


The Roman Catholic Doctrine of the State 37 

that the Roman Church possesses supernatural truth and 
divinely given supremacy, it furthers the common life ac¬ 
cording to the due directions given by that church, so that 
in this way the endeavor of the citizens after virtue, and 
thus after the eternal good, is in every respect facilitated 
and promoted. This means that the state truly fulfills its 
purpose only when it accomplishes its service in the spirit 
of obedience, recognizing the direct authority of the 
church in spiritual things and its indirect authority in 
things temporal. The end of the state is determined by the 
end of the church, which is of a higher order because it is su¬ 
pernatural. Thus the supra-political activity of the church, 
by the very fact that it is supra-political, acquires the high¬ 
est political relevance. 

At this point, which represents the zenith of the Roman 
Catholic political ideal, it is fitting that we allow the great¬ 
est political philosopher among the recent popes to speak 
for himself: 

Nature did not fashion society with intent that man should 
seek in it his last end, but that in it and through it he should 
find suitable aims whereby to attain to his own perfection. If 
then a civil government strives after external advantages 
merely, and the attainment of such objects as adorn life; if in 
administering public affairs it is wont to put God aside and 
show no solicitude for the upholding of moral law, it deflects 
woefully from its right course and from the injunctions of na¬ 
ture: nor should such a gathering together and association of 
men be accounted as a commonwealth, but only as a deceitful 
imitation and make-believe of civil organization . 12 

As a consequence, the state, constituted as it is, is clearly 
bound to act up to the manifold and weighty duties linking it 
to God by the public profession of religion. Nature and rea¬ 
son, which command every individual devoutly to worship God 
in holiness, because we belong to him, and must return to him, 
12 Leo XIII, ibid. 


38 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

since from him we came, bind also the civil community by a 
like law. For men living together in society are under the 
power of God no less than are individuals, and society, no less 
than individuals, owes gratitude to God, who gave it being and 
maintains it, and whose ever bounteous goodness enriches it 
with countless blessings. Since, then, no one is allowed to be 
remiss in the service due to God, and since the chief duty of all 
men is to cling to religion in both its teaching and practice — 
not such religion as they may have a preference for, but the re¬ 
ligion which God enjoins and which certain and most clear 
marks show to be the only one true religion— it is a public 
crime to act as though there were no God. So too is it a sin in 
the state not to have care for religion, as something beyond its 
scope or as of no practical benefit; or out of many forms of reli¬ 
gion to adopt that one which chimes in with the fancy; for we 
are bound absolutely to worship God in that way which he has 
shown to be his will. All who rule, therefore, should hold in 
honor the holy name of God, and one of their chief duties must 
be to favor religion, to protect it, to shield it under the credit 
and sanctions of the laws, and neither to organize nor enact any 
measure that may compromise its safety. This is the bounden 
duty of rulers to the people over whom they rule; for one 
and all we are destined, by our birth and adoption, to enjoy, 
when this frail and fleeting life is ended, a supreme and final 
good in heaven, and to the attainment of this every endeavor 
should be directed. Since, then, upon this depends the full and 
perfect happiness of mankind, the securing of this end should 
be of all imaginable interests the most urgent. Hence civil so¬ 
ciety, established for the common welfare, should not only safe¬ 
guard the well-being of the community, but have also at heart 
the interests of its individual members, in such mode as not in 
any way to hinder but in every manner to render as easy as may 
be the possession of that highest and unchangeable good for 
which all should seek. Wherefore, for this purpose, care must 
especially be taken to preserve unharmed and unimpeded the 
religion whereof the practice is the link connecting man with 
his God . 13 

13 Leo XIII, encyclical Immortale Dei. 


V 

AN EASTERN ORTHODOX VIEW 


T o give a brief answer to the question of the present 
attitude of Orthodox Christianity to the state is far 
more difficult than in the case of Roman Catholicism. The 
doctrinal formlessness of Orthodoxy (except at some par¬ 
ticularly important points), the great differences of view 
within the Orthodox churches themselves, and the impos¬ 
sibility of giving any picture which is not misleading with¬ 
out a personal knowledge of Orthodox Church life: these 
facts force us — however desirable it might have been to 
do otherwise — to abstain from any attempt to give an in¬ 
troductory sketch of the doctrinal presuppositions of Or¬ 
thodox political thought . 1 The picture which we shall 
give is further limited by the fact that we shall consider 
only the conception of the state held by a particular group 
of Russian thinkers, and that we shall not deal with the 
possibly divergent conceptions within other Orthodox 
churches . 2 

The historical situation from which the view of the state 
taken by these writers proceeds is that of the Russian Revo¬ 
lution. That revolution has made a deep cleft in the long, 
unbroken tradition of Russian Christian thought, and has 
compelled the members of the Russian Orthodox Church to 

i The reader may be referred to Visser’t Hooft’s book, Anglo-Cathol- 
icism and Orthodoxy , and the works of Arseniev and Zankov. 

2 Besides the papers of Fedotov and Vycheslavtsev in Die Kirche und 
das Staatsproblem in der Gegenwart, we may refer to Berdyaev’s books: 
De la Destination de Vhomme; The Fate of Man in the Modern World; The 
End of Our Time. 


39 


40 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

rethink completely the whole problem of the state. It was 
Byzantium which proclaimed that the ideal solution of the 
relation between church and state consisted in keeping the 
two spheres autonomous and in principle independent of 
each other, while at the same time they cooperated harmo¬ 
niously. But it cannot be maintained that the Byzantine 
ideal of “ symphony ” was ever historically fulfilled . 3 And 
now the Bolshevist Revolution has created an entirely new 
situation for Orthodox Christendom as a whole. This situ¬ 
ation, however, opens up possibilities for a freer and more 
genuinely Orthodox discussion of the political systems and 
practices of a modern age. 

The group of Russian Orthodox thinkers includes indi¬ 
viduals whose opinions differ widely, yet on the whole it 
represents a distinctive point of view. This view may be 
summed up as follows: Negatively, it consists in a decided 
rejection of Thomism, both of its philosophical and its 
theological implications, and of its doctrine of the state; 
equally decidedly, it rejects the individualism and sub¬ 
jectivism supposed to be peculiarly characteristic of Prot¬ 
estantism. Positively, it is characterized by a strong em¬ 
phasis upon the tragic dualism in the nature of the state, in 
that the state, as an institution of power, is indeed a divine 
instrument for the restraint of the evil and chaotic elements 
in this sinful world, but is at the same time an instrument 
of the demonic forces of evil. This conception of the state 
comes very close to certain Protestant conceptions, dis¬ 
cussed in a later part of this book. Fedotov has formulated 
the peculiar dual character of the state in a pregnant 
passage: 

Power or sovereignty, as part of the hierarchy of salvation of 
the divine love, belongs to the richness of the divine nature in 
whose image man was created. Man has been called to rule the 
3 Cf. Die Kirche und das Staatsproblem in der Gegenwart, p. 37. 


An Eastern Orthodox View 41 

world with God, and, as a member of the human family, must 
base his relations to his fellow men on love. . . . Through the 
fall, disharmony and strife have taken the place of the natural 
harmony of love in human life. In the communal life of hu¬ 
manity power has assumed the form of law and has girded on 
the sword of compulsion in order to carry out its ideal task in 
the service of love. It has become a complicated and contra¬ 
dictory phenomenon — a weapon used in the fight against sin, 
and simultaneously an instrument of sin. 4 

This fundamental view leads to a dual attitude toward 
the state. The state is power and compulsion, but it is 
absolutely necessary that it should be so, in order that it 
may be an external safeguard against the mighty forces of 
sinful disorder. The extraordinary significance of the 
power of the state lies in the fact that it makes possible and 
guarantees at least a minimum of personal cultural and re¬ 
ligious freedom. The whole paradox of the political order 
is revealed in the fact that it guarantees freedom and per¬ 
sonal existence by means of its legal compulsion, although 
it is itself sharply opposed to sacrifice, love, devotion, free¬ 
dom, and other personal values. As an earthly instrument 
in the hand of Almighty God in his fight against the sinis¬ 
ter, destructive and anticreative forces of evil, the state 
does, however dimly, reflect the pure and perfect power of 
the eternal God. 

But the state is “ also an instrument of sin,” and is en¬ 
tangled more than any other social institution in the net 
of destructive titanic forces. It is indeed an element in 
human civilization, in the wider sense of the word; but it 
stands at the lowest level in the hierarchy of values. Thus 
when the church tries to extend her influence over every 
sphere of human life she finds the state the most inaccessi¬ 
ble sphere of all. While it is possible to speak of a Chris¬ 
tian personality, a Christian culture, or a Christian society, 
4 Die Kirche und das Staatsproblem in der Gegenwart, p. 35. 


42 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

we can only in a very limited sense call a state “ Christian.” 
According to Berdyaev, to speak of the “ Christian ” state 
involves a dangerous failure to understand the ineradicable 
and tragic dualism in the nature of the state, and consti¬ 
tutes the first stage in the process of its deification. 

These Russian thinkers lay particular emphasis upon the 
dual nature of the power possessed by the state. Although 
willed by God and instituted for defense against chaos, the 
power of the state is at the same time a terrible and destruc¬ 
tive servant of evil, and is continually rebelling against 
God by asserting its own absolute sovereignty. This tend¬ 
ency toward “ ideocracy,” that is, the will to assert itself as 
the tyrannical, all-controlling central idea of life — a tend¬ 
ency which constantly reappears in varying forms through¬ 
out the whole course of history—reveals an essential ele¬ 
ment of the state. The ideal of ideocracy and the ideal of 
free theocracy are mutually exclusive. The Christian 
faith, in its clear-sighted, realistic view of the world, must 
therefore recognize that the state is the most evident mani¬ 
festation of the fact that this world of ours has fallen away 
from the freedom of the kingdom of God, and that it “ lieth 
in the wicked one.” The fact that the tendency to make 
the state into an absolute still possesses an ever renewed 
power to attract men and women to an enthusiastic devo¬ 
tion to the state — in spite of its way of destroying all per¬ 
sonal creative life — makes this problem painfully acute. 
An accurate expression of the view of the state held by these 
thinkers is therefore to be found in the dictum of Vladimir 
Solovyev that the task of the state does not consist in setting 
up paradise on earth, but in preventing the earth from be¬ 
coming hell. 

Accordingly, as we are taught by the Bible and by the 
whole classical tradition of Christianity, obedience to the 
state is required of the Christian insofar as the state pur- 


An Eastern Orthodox View 43 

sues its primary restraining purpose of controlling disorder 
by force and of directing social life toward the greatest pos¬ 
sible measure of justice. From the outset the Christian 
view excludes all glorification of the state and all optimis¬ 
tic political utopianism; yet the Christian faith may, and 
indeed should, cherish the hope that through the mighty 
grace of God in his church the “ demonic point of the 
sword of the state may in the course of history be blunted ” 
(Fedotov). 

These Russian thinkers, as we have seen, lay great em¬ 
phasis on the element of power in the idea of the state. 
Vycheslavtsev, for instance, in an essay, “ The Religious 
Meaning of Power,” 5 gives clear expression to the views 
of this group. In his view the insoluble difficulty of giv¬ 
ing a clear answer to the question of the Christian view of 
the state lies in the very nature of the case, in the mysteri¬ 
ous, antinomic nature of political power, which cannot be 
deduced by any logical process of argument. This power 
is distinguished by the peculiar fact that it proceeds both 
from God and from the devil. The Pauline dictum, 
“ There is no power but of God,” is no mere private opin¬ 
ion of the apostle, but finds its confirmation in the whole 
process of revelation as recorded in the Old and New Testa¬ 
ments. The omnipotent God is himself the source and 
giver of power. To Christ belongs “ all power in heaven 
and on earth.” 

But all the positive utterances of Holy Scripture regard¬ 
ing political power must on no account lead us to overlook 
its utterances concerning the demonic character of that 
power. The attitude toward the rulers of this world pro¬ 
claimed in the Book of Revelation is just as relevant to 
Christian political thought as are the utterances of St. Paul 

5 “ Der religiose Sinn der Macht,” in Die Kirche und das Staatsproblem 
in der Gegenwart, pp. 183-206. 


44 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

in Romans 13. We have no right to gloss over the polarity 
in the biblical interpretation o£ power, which can be 
plainly perceived, nor ought we to regard it as a foreign 
body in our view of the Christian faith as a whole. It is in 
full accordance with faith’s realistic insight into the tragic 
antinomy of the whole world-process, an antinomy of 
which the solution is to be found only in the Christian un¬ 
derstanding of history and its end. The idea that power is 
a “ neutral instrument ” which may be used in the service 
of good as well as of evil is therefore a pseudo-solution 
which makes power appear innocuous by failing to do jus¬ 
tice to its true nature. Likewise, to try to get rid of this 
antinomy by regarding the statements of Scripture con¬ 
cerning the omnipotence of God and the kingship of Christ 
merely as rhetoric or empty metaphor, and accordingly all 
earthly forms of power as Satanic, is an untenable proposi¬ 
tion. On the contrary, the Christian faith must hold fast 
to the mysterious, dual nature of all political authority, 
with its strange and obscure combination of divine and 
demonic power. “ The power which arose on earth after 
the fall includes simultaneously an element which cannot 
be recognized as right from the moral point of view, and 
an element which is morally necessary.” 

Vycheslavtsev endeavors to open up the way for a deeper 
understanding of the true nature of power by means of a 
phenomenological analysis. Power to rule necessarily in¬ 
volves a relation of command and obedience, of super- and 
sub-ordination. The special element which distinguishes 
this relation from all others is the fact that the command 
is incomprehensible, arbitrary and incontestable, and that 
the act of obedience is blind and unconditional and there¬ 
fore excludes the exercise of the individual will. “ Power 
which is cruel, unjust and senseless shows most clearly 
that in principle power is independent of the valuation 


An Eastern Orthodox View 45 

and judgment, of the thought and will, of the one who 
obeys. This opaque, sinister element in the command, 
from the point of view of the one who obeys, still exists 
even in the most civilized, lawful and humane exer¬ 
cise of power.” The phenomenon of power must also be 
distinguished from request, counsel and hierarchical au¬ 
thority. The exercise of power by modern states, which 
is influenced throughout by law and controlled and criti¬ 
cized by the subjects, does not constitute a really valid piece 
of evidence against this definition of the nature of power. 
On the contrary, all the ceaseless attempts of modern states 
to weaken the ruling power and to limit it by legal means 
and by methods of control support the argument for the 
irrational, domineering, demonic nature of that power. 
“ The greatest good is always beyond force and above 
power. The greatest evil always reveals itself through the 
exercise of power.” Vycheslavtsev finds this view con¬ 
firmed in the fact that the greatest crimes in history — the 
crucifixion of Christ, the deaths of the martyrs, the execu¬ 
tion of Socrates — were actually carried out by the power 
of the state. 

But in spite of its peculiar character, which is opposed 
to the dignity of man and the independence of personal 
life, power to rule must not be rejected in any anarchical 
way. The positive Christian estimate of the state is based 
upon the belief that “ the evil which power includes is a 
necessary and minimal evil, because power creates order 
and combats disorganization.” This is the justification and 
the end of the power of the state: to create in the common 
life of men in society an order based upon justice accord¬ 
ing to the will of God. In history, which is involved in sin, 
power to rule is indispensable, 

and the stronger the disorder and evil, the stronger and the 
more inflexible that power must be. In this sense, the ruling 


46 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

power really does not “ bear the sword in vain and the ruler 
who fights evil in the name of justice, who sublimates force with 
the help of the law, and who is at the same time conscious of 
the fleeting character and the secondary significance of this ex¬ 
ercise of power, can really be called a “ servant of God." In 
history, then, the thesis of power is and must be maintained; 
and yet above it there soar the higher principles of justice and 
love which continually remind men that the ideal unity and 
harmony can never be created by the earthly power alone. 

Throughout all its legitimate and necessary activity of 
maintaining order and law, the demonic, destructive tend¬ 
ency of all political power remains unconquerable, vigor¬ 
ous and living. Therein lies its tragic antinomy. The 
ideal of an order of perfect justice can never be realized in 
the sphere of the state and by political means. It points 
toward the transfiguration of the world in the kingdom of 
God, which in its “ powerless power" and in the perfect 
hierarchy of love provides the final solution of the tragic 
antinomy of power — a solution which is anticipated in the 
Sobornost> the church’s free community of love. 


VI 

ANGLICAN THEORIES OF THE STATE 


T the outset the question might be raised: In a discus- 



i\ sion of the Christian conception of the state, have we 
any right to speak of an “ Anglican” view in particular? 
The historical development of Anglicanism shows a con¬ 
tinual tension between its Catholic and Protestant ele¬ 
ments, in which sometimes the one, sometimes the other, 
seems to gain the upper hand. It might appear to be more 
in accordance with the facts to trace the political and ethical 
views prevailing in the Anglican communion to either the 
Catholic or the Protestant point of view. The fact that the 
Anglican Church is disinclined to make doctrinal defini¬ 
tions and to lay down fixed principles, coupled with its 
preference for a practical modus vivendi, do not make it 
any easier to decide this question. In point of fact it would 
be quite possible to trace the conceptions of the state held 
by Anglican thinkers to the influence of either the Catho¬ 
lic or the Protestant tradition. Nevertheless in this chapter 
we shall deal with a special Anglican type, based on the 
considered opinion of authoritative representatives of 
Anglicanism itself. 

This type, in its comprehensiveness and elasticity, in its 
simultaneous emphasis upon the traditions of the un¬ 
divided church and the spiritual heritage of antiquity, and 
upon its connection with the thought of the Reformation, 
constitutes a peculiar synthesis of Catholic and Protestant 
elements which can hardly be expressed in theological for¬ 
mulas. There is accordingly no consistent body of thought 


47 


48 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

which can be called specifically “ Anglican this is partly 
due to the fact that the interest of Anglicanism is mainly 
directed to questions other than those of explicit state¬ 
ments of doctrine. It is one of the characteristic features of 
Anglicanism that its conception of the state and of the atti¬ 
tude to be adopted toward it has never been systematically 
formulated. As a rule the attitude of the Anglican Church 
has been decided practically — by the church as a whole 
and by its individual members—in relation to historical 
events and circumstances, without much reflection on the 
inner connection between basic affirmations and practical 
conduct. Here, therefore, there can be no question of giv¬ 
ing an outline either of the fundamental ideas which all 
Anglican Christians recognize as controlling their thought 
about the state, or of the Anglican doctrine of the state, be¬ 
cause nothing of the kind exists. 

Here we shall allow two men to speak for themselves who 
represent different trends of thought within the Anglican 
communion — the Right Reverend William Temple, pres¬ 
ent Archbishop of York, and the Reverend V. A. Demant, 
representing the group of Anglo-catholic sociologists. For 
the sake of convenience, we will confine ourselves to giv¬ 
ing a brief outline of the general theological standpoint of 
the latter. 1 

The doctrine of man as the image of God, of his nature 
and his position in the cosmos, is fundamental for Demant’s 
approach to social and political questions. In his divine 
wisdom as Creator, God has created the world not in cha¬ 
otic disorder but as a hierarchy of living beings, a harmoni¬ 
ous communitas communitatum, which is ordered toward 

i Cf. his book God, Man and Society, and various essays in Christen¬ 
dom: A Journal of Christian Sociology. For the theological background of 
Dr. Temple’s conception of the state, cf. Christianity and the State, pp. 1 ff. 
The following passages are particularly illuminating: pp. 33, 39, 41 ff. 


Anglican Theories of the State 49 

the highest end, the glory and the eternal service of God. 
The hierarchy of functions in the world and in human 
society is reflected in man, the microcosm. It is the dis¬ 
tinctive dignity of man that although he is part of creation, 
as one who has been “ made in the image of God/’ he has 
been created to share in the divine work of creation and in 
the divine control over the fortunes of this earthly world. 

But the original harmony has not been preserved. Man 
aspired to become an autonomous creator. His sin con¬ 
sists in his attempt to break through the ordered structure 
in which his creator has set him, and to make himself — 
man — the center of the universe. By perverting his own 
faculty of creation man has dragged nature and history into 
sin, along with himself. The extensive perversion of the 
harmonious relation between means and ends, and the dis¬ 
integration of all social life, spring from man’s spiritual 
pride. So human sin exercises an ever widening influence 
upon the originally good order of creation and assumes con¬ 
crete form in the manifold ends, activities and social in¬ 
stitutions of man’s life in community. Not only is sin an 
actively destructive power in the relation between man and 
God, and man and his neighbors, but it also breaks down 
the boundary walls between the various spheres of human 
activity which were originally harmoniously related to one 
another and sets one against the other: politics against 
ethics, faith against reason, patriotism against finance, agri¬ 
culture against industry, and so on, ad infinitum. 

This fact explains, according to Demant, the peculiar 
dialectical relationship between culture and sin — which 
are both in a different way the outcome of man’s creativity 
— since on the one hand culture counteracts the social ef¬ 
fects of sin, but, on the other hand, it also vastly accentuates 
and increases them. That is to say, cultural activity im¬ 
plies that men who are separated from one another by sin 


50 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

group themselves together in all kinds of ways in the pur¬ 
suit of common interests and purposes. Thus the destruc¬ 
tive effects of sin upon community are to a certain extent 
neutralized, since there arises, as a by-product of the associ¬ 
ation of men for common ends, a species of community 
which at least bears some resemblance to the natural com¬ 
munity instituted by God. 

From this point of view, the cultural activities of men in 
the widest sense can be regarded as a means for creating 
real fellowship. Culture must at the same time, however, 
be regarded from another point of view. While on the one 
hand it means the integration of the conscious and uncon¬ 
scious instincts and ends of men, and so leads toward com¬ 
munity, on the other hand it also means a gigantic and 
increasing conflict between the interests and purposes 
which it brings together. It is this which constitutes its 
deepest tragedy, a tragedy which cannot be solved from 
within. All these forms of association may become, and 
indeed do become, powerful forces of sinful disintegration. 
This trend is greatly intensified by the fact that these con¬ 
flicts of interests and purposes — as cultural life becomes 
more complex and so increases the possibility of conflict 
between the various functions of society — become increas¬ 
ingly operative beneath the surface of conscious life; conse¬ 
quently their cumulative effect is very far-reaching. Thus 
with the progress of culture — in itself a triumph of the 
human spirit — the forces of evil also expand and become 
increasingly operative as a hidden, mysterious power which 
perverts the natural differences of life into sinister and de¬ 
structive conflicts. 

The conception of man as an autonomous being, and the 
dissolution of all organic and natural ties, product of the 
Renaissance and the Enlightenment, combined with man’s 
amazing control over nature by technical means, are some 


Anglican Theories of the State 51 

of the main causes which have produced the present situa¬ 
tion. No other previous era can equal the one in which 
we are now living in its chaotic collapse of the natural 
social structure, in the excessive growth of isolated func¬ 
tions within society and thus in the demonic character of 
its civilization. The objective effects of sin in the corpo¬ 
rate life of humanity have gained such a momentum of 
their own and have thrown the functions of life into such 
confusion that the human spirit has lost both its knowledge 
of the ordered relation of means and ends within social 
activity and also that ruling and controlling power over 
temporal events which is based upon the fact that man 
cooperates with God in the work of creation. 

It is precisely at this point, according to this view, that 
the unique significance of the Christian doctrine of the 
nature and destiny of man becomes evident. The problem 
can be stated thus: Are there any stable criteria which can 
enable us to shed light upon this sin-entangled chaos and 
to discover and reconstruct the original, God-given relation 
between all the different functions and activities in human 
society? To this we reply: Indeed there are; because man 
has been ordained by God to share in his work of creation 
and government upon this earth, all forms of social activity 
should be serviceable to man. The supernatural destiny 
of man, and the ordered relationship of functions and 
needs inherent in his nature, afford us a definite criterion 
for judging the structure of society and for reshaping the 
social order into greater conformity with the divine order. 
The nature of man, with its hierarchy of functions, is ac¬ 
cordingly the most important source of knowledge for 
Christian sociology. It is true that this criterion yields us 
no rigid system fixed forever in concreto; but it yields cer¬ 
tain immutable, regulative and constructive norms which, 
amid the continual transformation of social relationships 


52 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

and purposes, reveal the fundamental features of a social 
order which is Christian and thus “ natural ” in the true 
sense of the word. 

Thus, so far as social life is concerned the teaching office 
of the church is entrusted with the responsible task, not 
merely of dealing with the social motives of man, but also 
— and especially — of pronouncing a judgment upon the 
ends and forms of social life by indicating their relative 
agreement or nonagreement with the essential needs of hu¬ 
man nature. The secular world is still plunged in chaos. 
The church alone possesses supernatural insight into the 
nature of man and things. She alone — as being herself 
a redeemed society and the divine priest of humanity — 
possesses the supernatural power to lead human society 
toward its redemption, by restoring the order God in¬ 
tended for it. 

What, then, are the characteristic features of the concep¬ 
tion of the origin, nature and purpose of the state presented 
by the Anglican thinkers with whom we are here con¬ 
cerned. If we study some of the central elements in their 
interpretation of the state we shall soon see that they are 
carrying the line of the Catholic tradition of political phi¬ 
losophy a stage further — with this difference, that while 
Temple’s view is more comprehensive, and emphasizes 
other currents within Christian thought, Demant’s view is 
definitely nearer the Thomistic position. 

“ The state is the coordinating organ, inherent in the 
nature of man, of human social functions.” This formula 
of Demant’s shows clearly how he deduces and justifies the 
existence of the state from the nature of man. Man is by 
nature a being in whom individual and social elements are 
indissolubly united. The tendency of human nature to¬ 
ward community finds its expression through the family, 
the tribe, the nation and through all kinds of cultural as- 


Anglican Theories of the State 53 

sociations, in accordance with the aims given by the 
Creator, and thus provides personal life with new oppor¬ 
tunities for development and enrichment. It is here that 
we find the origin of and the sanction for the state. The 
state grows out of the social tendencies implanted in man 
and must be understood as an ordering and regulative or¬ 
gan which effects a balanced adjustment and equilibrium 
between the functions and ends within the community 
which otherwise would tend to fly apart. As society is a 
natural phenomenon, so also is the state, being itself a func¬ 
tion of society endowed with special authority. 

The fact that the origin of the state lies in the nature of 
man himself as a social being does not, however, justify 
man in an arbitrary disregard or even contempt for its 
unique authority. The state is sovereign within its own 
sphere and is justified in demanding obedience. The 
Christian, in particular, has no right to try to escape from 
the dilemma of his double loyalty to church and state by 
denying the authority of the state. On the other hand, 
however, the fact that the state is naturally needed for the 
life of the community must not lead man to overestimate 
it or to make it absolute. Both these assertions are based 
on the fact that the state, as a natural phenomenon, is or¬ 
dained by God and ultimately derives both its sanction and 
its peculiar dignity from that fact. Dr. Temple is doubt¬ 
less expressing a conviction common to the Anglican com¬ 
munion as a whole when he says: 

If, then, we believe in any divine suzerainty of the universe, 
we shall find here [i.e., in society] a sphere of divine activity; 
and to whatever has over this society an authority vindicated by 
society’s own need of such authority, we shall not hesitate to 
attribute a divine origin and a divine right. 2 

The only effective way to limit the authority of the state is to 

2 Temple, Christianity and the State, pp. 89-90. 


54 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

regard that authority as bestowed by God for certain pur¬ 
poses. . . . No doubt to call it a human contrivance is to pay 
it less honor than to call it a divine institution. But the de¬ 
spised contrivance in practice dominates human life; while the 
honored institution can be made to serve it. 3 

The state is thus conceived as a natural organ of society 
which coordinates and controls its manifold functions and 
associations with supreme decisive authority and has been 
invested with this authority by God himself. Both Temple 
and Demant lay special stress upon the view that force can¬ 
not be regarded as the differentia specified of this all-em¬ 
bracing organ of society, with its function of creating and 
preserving order. They agree with the great traditional 
Catholic doctrine of the state in rejecting every conception 
which seeks to derive the state from the existence of evil, 
or to describe it as being essentially sinful. 

The Christian faith does indeed recognize that the power 
of sin operates in a variety of ways in the social life of man 
and destroys the original harmony of social ends. In cer¬ 
tain circumstances, therefore, the coordinating impulse of 
the state must assert itself by force or compulsion in order 
to be effective at all. To Demant, however, this does not 
mean that it is force which constitutes the state. The 
power to use force does not belong to the substance of the 
state, but is an accidental element springing out of em¬ 
pirical necessities. Temple holds the view that the instru¬ 
ment of force belongs to the necessary equipment of the 
state, in order that it may be able to carry out in this world 
the special task entrusted to it by God. The fact that it is 
born of necessity does not, however, justify any glorification 
of force, or any acquiescence in the misuse of force by the 
state. Force is only to be used in the last resort, as a neces¬ 
sary means to a necessary end, that is, law and order. This 
s Temple, Essays in Christian Politics, pp. 33-33. 


Anglican Theories of the State 55 

end provides the norm for an ethical judgment on the use 
of force. 

Force is entrusted to the state in order that the state may ef¬ 
fectively prevent the lawless use of force; and from the moral 
standpoint the use of force to uphold a law designed for the 
general well-being against any who try to use force contrary to 
the general well-being, is in a totally different class from the 
force which is thus kept in check. 4 

The force with which the state is entrusted is the means of 
making actual and effective this universality of law. 5 

The chief characteristic of the state, at all times and in 
all places, is the fact that it embodies and enforces law. 
Without a law which can assert itself with ultimate author¬ 
ity men cannot lead an ordered and peaceful community 
life, either as individuals or as members of social groups. 
Precisely in its capacity as the protector of law the state is 
“ the precondition of the maintenance of all common or 
social life.” 6 It is this which gives political authority its 
right to exist and at the same time limits the sphere of its 
authority. Temple’s reflections upon political questions 
lead him, therefore, logically to the following definition: 
“ The state is a necessary organ of the national community, 
maintaining through law, as promulgated by a govern¬ 
ment endowed to this end with coercive power, the uni¬ 
versal external conditions of social order.” 7 

The question, however, now arises: Are there any spe¬ 
cifically Christian criteria for forming a judgment on law, 
or is the Christian citizen obediently to accept as law that 
which a particular government promulgates as law? In 
Temple’s view the distinctive quality of law resides in its 
universality, stability and reliability. When we perceive 

4 Temple, Christ and the Way to Peace, p. 15. 

5 Temple, Christianity and the State, p. 113. 

« Op. cit., p. 126. 

7 Op. cit., pp. 123-24. 


56 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

the danger of social disintegration — a danger which is a 
constant menace whose reality is but confirmed and deep¬ 
ened by the Christian understanding of the world and of 
man — we see clearly that a law which may perhaps corre¬ 
spond only slightly with the ideal demands of justice, 
but is firmly administered, without respect of persons, is 
better than the best law which is either not enforced at all, 
or, if it is enforced, is administered only in a partial and 
arbitrary way. For men can order their cultural, moral 
and spiritual life in peace and security only if the general 
legal fabric of society is firm and reliable, even though it 
may be also rather crude and narrow. The guiding prin¬ 
ciple must always be: “ It is desirable that it [the law] 
should be just; it is essential that it should be stable.” 8 
This must not, however, be misunderstood to mean that 
Christians are not summoned to make the Christian prin¬ 
ciples of the sanctity of personality, the fact of community, 
and the duty of service operative in the whole realm of law, 
in cooperation with other socially constructive forces. 

Discussing the view maintained in the Copec report that 
it is “ the function of the state in the first place to maintain 
order, . . . a legal order, . . . as the sense of justice in the 
community shall direct,” 9 Demant gives a lengthy exposi¬ 
tion, from his own Anglo-catholic point of view, of this 
question of law and justice as an element in the state. 10 He 
quotes Kant’s remark that the formation of a state would be 
possible “ even for a race of devils, if intelligent,” in order 
to show that Christian thought about the state cannot rest 
content with the achievement of a social equilibrium which 
has no particular moral basis as a criterion. Sooner or 
later a state which confined itself to a merely negative con- 

8 Temple, Christianity and the State, p. 122. 

9 Copec Commission report, Politics and Citizenship, pp. 14 f. 

19 God, Man and Society, pp. 100 ff. 


Anglican Theories of the State 57 

trol of the disruptive forces in the community would col¬ 
lapse and would only “ make confusion worse confounded ” 
by its convulsive efforts to restore order. 

Demant finds a striking confirmation of this view in the 
“ growing failure of the modern state to maintain peace 
and order.” This failure may be due to the fact that mod¬ 
ern politics has “ no other aim than the merely social one 
of peace and external order so far as the question of the 
just order is concerned, the modern state is absolutely 
neutral, and indeed it cannot help being neutral, because 
it is not based upon any total conception of life which in¬ 
cludes morality and justice. “ There is no valid body of 
opinion by which the purpose or efficiency of the state can 
be judged. We are left with the abstract criterion of 
whether it, the state, can hold itself together.” 11 The mod¬ 
ern state justifies its existence by the fact that it can pre¬ 
serve its own life. It is this justification which has made 
it possible for various groups, representing special interests, 
to gain a large measure of control over the state and thus 
to give the appearance of political legitimacy to the exag¬ 
gerated development of their own partial aims. In the 
process, however, other social interests, perhaps equally or 
even more justified, have been suppressed. The conse¬ 
quence is that formal legality and the exercise of force be¬ 
come prominent in political life. 

Demant does not, however, confine himself to this soci¬ 
ological analysis of the political situation of the present 
day. With an explicit reference to the medieval doctrine 
of natural law, he comes to the conclusion that a state in 
order to be a true state must embody the just order, and 
that its task consists in “ the right ordering of the various 
activities of society, domestic, economic, technical, educa¬ 
tional, cultural, and so on.” 12 Further, this means that 
11 Ibid., p. 154. 12 Ibid., p. 183. 


58 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

the state is a real state only insofar as it directs its organi¬ 
zation of social life toward the universal order of justice, 
with its hierarchy of means and ends. “ ‘ Rightness ’ in the 
dimension of social relations is dependent upon ‘ rightness ’ 
in the other dimension which comprehends man as a 
natural, social and spiritual being and gives all his activi¬ 
ties a relative place in an order of which his spiritual es¬ 
sence and destiny is the ultimate energy, interpreter and 
crown.” 13 

The preceding remarks will have already suggested what 
these Anglican thinkers regard as the end of the state; all 
we need do is to produce the line a little further. The end 
of the state consists first of all in protecting and encourag¬ 
ing the ordered interplay and the due development of the 
individuals and groups within the community. The end 
of political activity is “ the temporal well-being and happi¬ 
ness ” 14 of the community. In temporal affairs, therefore, 
the state may limit to a considerable extent the rights of 
individuals and groups, even going so far as to demand the 
sacrifice of property or even of life itself if such sacrifice be 
absolutely indispensable for the maintenance of the life of 
the whole, although here the state should proceed with the 
greatest prudence and caution. If, however, the state, in 
accordance with its task of protection and service, desires 
to concern itself with “ the fullness of life in the commu¬ 
nity,” 15 then it must recognize not only that man is more 
than a citizen, but also that the supra-political functions of 
man necessarily determine his conduct as a citizen. In the 
hierarchy of values the family, economics, art, etc., are 
spheres of the common life which rank higher than the 

13 Ibid., p. 179. 

14 Ibid., p. 182. 

is Temple, Christianity and the State, p. 127. 


Anglican Theories of the State 59 

sphere of politics, and accordingly are contributing factors 
in determining the aim and the limits of politics. 

The vital thing is, however, that the community of which 
the state is an organ consists of persons, that is, beings with 
a supernatural claim and end, beings who are called to 
serve God eternally in the perfect freedom of his Son. 
“ The individual is immortal and the state is not; that is 
the fundamental conviction which must always distinguish 
Christian politics from secular politics.” 16 Temple can 
therefore say also that “ the end of the state is freedom,” 17 
freedom from oppression, material uncertainty and dis¬ 
tress, freedom which gives man the possibility of choice 
and of developing his higher personal faculties. The po¬ 
litical sphere, like every other sphere of human activity, is 
a reality which transcends itself and is directed toward the 
supernatural end of man. It would be a heresy for the po¬ 
litical authority to treat man as if it had power over his 
spiritual destiny. The Christian doctrine of the nature 
and the destiny of man alone provides the true standard 
for the understanding of the place and the task of politics 
in human life as a whole. The church alone, as a super¬ 
natural body, is in a position to give the answer to the fun¬ 
damental questions of human existence; at the same time, 
therefore, according to its divine commission, it proclaims 
the true meaning of political power. 18 

The enigmatic character of the state — that is, that it is 
both indispensable on earth and yet always pointing be¬ 
yond itself — is finely expressed by Temple in a passage 
which may fittingly close this chapter: 

is Temple, Essays on Christian Politics, p. 39. 

17 Ibid. 

is Cf. Demant, God, Man and Society, pp. 117 ff., on “ The Essentials of 
Christian Politics.” 


60 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

The state with its law supplies the firm foundation on which 
man can build the spiritual edifice of a corporate life transcend¬ 
ing earthly limitations. The state is still necessary to him while 
he lives on earth, but it suffers nothing from his claim to possess 
a higher citizenship than it has to offer. The humblest child of 
God has a rank above that of earthly emperors. The state as 
we have conceived it will help him to live worthily of his high 
destiny, and will fulfill itself in supplying the external condi¬ 
tions which make possible a spiritual development forever be¬ 
yond its ken. 19 

19 Temple, Christianity and the State, p. 140. 


VII 

CONTINENTAL PROTESTANTISM: THE 
DOCTRINE OF THE ORDERS 

W hen we turn to continental Protestantism and inquire 
into its conception of the state such a question at first 
sight seems meaningless. The wealth and diversity of the 
conceptions of the state within all the churches and Chris¬ 
tian bodies which bear the name “ Protestant ” is so varied 
and so confusing that it is impossible to give an adequate 
answer to this question. These conceptions ring all im¬ 
aginable changes on the idea of the state. They range from 
the idealist’s depreciation of the state or the anarchist’s 
absolute denial up to the most extreme form of the con¬ 
servative deification of the state. Yet each in turn justifies 
his point of view by appealing to the principles of Prot¬ 
estantism. 

If, however, we sift the ideas which lie behind these va¬ 
rious views we find it possible to reduce the alternative 
views to a few main types. The following survey will be 
confined to a description of some of these types, as they 
emerge in the passionate struggle which is now going on 
within continental Protestantism for a new understanding 
of the meaning of the state. The outstanding characteris¬ 
tic of this struggle, and one which gives it a special claim 
on the attention of ecumenical Christendom, is the deliber¬ 
ate effort to establish this Christian ethic of politics upon 
the central doctrines of the Christian faith, and then from 
that standpoint to come to terms with the new political 
situation in modern Europe. 

61 


62 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

When we begin to inquire into the views of the state 
which prevail within these churches—especially in those 
which use the German tongue — inevitably, and at every 
turn, as we study their underlying assumptions, their ex¬ 
plicit statements and their heated controversies, we are 
confronted by the word “ order ” ( Ordnung ). The in¬ 
tensive study of the problem of the state as a problem for 
Christian thought takes place for the most part within the 
categories of the “ orders.” The search for the will of God 
for the state, and for the political duty of the Christian, 
finds its doctrinal foundation and its terminology in the 
so-called “ doctrine of the orders.” It will, therefore, be 
worth while to study these theories in some detail, and use¬ 
ful from two points of view: first, in order to make the fol¬ 
lowing observations on the political thought of the con¬ 
tinental Protestantism of the present day more intelligible 
to the reader who is unfamiliar with this terminology; 
second, because this “ doctrine of the orders” brings out 
into the open those underlying assumptions of the Protes¬ 
tant view of the state which are so often hidden from sight, 
and in so doing provides the right point of contact for an 
ecumenical discussion. 

The passion which characterizes the controversy con¬ 
cerning the Christian meaning of the orders may seem 
strange to the outside observer. Some preliminary obser¬ 
vations of a general character may serve to show that this 
controversy is no mere matter of words or of hairsplitting 
doctrinal definitions, but that its real aim is to arrive at and 
bring out the meaning and the implications of evangelical 
Christianity for human life in the modern world. 

In the search for a theology and ethic of the orders — for 
a Christian “ ordinology ” 1 — we find that a very signifi- 

i This word is variously rendered as “ theology of the orders,” or “ doc¬ 
trine of the orders.” (Tr.) 


Continental Protestantism: The Orders 63 

cant change is taking place within continental Protestant¬ 
ism. To put it briefly, it signifies a revolt, inspired by a re¬ 
newed belief in the religious motives of the Reformation, 
against the spirit of modernist Protestantism, with its hu¬ 
manized gospel and its individualistic view of the common 
life. 

The fact that the idea of progress in civilization has 
broken down so badly in Europe in recent years — and 
indeed in Europe in particular — coupled with the shock 
of finding that the world was not gradually improving in 
a kind of inevitable way, as had been formerly believed, has 
forced continental Protestantism to face the question: 
What, indeed, does the gospel mean for the troubles and 
the hopes — whether economic, political or spiritual — of 
mankind today? 

Gradually continental Protestantism has emerged from 
its relatively secure and even partially idyllic existence, and 
it now stands gazing with horror into the abyss of chaos. 
The sunlit heaven of the preceding historical era has sud¬ 
denly been darkened by apocalyptic thunderclouds. The 
house of a settled church life, built upon the ground of a 
common European spiritual inheritance, has been shaken 
by the violent and stormy winds of a new era. Suddenly 
men have discovered that the foundation was not of rock, 
nor was the house secure. Continental Protestantism, its 
message and its whole life, in its close connection with the 
existing political, economic and cultural forces of the day, 
has been profoundly affected by the general crisis. In his 
anxiety and despair European man sees the proud world 
which he has himself erected falling to pieces about his ears. 
Increasingly he has become conscious that what he is ex¬ 
periencing is not one of the usual fluctuations of circum¬ 
stances within what used to be regarded as the steady march 
of progress in civilization, but that it marks the end of an 


64 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

epoch. Not only this or that form of human social life is 
being challenged; the very foundations of human existence 
and community as a whole are being shaken. 

In the midst of this disintegrating secularized civilization 
and religion new beliefs, ideals and forces are emerging 
from the deep, irrational levels of the subconscious life, 
forces which promise to give a new meaning, a new spirit 
of fellowship and a new security to the life of man. The 
disturbing question of the Decline of the West is being met 
with assurance, with a ringing message of promised victory, 
with prophetic promises of a new earth which will com¬ 
pensate in every direction for the misery and emptiness of 
the present day. The vacuum which had been created by 
the message of a largely secularized Christianity, which had 
obscured the sovereignty of the holy and loving God, is now 
filled by new authorities who claim joyful surrender and 
unhesitating loyalty. In class, state and people new centers 
of organization are being formed which give a new and 
thorough integration and effectiveness to life as a whole 
and assert that they can create new order out of chaos and 
give man new vision, elasticity and energy. 

And what of the church? Has her message of redemp¬ 
tion in Christ anything to say to this bewildering combina¬ 
tion of complete integration and complete disintegration, 
of irreligious secularism and newborn enthusiasm and 
faith? Does the church regard the question of order and 
disorder in human society as irrelevant? Or does her mes¬ 
sage express some prophetic truth which alone can give a 
right perspective and an inspiring direction to the organi¬ 
zation of human affairs? Is the church herself also partly 
responsible for the social, political and spiritual confusion 
of the present day? 

When continental Protestantism faced this question it 
made the painful and humiliating discovery that it had 


Continental Protestantism: The Orders 65 

very little to say in reply, but that the question itself could 
not be evaded. It then became aware that it had distorted 
and weakened the gospel when it forgot to proclaim that 
Christ has a word, and indeed, the decisive word, even for 
the homo economicus and the homo politicus. It became 
aware that this new concern for the social responsibility of 
Christianity implied the need for a new ethic which would 
place the thronging social, political and other problems of 
the modern world in the light of the pure gospel. It was 
a natural result of this situation that the eyes of continental 
Protestantism were opened to see the limitations and weak¬ 
nesses of the traditional understanding of the Christian 
ethos. Lutheranism above all incurred the reproach of 
having confined its attention — on the whole — to the 
sphere of individual ethics and, through its social indiffer¬ 
ence, of sharing to some extent in the responsibility for the 
collapse of the social order. In the realm of social and po¬ 
litical justice Christian preachers had usually been content 
to utter vague generalizations and pious exhortations to 
love and political loyalty. There was no specifically Chris¬ 
tian view which could throw light— “ in terms of a mod¬ 
ern world ” — on all the questions which confront man in 
his daily life with other human beings; even the legitimacy 
of such an undertaking was sometimes denied on theologi¬ 
cal grounds. The Christian life seemed on the verge of 
degenerating into a species of religious and ethical “ pri- 
vate-mindedness,” with the inevitable result that the in¬ 
fluence of Christian faith upon the whole course of public 
life was fading away. 

Another important element in the situation, which gave 
to this search for a Christian “ theology of the orders ” a 
decidedly religious inspiration and a theological direction, 
can be mentioned only very briefly at this point, as it has 
already been mentioned and will be constantly mentioned 


66 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

in the following pages. This element is the new interest 
in and understanding of the message of the Reformation. 
Here we find the ultimate roots of the present rejection of 
a humanized and individualistic Christianity, although of 
course other factors have also played their part in this 
matter. In recent years, and especially during the post-war 
period, the great formulas of justificatio sola fide and solo 
Deo gloria, in which Luther and Calvin and their follow¬ 
ers expressed their joyful new discovery of the pure gospel 
and which completely dominated the spiritual situation of 
that epoch, have once more become living realities. The 
universal sovereignty of the redeeming love of God; the 
personalistic and dramatic conception of the divine con¬ 
flict with the destructive powers of the world; the unmerited 
gift of communion with God through faith, apart from all 
human merit or moral and religious strain and effort; sanc¬ 
tification not as a self-achievement of the isolated human 
being but as the grateful sharing of the divine love with 
one’s neighbor — these are different ways of expressing the 
central motif of this awakening. 

One interesting result of this rediscovery of the central 
truths of the gospel has been that it has led to a renewed 
study of the problems of religious belief and practice in 
every direction. Even in the sphere of social ethics this 
tendency has manifested itself in an extraordinarily stimu¬ 
lating ferment of ideas. Fresh emphasis has been laid 
upon the category of personal community and solidarity 
— a conception which is opposed to both the predominant 
systems — the individualistic and collectivistic alike. This 
category, however, receives its special religious character 
from the fact that it does not originate in the autonomous 
individual — who for one reason or another arbitrarily 
seeks contact with other individuals — but in the sovereign 


Continental Protestantism: The Orders 67 

act of the loving God who has created man in responsible 
community, with mutual obligations, and who calls him in 
Christ into the membership of a redeemed society. When 
God releases man from his egoistical repressions, receives 
him again into communion with himself, and directs his 
attention to his neighbor, he makes him truly personal and 
truly social. Thus the Pauline formula, “ justification 
through faith alone,” which was taken up afresh by the Re¬ 
formers, has become at the same time the leitmotiv of a new 
social ethic which tries to interpret the Christian relevance 
of the various kinds of social life — marriage, the state, 
economics, etc. — in a manner which is in closest touch 
with the life of the present day. 

This renewed loyalty to the spirit of the Reformation 
does not apply only to the subject matter of this movement 
within continental Protestantism but also to its terminol¬ 
ogy. The thinkers of the period of the Reformation, for 
instance, above all those of the Lutheran line of tradition, 
were accustomed to speak of the family and the authority 
of the state as “ divine orders.” Thus the renewed use of 
this phraseology by contemporary Protestantism, in con¬ 
nection with social questions, means that an integral part 
of the Reformation doctrine which had long been for¬ 
gotten and ignored has again been brought to light. Even 
the thought-forms of the present “ theology of orders ” bear 
witness to the fact that at the present time there is a de¬ 
liberate and conscious endeavor to consider Luther and 
Calvin as the authentic interpreters of the gospel and its 
vision of human existence and social duty. 

This effort to create a Protestant ethic of the orders is 
still in a state of great ferment, and its statements and defi¬ 
nitions are in the highest degree controversial. Various 
thinkers, with mutually exclusive conceptions, are engaged 


68 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

in heated conflict . 2 It must be admitted that not only are 
many of the present conclusions of those who are engaged 
in this search for a Christian “ theology of the orders ” be¬ 
ing attacked, but the whole effort has been described as 
fundamentally a dangerous departure from the straight 
line of truth, and as leading the Protestant social ethic 
down the wrong turning. In the process of taking sides on 
these questions all kinds of divergences and agreements 
emerge on points affecting ultimate convictions which cut 
right across the traditional distinction between Lutheran¬ 
ism and Calvinism. 

For reasons which have already been indicated, the ques¬ 
tion of a Christian “ theology of the orders ” has become a 
burning question; for the whole controversy concerns fun¬ 
damental doctrines, as the saving revelation of God in 
Christ, the religious significance of nature and of historical 
events, the divine commandment of love and the law of 
nature, the sovereign grace of God and human activity, the 
relations between church and state, and other important 
questions of the Christian faith. Hence it is no easy matter 
to present a clear analysis of the dense network of contra¬ 
dictory tendencies and overlapping alternatives in this 
Protestant doctrine of the “ orders.” A brief description 
of some examples of the solutions which are being at¬ 
tempted may, by presenting us with contrasting concep¬ 
tions, give us a more living and accurate impression of the 
tendencies of this “ theology of the orders,” and also of the 
political thought of continental Protestantism at the pres- 

2 Some of the more important documents for this discussion may be 
noted here for the sake of those who wish to pursue this subject further 
and in greater detail. Paul Althaus, Theologie der Ordnungen; Karl Barth, 
Nein! Antwort an Emil Brunner; Emil Brunner, Das Gebot und die 
Ordnungen (Eng. trans.. The Divine Imperative ); Emil Brunner, Natur 
und Gnade; F. Gogarten, Politische Ethik; H. Thielicke, Geschichte und 
Existenz ; W. Wiesner, Die Lehre von der Schopfungsordnung. 


Continental Protestantism: The Orders 69 

ent time, than might a strictly systematic analysis of the 
problems themselves. 

A short historical survey will best open the subject of 
these endeavors to create a “ theology of the orders,” above 
all, those which are of Lutheran origin. 

Against the medieval theory of nature and supernature 
the theologians of the Reformation maintained with great 
determination that this solution prejudiced both the 
unique character and the centrality of the divine salvation 
in Christ, as well as the truth of God’s presence in the world 
as Creator and Preserver, by speaking of nature as an inde¬ 
pendent sphere, while at the same time it cast suspicion on 
the natural world and made it subordinate to priestly con¬ 
trol. For the graduated hierarchy of nature and super¬ 
nature the thinkers of the Reformation substituted the fun¬ 
damental contrast between faith in God and faith in the 
self as two completely different attitudes. 

For the previous fluctuation between an ascetic and a 
theocratic solution of the relations between the spiritual 
and the temporal power, the thinkers of the Reformation 
substituted their new understanding of the gospel and the 
ruling powers as differing agents of the divine action in 
this world, both of which are regarded as springing directly 
out of the fatherly will of the sovereign God. ft has, how¬ 
ever, been the nemesis of Lutheranism that it has confused 
this distinction with another alternative: the spiritual 
sphere of love and the temporal sphere of the law, the inner 
man who lives within the sphere of the freedom of grace 
and the outer man who lives under the conditions of the 
world. 

The endeavor to preserve the purity of the gospel led to 
the separation of the temporal and the spiritual realms. 
The result was that usually the different attempts to re¬ 
unite them only led to an oscillation between exaggerated 


70 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

forms of the same errors with which the Catholic doctrine 
had been charged. On the one hand, the presence of God 
in the world as Creator was minimized or even denied; the 
world was conceived exclusively as a kingdom of the devil. 
The ethical consequences of this dualism between pure 
love and demonic force remained in the form of asceticism 
and renunciation of the world. Those who interpreted 
this dualism in an optimistic sense believed in the possibil¬ 
ity of overcoming it by setting up, here and now, an earthly 
kingdom of love by means of human agents. Others, how¬ 
ever, glorified the world and its institutions as a divine 
creation, and asserted the divinely instituted antinomy of 
the different spheres of human life; and from the distinc¬ 
tion between the temporal and the spiritual spheres the 
final conclusion was drawn that the Christian ethos con¬ 
sists essentially in unconditional obedience to the secular 
authority and to its claims as a divine command. The 
dualism with which Catholicism was charged, that between 
two moral standards and two kinds of Christians, became 
in one way or another a non-dialectical dualism within 
man, between his private and his official behavior. The 
so-called Catholic “ two-story religion ” came back, by 
means of a detour, in the form of a “ two-sphere religion.” 

It is this inheritance which represents the setting of the 
distinction made by many Lutherans between the Creator 
and the Preserver who works in nature and in history, and 
the Redeemer who works in the spiritual sphere of the 
church. The decisive point in our inquiry into the politi¬ 
cal ethic is that in this distinction the ethical interest is 
concentrated upon an emphasis upon the divine activity of 
the Creator in the historically given orders of human life, 
above all in the nation and the state. Whether this argu¬ 
ment uses the ideas or the terminology of early Lutheran¬ 
ism, or of idealistic philosophy and nationalistic romanti¬ 
cism, is a matter of lesser importance. 


Continental Protestantism: The Orders 71 

Gogarten, whose writings have exerted a widespread in¬ 
fluence upon this whole controversy, starts from an analy¬ 
sis of the “ I-Thou ” relation as the basic phenomenon of 
human existence. In so doing his aim is to work out a con¬ 
crete anthropology and “ theology of the orders ” in the 
light of the distinctively Christian belief in God as Creator. 
God creates man in an indissoluble union with the 
“ Thou.” Only in his meeting with the “ Thou ” and in 
the answer to his claims does man truly become an “ I.” 
The very fact that one is a human being means dependence, 
response, obedience, adjustment to the claims of his neigh¬ 
bor. Thus the fact that human beings are so made that 
they are disposed for one another in mutual responsibility 
means something very different from an egalitarian coor¬ 
dination of free individuals; the relations of super- and 
sub-ordination are part of the ontological structure of life. 
Man can therefore never be understood a se and per se, 
since he exists only in relation to others, i.e., as father or 
child, husband or wife, employer or employee, etc., rela¬ 
tions which exist apart from the choice of the individual 
human being. 

However, these natural and organic ties which bind hu¬ 
man beings together, and the demands which they lay upon 
man, acquire their particular character from the fact that 
in them God the Creator calls man to a total surrender in 
the service of his neighbor. Behind the human “ thou ” 
stands the divine “ Thou.” 

But in this meeting with the word of God, in the claim 
of our neighbor for a loving response, the radical and in¬ 
vincible sinfulness of each human being is unveiled. En¬ 
closed within his egoism man severs himself from his 
neighbor and remains literally irresponsible. Instead of 
serving his neighbor according to the concrete indications 
of the relations imposed by the existence of the orders, man 
in his arrogant autonomy rebels against the orders and 


72 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

their Creator and threatens to destroy the actual orders 
themselves by trying to make them serve the purpose of his 
own self-glorification. Thus obedience to God and to the 
neighbor, which constitutes the created freedom of man, 
is turned into a slavery to the demonic forces of unre¬ 
strained evil. 

It is the great fault of all idealistic, materialistic, liberal- 
istic ideologies and systems that in the last resort they all, 
without exception, believe in the natural goodness of man. 
With their beautiful phrases, which extol man’s freedom 
and his right of self-determination, they conceal his real 
defect, that of loss of community, and in so doing they drive 
him still more deeply into ruin and chaos. Because they 
refuse to acknowledge that the permanent order of life, 
which keeps the caprice and the selfish striving of man 
within narrow bounds, is God’s creation, all that they say 
simply flows over the heads of actual concrete wicked men. 
Thus they do not know the blessing and the hidden pur¬ 
pose of love which lie concealed behind the fact that men 
are bound together within the framework of these orders. 

Hence these ideologies also fail to have a right view of 
the necessity for the state. For Gogarten the state is the 
“ order of creation ” par excellence, which prevents the 
worst effects of sinful chaos from being realized, which 
hinders men from devouring one another like wild beasts 
in their self-centered renunciation of all mutual responsi¬ 
bility, and which by its power makes it at least possible for 
mankind to live together in tolerable harmony. Gogar- 
ten’s “ theology of the orders ” culminates in this concep¬ 
tion of sin as irresponsible rebellion against the call to com¬ 
munity on the one hand, and of the divine necessity for the 
state as a supreme “ ordinator ” of human life on the other. 
Gogarten’s statement that man can exist only by means of 
the state, and, in consequence, that ethics as a whole is 


Continental Protestantism: The Orders 73 

necessarily simply a political ethic , 3 can be understood only 
when we recall his thoroughly pessimistic view of the self- 
centeredness and lovelessness of man. 

The theological setting for this conception of the radical 
sinfulness of man and of the pre-established orders as a 
divine creation is provided by Gogarten’s doctrine of the 
gospel and the law. The orders are divine laws in a two¬ 
fold sense. They allure and compel self-centered man to 
an at least outward fulfillment of his moral obligations, 
which confront him when he comes into contact with his 
neighbor. As such they are an instrument of the divine 
long-suffering and providence. 

In this sphere of legality the claims of the orders can be 
understood and fulfilled by Christians and non-Christians 
alike. But of greater weight than this politico-ethical ob¬ 
servance of the divine law in the orders is its religious sig¬ 
nificance, its testimony to the wrath and the justice of God 
which can never be realized by man. Gogarten maintains 
that in this religious interpretation of the law, not as an 
ethical norm which is to be realized to a greater or lesser 
extent by means of moral effort, but as a manifestation of 
the wrathful, hidden God, one of the leading ideas of the 
Reformation has been revived . 4 

The law in its religious sense unveils man in his self- 
seeking and in his severance from God and his neighbor, 
even when all the demands of legality, or human good will, 

3 Cf., for instance, his Politische Ethik, passim. 

4 We may observe that Gogarten is certainly right in pointing out 
the paradoxical dialectic of the law and the gospel as the kernel both of the 
Pauline and of the Reformers’ message. The whole of the struggle of the 
present day for a “ theology of orders,” as well as for the Christian attitude 
toward the state in particular, is ultimately concerned with this question. 
But it may be questioned whether the way in which Gogarten himself 
and several other contemporary Protestant thinkers try to grasp this dia¬ 
lectic, does justice to the thought of the Reformation. 


74 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

of natural love and decency have been fulfilled. It shows 
him, in his egocentricity, that he can never fulfill the es¬ 
sential requirement of the law, “ Thou shalt love thy neigh¬ 
bor as thyself,” and thus that he is rightly exposed to the 
divine wrath. It is only against this dark background of 
the divine law in its religious sense that the marvelous na¬ 
ture of the divine love in Christ shines out in its full radi¬ 
ance. The wrath of God, the despair of man, are removed 
by Christ, and in the light of this saving divine fact the 
believer sees all these orders of the natural world, and their 
ethical requirements of obedience and service, as willed by 
the Creator, as a framework within which Christians and 
non-Christians can and should fulfill the will of God as the 
Preserver of mankind. 

What, however, gives its distinctive character to this doc¬ 
trine of the law and the gospel in the thought of Gogarten, 
and moreover makes it into a menace to this whole search 
for a specifically Christian ethic, comes out in the follow¬ 
ing statements, the first of which has already been implied. 
The divine law to which man is subject confronts him in 
the claim of his neighbor, that is, in the concrete impera¬ 
tives of the relations between the “I” and the “ Thou ” 
within the orders; since in this sinful world the state rep¬ 
resents the highest and the most inclusive order of creation, 
the divine law meets man preeminently in the claim of the 
political authority for responsible obedience. Second, al¬ 
though freed from the law in the religious sense, even the 
Christian remains under the law in the political and ethical 
sense. It is indeed the privilege of one who believes in 
Christ, who has been set free from the insane illusion of 
human self-sufficiency and from the curse of the divine 
wrath, that he may submit to the legal ordinances of the 
earthly authorities in willing service. In this unceasing 
obedience and in this adjustment to the claims of authority 


Continental Protestantism: The Orders 75 

he serves his neighbor best, since he does not resist the con¬ 
crete social demands which bind him to the “ Thou ” in 
the name of any so-called “ Christian ” ideals and norms 
or in a spirit of criticism, but willingly respects the hidden 
ordering of God, which, he believes, these orders contain. 
Precisely when the Christian in all humility takes his place 
within the orders of society, and in a very concrete and 
practical way fulfills his various duties as they arise natu¬ 
rally in the course of his profession or calling, does he prove 
the reality of his faith in Christ. 

There is no need to go further to prove that thought of 
this kind does not leave much room for a specifically Chris¬ 
tian ethos. Of recent years Gogarten has modified his 
views to this extent, that he now conceives the people 
(Volk) and not the state as the real “ order of creation 
it is the duty of the state to see that the purity of the people 
and its stability are not injured or disturbed. This the 
state must do as the supreme political authority . 5 At the 
same time he denies still more sharply and vigorously 
the possibility of a Christian ethos whose content could 
differ from that of the morality of the people (Volk ). The 
eternal will of the Creator, as a preserving and ordering 
will in the midst of the disintegration of human sin, is 
manifested in the people (Volk) in the complex of natural 
and moral ties of organic community and powerful author¬ 
ity, of service and willing obedience, which constitutes the 
national environment of man. 

The national ethos, the national standards, customs and 
traditions are equally binding on Christians and non-Chris¬ 
tians. For Gogarten, therefore, the one and only social 
task of the Christian message is that it should proclaim 
these obligations as the will of the Creator. For only in 

s Cf. Einheit von Evangelium und Volkstum? and 1st Volksgesetz Gottes- 
gesetz? 


76 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

disciplined obedience to the orders is human life preserved 
from destruction and the concrete love of our neighbor 
made possible. And it is only the proclamation of this 
Volksnomos as a divine imperative which opens the ears 
of men to the message of the gospel. “ For the gospel can 
only reveal its meaning where man is placed under the 
most austere law.” 6 

In various ways the general theological position of which 
Gogarten provides an outstanding example is adopted by 
several Lutherans of the present day. One of these Luther¬ 
ans, indeed, describes it as a fundamental doctrine of the 
Lutheran Reformation that the ethical attitude of the 
Christian is summed up completely in the natural orders, 
according to the rules of their “ immanent rationality,” 
which is not invalidated by God’s saving will in Christ but 
has rather been confirmed thereby . 7 

Emanuel Hirsch, a leading theologian among the Ger¬ 
man Christians, has tried — with a personal feeling and 
literary ability which practically excel those of all the other 
contemporary Lutheran thinkers — to combine the life of 
man in its natural social forms with the Christian faith . 8 

Although in many directions Hirsch takes a line dif¬ 
ferent from that adopted by the Lutheran group which has 
just been mentioned and is strongly influenced above all 
by German idealism, he also, in the attempt to answer this 
question, makes the Lutheran doctrine of the law and the 
gospel and the two realms his starting point. With this he 
combines a religious and ethical philosophy of history 
whose central motif is the belief in God as the “ Lord of 
History.” That God is Lord of History means that the 

6 Einheit von Evangelium und Gesetz ? p. 21. 

7 Elert, Bekenntnis , Blut und Boden , pp. 46, 33, et passim . 

8 Cf. his books. Die gegenwartige geistige Lage ; Deutsches Volkstum 
und evangelischer Glaube ; Christliche Freiheit und politische Bindung . 


Continental Protestantism: The Orders 77 

whole of earthly existence within which man is set is 
created, supported and pervaded by God. And this creative 
presence and self-revelation of God in the dynamic course 
of history is not something general and abstract, but must 
be understood in an absolutely concrete manner. The 
actual presence of the Creator is manifested in the claims 
of human life which transcend the individual altogether, 
demands on man which release his deepest instincts for love 
and joyful self-devotion and summon him to discipline 
and self-denying obedience. Above all, the nations are the 
instruments of the Lord of History and the concrete em¬ 
bodiments of his will. In their growth and in their decline, 
in their honor and in their victory, in their fidelity to their 
own divine commission, the religious depth and the divine 
significance of history becomes visible. The nation (Volk) 
is the “ hidden sovereign ” of all human life, the moving 
force and the norm of all human activity, the one all-per¬ 
vading and all-inclusive entity. All the other orders and 
activities of man, such as the state, the family, the economic 
order, culture and international relations, must be con¬ 
ceived and estimated from the point of view of the nation. 
This is the general argument which determines Hirsch’s 
interpretation of human order and of Christian behavior. 
And on this point Hirsch is only a particularly eloquent 
and brilliant exponent of a conviction which has exercised 
a great and enduring influence upon the whole thought of 
German Lutheranism. 

Now the great question with which Hirsch is faced is 
this: Is the Lord of History — of whom man, when he 
boldly steps into the stream of history, is in some dim way 
aware — the same God as the Father of our Lord Jesus 
Christ? The Creator and Preserver who as a condition of 
historical existence demands thoroughgoing compulsion, 
harshness and self-assertion in fighting even to the point of 


78 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

death — is he the same God who in Christ summons us to 
a life of love and freedom? Hirsch does not ignore the ex¬ 
treme tension which these questions hold. But he replies: 
“ The Protestant Christian belongs to the one and the same 
God, both when he hears the call of God in the gospel, and 
when he hears the call of the ‘ Lord of History ’ in the 
great and sacred storm of national events. The meeting 
with God in national existence and in history is the only 
preparation for meeting with God in the gospel /’ 9 

Thus the message of God’s self-sacrificing love, which 
breaks into history from the world beyond, is not a radical 
antithesis to human life within history. Rather it confirms 
and blesses that which the Creator makes known to man in 
the mysterious course of history. The release from the law 
of egocentricity which the word of forgiveness effects does 
not on that account mean a release from the demands of 
history. It is the special privilege of the Christian that 
while rooted in the transcendent sphere of eternity and 
turned toward his neighbor in selfless love he can serve the 
earthly community with a resolution and a total surrender 
possible to no one else. He does not seek to master the 
course of history by so-called “ Christian ” norms; he does 
not stand aside as an indifferent spectator; with gratitude 
he knows that his position in society, and the duties which 
it brings, is the place which God has preordained as his 
place of service. In joyful obedience he adapts himself to 
the divine order of creation, to the people (Volk ), and 
works hard to insure that the call of the Creator to disci¬ 
plined and settled order, to the strengthening of natural 
ties, to the purity of the nation (Volk) and the realization 
of its historical commission shall be heard. Unconditional 
fellowship with God imposes on the Christian the uncondi¬ 
tional obligation to be utterly faithful to the earthly life, 

9 Deutsches Volkstum und evangelischer Glaube , p. 39. 


Continental Protestantism: The Orders 79 

with all the social obligations which it involves. “ Fidelity 
to the Lord becomes the sanctification of fidelity to the 
blood and the people [Voik] or nation.” 10 

In Hirsch’s view this attitude toward the world expresses 
the distinctive character of the Lutheran view of life. The 
Lutheran Christian sees the fleeting and contingent char¬ 
acter, the finitude, and indeed the profound distress and 
torment of the earthly reality and its tasks; he sees how 
utterly remote they are from the kingdom of God. But 
with his heart rooted in this spiritual kingdom, and thus 
released from the bondage of being obliged to seek his own 
salvation, he is free to give himself up wholly to the claims 
of the earthly powers — actually, to Hirsch this means the 
claims of the nation and the state — trusting that here he 
is met by the Lord of History. Thus the answer given by 
Hirsch, and by those who agree with him, might well be 
summed up in his own words: “ This Lutheran view of life 
makes it possible to regard the national political order as 
hallowed by God, that is, as given, supported and required 
by him, made by him the source of creative activity and 
absolute duty, and yet at the same time to regard it quite 
clearly and plainly as a mundane and transitory matter.” 11 
The Barthian theology gives an entirely different an¬ 
swer to this question of a Christian “ theology of the 
orders.” As the Barthian theology itself — so far as its his¬ 
torical genesis is concerned — developed as a powerful 
movement of protest against every form of Christianity 
which gives to man and his world an independent value 
apart from God, let us first of all listen to its protest against 
the attempts which have just been mentioned to give a re¬ 
ligious interpretation of the life of man in society. All 
these and similar attempts deny the universal sovereignty 

10 Ibid., p. 2i. 

11 Hirsch, Christliche Freiheit und politische Bindung, p. 40. 


80 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

of God and the radical sinfulness of the world of man. Al¬ 
though they profess the religious principles of the Refor¬ 
mation they constantly fall into the errors of the Roman 
Catholic separation between nature and supernature, and 
ascribe to the man who has not been born again a knowl¬ 
edge of what is or is not in agreement with the law of God 
which he does not possess. The irrational national law, 
which Hirsch declares to be the will of God, and other 
theories of the order of creation, are not radically opposed 
to the rational natural law of Roman Catholicism, as 
their protagonists think they are; they are only different 
solutions of the same false dilemma. For these theories 
are all attempts to answer the question: In the Christian 
ethic how can we strike a right balance between creation 
and redemption, between nature and grace, reason and 
faith? But what makes this dilemma so dangerous is the 
assumption which lies behind it: that reason and the nat¬ 
ural world may be conceived, more or less, as an independ¬ 
ent entity which receives a Christian sanction. Barth and 
his followers are entirely opposed to this coordination of a 
supposedly independent creation with the word of God in 
Christ of salvation and judgment. The religious aspira¬ 
tions and moral efforts of men, or certain forms of man’s 
social and political life, are in no way a preparation for, nor 
can they manifest an affinity with, the sovereign and free 
grace of God. Indeed, such a way of thinking only con¬ 
firms man in his rebellious self-sufficiency and gives him a 
self-made world where he can evade the sting of the divine 
word. 

When national solidarity, political obedience, the de¬ 
velopment of personality, or any other intra-mundane ideal 
is conceived as the concrete content of the divine will, the 
subordination of all human life to the actual command- 


Continental Protestantism: The Orders 81 

ments of God is destroyed. The law of God is severed from 
the saving word in Christ, and its concrete content is identi¬ 
fied with definite human claims. The national gospel 
comes under the same condemnation as the social gospel 
insofar as in it interest is concentrated upon efforts and 
problems which concern this world alone and upon the 
contribution which Christianity can make toward their so¬ 
lution, and not on the divine word and its message of judg¬ 
ment and grace to fallen man. When the emphasis is laid 
upon evanescent, historically relative factors, men have for¬ 
gotten that this earth, with all that belongs to it, must be 
regarded from the eschatological point of view. The em¬ 
phasis must be removed from man and his world to God as 
judge and redeemer, and to his coming kingdom. From 
this point of view the whole process of history becomes ab¬ 
solutely relative. It becomes evident that all human as¬ 
pirations and activities, all historical events, all organiza¬ 
tions of human relations without exception come under 
the law of nothingness and rebellion against God. 

This charge of diminishing the sovereignty of God is 
directed not only against every attempt to deal with the 
problem of the Christian ethic on the basis of an ontologi¬ 
cal or philosophical theory of human existence which can 
then afterwards — in some way or another — be combined 
with the gospel. It is also leveled against the distinction — 
common in modern Lutheranism — between the spiritual 
and the temporal spheres, insofar as it implies that the do¬ 
minion of Christ is restricted to the inner world of men’s 
hearts and that the organization of human affairs is left to 
the control of practical necessity. This solution, too, denies 
the radical sinfulness of the world, which also pervades the 
social life of man; it limits in an arbitrary manner the to¬ 
talitarian claim of the divine will over all spheres of human 


82 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

life. The fact that it declares that the saving operation of 
God in Christ has no direct reference to life in society erects 
selfmade barriers to the universal claim of God. 

It would, however, be a complete misunderstanding of 
this view if we were to conclude from its ardent protest that 
its attitude toward the questions of the Christian ethos is 
purely negative. On the contrary. But its concern for the 
sovereignty of God’s word leads it to radical abolition of 
all kinds of interpretations of the Christian ethos which try 
to coordinate this solely valid center with other principles. 

There is only one starting point and one center for the 
Christian ethos: the God who reveals himself only in Christ 
as Creator, Preserver and Redeemer. But this does not 
mean that God leaves the fallen world outside Christ to it¬ 
self and its own ideas of law. Faith in the sovereign God 
includes confidence in the mighty working of providence, 
which, in spite of all human and superhuman rebellion, 
leads world history toward its eschatological end. In his 
long-suffering God preserves this world — which is so 
deeply entangled in sin and so far gone in apostasy — in 
Christ and for Christ. In the midst of all the disorder and 
the chaos of the world faith holds firmly to the fact that 
God is and remains One who in hiddenness and secrecy 
orders all that happens. The central motif and the distinc¬ 
tive character of the Christian ethos consist in witnessing 
to his honor and glory in the paradoxical garment of hu¬ 
man sinfulness. And this unconditional obedience to the 
divine claim to absolute sovereignty is the only basis and 
boundary of all earthly fidelity. 

What, then, does this active obedience to the will of the 
One who orders all things actually mean in concrete terms? 
The dynamic conception of the free operation of the “ or- 
dinator,” who summons men to obedience in the perpetual 
change of historical situations and callings, excludes pre- 


Continental Protestantism: The Orders 83 

conceived opinions and ethical systems. It rules out 
every kind of Christian world-view or any kind of estab¬ 
lished scale of values according to which historical events 
and human institutions could be judged. With great 
energy it is maintained that the Holy Scriptures form the 
only source of knowledge for Christian thought and con¬ 
duct. Their revelation of the will of God, exemplified in 
the Ten Commandments, in the Sermon on the Mount, in 
the apostolic exhortations, and so forth, constitutes the guid¬ 
ing principle of Christian conduct and no immanent prin¬ 
ciples or any personifications of the ordinances of the world. 
What the divine order means in the family, the state and 
society, understood in the sense of a personal concrete call, 
here and now, can be known and affirmed only in an obe¬ 
dient listening to the Scriptures, under the leading of the 
Holy Spirit. 

It is therefore only in the Christian community that the 
divine word of judgment and of grace, and its concrete in¬ 
structions, is perceived in joyful thankfulness and penitent 
obedience. It is within the Christian community, among 
sinners who are waiting for the coming kingdom of God, 
that God himself, in wonderful grace, gives the fulfillment 
of his commandments through Christ. The man who has 
not been born again does not know the law of God, nor 
does he obey it. But this fact of rebellion against God, 
which constitutes the basic character of the world, does not 
remove one jot or tittle from the totalitarian claim of the 
divine lawgiver; God remains Lord over the whole world. 
For this reason, therefore, the church is under the obliga¬ 
tion to testify boldly to the whole world to her faith in God 
as her Lord who is at the same time Creator, Judge and Re¬ 
deemer, and in the midst of an unbelieving world to erect 
the signs of his majesty. “ The church would not be the 
church,” says Karl Barth in a characteristic passage, “ if 


84 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

not merely in her existence, but also in her doctrine and in 
her attitude, the law of God, his commandments, his ques¬ 
tions, his exhortations, his accusations were not also visible 
and tangible for the world, for the state and for society, un¬ 
less its message of the grace of the Triune God . . . were, 
as such, a prophetic witness to the will of God, against all 
sinful arrogance and against all the lawlessness and injus¬ 
tice of man.” 12 

Finally, we must indicate a third method of approach to 
our present subject. The tendency which was first men¬ 
tioned resulted in a social ethic which combined the Chris¬ 
tian message, in one way or another, with other principles 
and in consequence diminished either its uniqueness or its 
universality. The second theory proclaimed the exclusive 
revelation of God in Christ, but appeared to deny the legiti¬ 
macy of a Christian ethic of the orders. To carry this some¬ 
what schematic division a little further, let us now indicate 
a third tendency which also takes God’s self-revelation in 
Christ as its starting point, but from that very point of view 
maintains that it is able to develop a specifically Christian 
interpretation of social institutions . 13 Some indications of 
the general line of argument may throw some further light 

12 “ Evangelium und Gesetz,” Theologische Existent Heute, No. 32, 
p. 11. 

is We must, however, add that the Christocentric ethic of the life of 
the orders often slips into the view which was mentioned first of all — 
the view of the two poles — which regards the common life of man as a 
more or less self-contained order of creation (or natural order) governed by 
its own principles, which it tries to combine with the “ order of redemp¬ 
tion ” of the church. This recurring inconsequence is perhaps most strik¬ 
ingly expressed in the actual conception of church and state and their 
mutual relations. Even among the representatives of this group there is 
a tendency from time to time to allow phrases like “ the self-preservation of 
the state ” and “ realization of the historical mission of the nation ” and 
similar formulas to be conceived as independent ethical principles which 
do not affect the Christian ethic but have to be taken simply as an in¬ 
disputable norm of creation. 


Continental Protestantism: The Orders 85 

upon the complicated network of assumptions which de¬ 
termine political thought within continental Protestantism 
at the present day. 

The starting point of this conception is suggested in the 
following words of Brunner: “We can only rightly under¬ 
stand the God-given orders which make life possible even 
for the heathen (although he perceives their origin and 
their meaning only very indistinctly) through Jesus or the 
Holy Scriptures, as divine orders and therefore as God’s 
rules for our behavior in society .” 14 God’s reconciliation 
with man in Christ is the only center of all Christian life 
and truth. But from this center new light streams forth 
upon the darkness of the fallen world which unveils its 
hidden meaning. 

It is an inalienable part of the Christian faith that the 
God who reveals his redeeming love in Christ is always and 
everywhere at work as the almighty Creator who is unceas¬ 
ingly creating something new in history and in the world 
in spite of its rebellion against him, who in spite of its dis¬ 
order and its hostility does not let the world fall into decay 
but graciously preserves it for his purpose of redemption. 
New light also falls upon the ordered structure of human 
life in the family, commercial life, the state, etc. These 
orders must be understood not as forming an ethically neu¬ 
tral framework of personal life but as agents of a definite 
divine purpose. They are instruments by means of which 
God re-creates the life of humanity and preserves it for its 
meeting with Christ. Since these orders erect objective 
barriers against human caprice and self-seeking, and pro¬ 
vide concrete opportunities for community and the service 
of one’s neighbor, they form an excellent means for the 
educative love of God. The family, the nation, the state, 
etc., “ are not merely particular spheres of human life, 

14 Natur und Gnade, p. 6, n. i. 


86 Christian Faith and the Modern State 


within which we are to act, but ‘ orders ’ in accordance 
with which we have to act, because in them — even if only 
in a fragmentary and indirect way — God’s will meets 
us.” 15 In them a divine gift and a divine imperative meet 
man. 

These words of Brunner point to the obvious fact that 
the existing orders are in no way identical with the divine 
intention for them. The forces of evil are not only opera¬ 
tive in the hearts and the motives of man, but are also 
interwoven with all social institutions. Human sinfulness 
and superhuman evil have become crystallized in the or¬ 
dered relations among human beings and have destroyed 
their divine meaning. All Christian life, therefore, means 
the life of a redeemed sinner in an ambiguous and demonic 
environment, where even the purest motives have sin¬ 
ful effects and where only the certainty of divine forgive¬ 
ness can give joyfulness for aggressive action. But this cer¬ 
tainty of forgiveness, in which the Christian boldly regards 
his calling as a divine vocation, does not imply a quietistic 
acceptance of the existing situation. It is impossible to 
combine the Christian ethos with any unreserved fidelity 
to any earthly authority, with any uncritical acceptance of 
existing conditions. In the complexity of social life, where 
the creative activity of God is always entangled with evil, 
faith is assigned an extremely diacritical and selective 
function. 

What is the standard for the Christian judgment on so¬ 
ciety? It is the divine meaning of the orders, “ as it dis¬ 
closes itself in listening to the word of God concerning man 
and the world.” 16 Thence comes the possibility of a con¬ 
crete ethic of the social order which illuminates the con¬ 
stant flow of the common life, its institutions and its move- 

15 Brunner, Das Gebot und die Ordnungen, p. 275. 

16 Althaus, Theologie der Ordnungen, p. 31. 


Continental Protestantism: The Orders 87 

merits in the light of the ordering will of God . 17 From this 
point of view, then, it becomes possible to distinguish be¬ 
tween that which is relatively better or worse in political 
and economic organization, in the moral and cultural life 
of society. From this point of view, too, it is the privilege 
and the duty of Christians — as instruments of God for the 
realization of his sovereign love — to work for a constant 
transformation of human institutions, in the sense of bring¬ 
ing all into closer conformity with his divine will. Per¬ 
sonal sanctification cannot be severed from the “ hallowing 
of the orders there must be an unbroken struggle against 
the concrete demonic forces in political, social and inter¬ 
national life. 

This does not mean, however, a moralistic perfectionism 
or the setting up of the kingdom of God on earth by human 
effort. God himself is the sole Lord of this conflict. And 
so long as history shall last the forces of evil will offer em¬ 
bittered resistance and will try to recapture the spheres of 
individual and social life. The fight will rage with pe¬ 
culiar intensity wherever Christian faith and Christian vo¬ 
cation have introduced a purifying and sanctifying influ¬ 
ence. Thus the Christian life within the framework of the 
orders remains filled with eschatological tension and points 
beyond itself to a new heaven and a new earth which God 
himself will create in his own time. 

This third conception also implies that the true mean¬ 
ing of human social life will only be disclosed in the light 
of Christ. Only he “ whose eyes have been opened by 
Christ ” 18 can believe — against all the empirical reality 
of immeasurable suffering, hatred and injustice — that 

17 The most thorough attempt down to the present time to erect a 
modern social ethic upon these general premises is Professor Emil Brun¬ 
ner’s comprehensive work. Das Gebot und die Ordnungen (Eng. trans.. The 
Divine Imperative ). 

is Brunner, Natur und Gnade, p. 14. 


88 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

God realizes his ordering love in and through human 
agents and institutions. The man who has never been 
born again remains in rebellion against God; his eyes are 
blind to the will of God and he sees only that which affects 
his own welfare, even when he directs his gaze toward 
heaven. To use Luther’s expressive phrase, man is “ hud¬ 
dled up within himself,” and he can be converted to true 
humanity and community only by an act of sovereign grace. 
We here see the anthropology of the Reformation with its 
severe judgment on man. 

But does this conception mean that all human insight, all 
human efforts, apart from Christ are included in one sweep¬ 
ing condemnation as radically opposed to God? Does it 
mean that the natural man has no insight into the right 
order of things, and that whether he works for peace or war, 
for social justice or selfish gain, for better family life or 
moral corruption, is a matter of indifference to God? This 
question is answered in the following way. 

The mysterious fact of the selfish rebellion of man 
against his Creator (which is the heart of all sin) with its 
poisonous effects upon human character and upon relations 
between human beings has in point of fact drawn man 
wholly away from God. Therefore it is impossible to speak 
of the relation between natural man and God in terms of 
gradualness and continuity. But the fact that the human 
knowledge of the will of God is perverted does not mean 
that it has been entirely destroyed; in however fragmentary 
and ambiguous a manner, the law of God is written upon 
the heart of man in indelible characters. The hidden God 
manifests himself to man in his religious idols and in his 
moral ideals, in his feeling for justice, in his capacity for 
statesmanship and the shaping of culture; thus, whether 
man is aware of it or not, God uses him to serve his own 
ends. Therefore it is also possible to speak of an external 


Continental Protestantism: The Orders 89 

realization of the ordering will of God even among non- 
Christians, even in the sphere of religious revolt against 
God. For this reason, over wide stretches of human life 
there can prevail an agreement between the Christian and 
the non-Christian ethos, even though in their central mo¬ 
tives and their final aims they are totally different. It is 
this external approximation in the field of discontinuity of 
which Brunner is thinking, for instance, when he says that 
God’s order of creation in marriage “ can also to some ex¬ 
tent be realized by those who do not know the God who 
is revealed in Christ .” 19 

Thus this current of Protestant social thinking has a 
peculiar dialectical attitude toward the natural man and 
his efforts for social and political transformation. It main¬ 
tains that the non-Christian world does not know the real 
meaning of all human institutions which has been revealed 
in Christ, and therefore that it always distorts it. But be¬ 
ing aware of God’s hidden working within all human 
efforts and movements, it does not lose sight of the ele¬ 
ments of truth and the relative approximation to the will 
of God which these movements contain. The Christian 
message about the orders does not refer only to believers; 
since it witnesses to the ordering will of God it gives guid¬ 
ance, warning and encouragement to the whole world, 
whether the latter recognizes or ignores it. But this guid¬ 
ance in moral, social and political matters is not severed 
from the central message of the gospel. Ruthlessly it lays 
bare the sinful heart which lies behind the highest form of 
culture and behind the most ardent service to one’s nation 
or people; it is a summons to repentance and change of 
mind. It proclaims that outward conformity to the order¬ 
ing intentions of God does not save man from his aliena¬ 
tion from God, but points to the true conformity to the will 
is Ibid., p. 17. 


90 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

of the One who creates the orders which is given in Christ’s 
forgiveness of our sins. 

The individual issues which this third approach to the 
problem of the social order includes cannot be expounded 
here. Our attention must, however, be directed to an im¬ 
portant distinction which is far more than a terminological 
subtlety and which in point of fact works out in two com¬ 
pletely different doctrines of the state. While some of the 
thinkers of this group regard all the different institutions 
of social life as “ orders of creation,” or sometimes as 
“ orders for preservation,” others lay the greatest emphasis 
upon the sharpest distinction between, on the one hand, 
the family, the people, art, culture, and so on, as rightly 
belonging to God’s created order, and, on the other hand, 
the state and the law as belonging to the order of preserva¬ 
tion. The nerve of this distinction is the statement that 
whereas marriage, for instance, is directly rooted in the 
intention of the Creator, the state can only be understood 
as existing upon the basis of sin as an indispensable but 
negative instrument of the divine preservation of the world 
against the disruptive forces of evil. The far-reaching con¬ 
sequences of this distinction will become clear in the chap¬ 
ter which deals with the Calvinistic doctrine of the state. 


VIII 

LUTHERANISM AND THE STATE 


S ince the end of the war in 1918, continental Lutheran¬ 
ism has been wrestling with the problem of church and 
state with a vigor greater, possibly, than it had ever exer¬ 
cised during the whole course of its existence. During the 
last year or two in particular and (for obvious reasons) es¬ 
pecially in Germany the question of the state and the na¬ 
tion (Volk ), and the Christian significance of these institu¬ 
tions, has been studied and discussed with still greater 
earnestness. A whole mass of publications of all kinds — 
books and pamphlets and articles — as well as public state¬ 
ments by ecclesiastical bodies, show how serious and pro¬ 
longed is this process of searching for a new understanding 
of the church, the nation (or the people) and the state. 
Some preliminary observations, however, will show that it 
is far from easy to give a comprehensive survey of the pre¬ 
vailing characteristics of this process. 

In spite of the fact that all schools of thought make a com¬ 
mon appeal to the principles of the Lutheran Reformation, 
there is no consensus on the question of what actually con¬ 
stitutes the genuine Lutheran conception of the state. The 
preceding chapter has shown us what divergences of opin¬ 
ion already exist in the sphere of ultimate convictions. We 
do not need much imagination to perceive that the concep¬ 
tions of the ordering of human life which will be held by a 
Lutheran of the “ German Christian ” group (like Hirsch 
for instance), on the one hand, and by a Barthian Lutheran 
on the other, must inevitably work out in completely differ- 

91 


92 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

ent views of the state. Hence the conflicting doctrines of 
church and state are not merely variations of one common 
fundamental theme, nor can they be explained simply as 
a difference of emphasis. Such a simplification of the con¬ 
troversy would never do justice to this tragic situation 
which compels each side — on conscientious grounds — to 
reproach the other, saying: “ Your spirit is utterly different 
from ours! We have neither part nor lot with you! ” 

So far as German Lutheranism is concerned, not for one 
moment must we forget the special background of this con¬ 
troversy— which explains its existential character and 
many of its peculiar features — namely, the whole impact 
of the National Socialist regime. The reflex effects of this 
sweeping revolution even upon the church, on its witness, 
its organization, and its possibilities of influencing public 
life in the Christian direction, are well known. 1 This 
wholly changed situation has forced the German churches 
to rethink the question of their relation to the state as well 
as that of the Christian’s duty in political life. And in this 
process of reorientation the desire to relate the message and 
the life of the church to the new situation has produced — 
especially on the side of Lutheranism — new tendencies 
and theories which, at least in part, appear to be simply a 
theological superstructure based on a political and racial 
ideology. The Christian conception of the task and the 
limits of the state, especially in its relation to the church, 
has therefore become a greater field of controversy within 
German Lutheranism than ever before. Lutheranism, 
however, is not a peculiarly German form of Christianity. 
In Scandinavian Lutheranism, for instance, we find a piety, 
a theology and an empirical relation between church and 
state which in many respects represent a distinctive type 

1 Cf. Keller’s description in Church and State on the European Con¬ 
tinent. 


Lutheranism and the State 93 

and for that very reason throw new light upon the political 
ethic of Lutheranism. Unfortunately, however, the dis¬ 
tinctive position of Scandinavian Lutheranism has never 
been adequately stated or described. 

A further element in this situation — and one which 
makes the ecumenical understanding and estimate of the 
Lutheran position more difficult — is the following fact, 
which is more than a methodological peculiarity. In much 
recent Lutheran literature it is constantly asserted that 
there is no general and universal Christian opinion on po¬ 
litical matters; Christian reflection on the question of the 
state is legitimate only in reference to a particular moment 
and a concrete national and political situation. The fol¬ 
lowing statement of a representative neo-Lutheran may 
serve to illustrate this point: “ The Christian message con¬ 
cerning the state always refers to the concrete actual situa¬ 
tion of a particular state at a particular time. From the 
theological point of view we speak rightly about the state at 
the present day only when we start, not from an abstract 
conception of the state, but from the concrete reality of the 
German national state [ Volksstaat ] as a historical fact of our 
present experience.” 2 Behind this methodological thesis 
there lies a peculiar theory of history, a profound convic¬ 
tion of the distinctive and incommensurable character of 
the historically contingent situations as given by the 
Creator — a feature of the thought of continental neo- 
Protestantism which is particularly prominent in German 
Lutheranism. The evident advantages of this theory are 
realism and concreteness; the equally evident danger is 
that ethical reflection on the particular situation will rest 
satisfied with a more or less phenomenological description 
inserted into a theological frame of reference and then hal¬ 
lowed by a Christian sanction. For this reason other Lu- 

2 Althaus, Kirche und Staat nach Lutherischer Lehre, p. 7. 


94 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

therans lay more emphasis upon the fact that the Christian 
message contains a revelation of the will of God for the 
political order which is of universal and abiding relevance. 
It is obvious that this proclamation of the religious signifi¬ 
cance of the state must be reformulated in every generation 
and made concrete with the aid of the best Christian 
thought of the time; but in its essential content it is not af¬ 
fected by particular situations. It provides binding stand¬ 
ards and criteria for every kind of Christian judgment on 
and attitude toward political questions. Thus the national 
and political factors which distinguish Christians and 
churches from one another are not to be regarded as ir¬ 
relevant, yet on the other hand they are wholly subordi¬ 
nate to the supra-national and ecumenical community. 

These preliminary observations have shown that the Lu¬ 
theran doctrine of the state does not present any uniform 
body of thought, but that, on the contrary, at the present 
moment it is in a condition of great ferment and conflict. 
It is true of course, as we have already noted, that the ap¬ 
peal to the Lutheran Reformation and its confessional 
statements, and the use of Lutheran forms of thought, give 
a certain common framework to the controversy. And 
further, at least to a certain extent it would be possible to 
write a description of the general tendencies of Lutheran 
political thought from an external point of view by sug¬ 
gesting the conceptions of the state from which it differs. 
But every representation of its content would immediately 
confirm the statement that in point of fact, even in respect 
of the problems of the political ethic, many different at¬ 
titudes exist all of which claim to be “ Lutheran.” 

How does contemporary Lutheranism conceive the di¬ 
vine sanction and the significance of the state in human 
life? Instead of analyzing the particular conflicting cur¬ 
rents of thought in detail, it will be better for our purpose 


Lutheranism and the State 95 

to try to give a kind of mosaic both of the general temper 
and of some of the chief issues; only at some important 
points will we deal with the existing differences of opinion 
in detail. 

Some recent attempts of two representatives of the neo- 
Lutheran “ middle way ” will serve to bring out clearly 
the general direction of Lutheran thought. Althaus, in his 
explanation of the political ethos, says that both that view 
of politics which ignores ethics altogether and that view of 
ethics which is wholly nonpolitical should be regarded as 
a Scylla and Charybdis which must at all costs be avoided. 3 
In different ways both give a wrong idea of the relation be¬ 
tween religion and politics. The Lutheran conception 
does not place the political life outside moral sanctions, in 
the form of a separation between personal piety and an un¬ 
critical submission to the demands of a state which ignores 
the claims of morality. It does not in any way sanction a 
Machiavellian policy of domination. “ There is a brand 
of political autonomy which is not of God but of the 
devil. ... At every step, therefore, politics which is re¬ 
lated to the will of God must resist this demonic autonomy, 
and will have to fight against those who have fallen under 
its sway.” 

But there is a negative element of truth in this moral 
skepticism in the political sphere, namely, that the ethical 
obligations of political life cannot be laid down and fixed 
once for all in a universally applicable system. These ob¬ 
ligations vary with changing concrete situations and per¬ 
sonal responsibilities. The purely ethical point of view, 
on the other hand, which ignores politics altogether and 
tests everything by its own abstract standards distorts the 
statement of the problem. Those who hold this view for- 

3 Cf. Grundriss der Ethik, p. 104, and his article, “ Politik und Moral,” 
in the encyclopedia Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (2nd ed.). 


96 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

get that one’s ethical position is necessarily different in 
strictly personal relations and in the objective relations of 
groups. In its Christian form it often isolates a partial truth 
— like the Sermon on the Mount, for instance — from the 
context of the Christian revelation as a whole, and gives it 
an absolute and legalistic interpretation. It then pro¬ 
claims this code of Christian principles as a norm which can 
be applied to the world as a whole. Others, again, are con¬ 
tent to believe that this principle can be applied only in 
private life and in the purely personal sphere. Inevitably 
this idea suggests that politics is fundamentally non- 
Christian and should at all costs be avoided. The Christian 
ethic must therefore find a way between these two ex¬ 
tremes of an ethical view which misinterprets the peculiar 
dynamic of the political sphere, and a view of politics 
which ignores the claims of morality. 

The argument has of course a much wider reference than 
Lutheranism. But we can approach the Lutheran posi¬ 
tion more closely if we delimit and define our subject in 
greater detail. Wendland maintains that the various con¬ 
flicting views on this subject within contemporary German 
Protestantism do converge at one point — and this in a 
very significant manner — namely, in their common rejec¬ 
tion of the following conceptions of the state (an assump¬ 
tion which would apply a fortiori to Lutheranism) : the 
anarchist theory with its radical negation of the state; 
utopian humanism, according to which in a future stage of 
human history the state will no longer be necessary, since 
it will have been rendered superfluous by a society based 
upon perfect reason and justice; a conservative romanti¬ 
cism which believes in a “ Christian state ” and misinter¬ 
prets the strictly temporal character of the political order 
and its distinction from the kingdom of God; the Catholic 
state doctrine with its premises of natural law and its sub- 


Lutheranism and the State 97 

ordination of the state to the church; and, finally, the secu¬ 
lar view of the state, which either turns the state into an 
idol or depreciates it as a merely “ auxiliary apparatus of 
society.” 4 

Now, what are the positive presuppositions for this point 
of view? All the currents of contemporary Lutheran 
thought — and at this central point they are in agreement 
with other Christian bodies — are agreed that the state is a 
divine institution with special authority in the communal 
life of man. But in more concrete terms, what is the signifi¬ 
cance and the character of this institution? The answer 
must be sought in the searchlight of the Christian faith as 
a whole. Following a familiar line of argument, Lutheran 
thinkers try to answer this question by asking what the 
fundamental statements of the Christian creed — God’s 
creative and ordering operation in all human life; the 
mysterious destructive power of evil, which separates man 
from God and from his neighbor; the redeeming presence 
of God in Christ and his kingdom — imply for the meaning 
of the state and of man’s attitude toward the state?. 

As the preceding chapter has already shown, it is our 
understanding of these objects of ultimate belief, in their 
distinction and in their conjunction, which in every case 
determines the perspective and the content of the political 
ethic. Beneath the variety of overlapping interpretations 
we may distinguish two main positions. Many Lutherans 
regard the state as an “ order of creation.” Like the other 
social forms of life which form part and parcel of man’s 
equipment, the state with its authoritative exercise of power 
and of law is a manifestation of the will of God as Creator. 
Like them, perverted by human arrogance and self- 
sufficiency, in all its empirical forms it is a corpus mixtum 

4 Cf. his Das Staatsproblem in der deutschen Theologie der Gegen- 
wart, p. 5. 


98 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

of good and evil whose true function can be realized only 
under the influence of Christ. Others regard the state 
mainly as an “ order of preservation,” its peculiar sanction 
lying in the fact that it has been instituted by God as a 
dam which prevents the inrush of the destructive effects of 
evil in the social sphere. It is thus regarded as an “ emer¬ 
gency order,” which only prevents complete chaos by its 
exercise of compulsion and force. The state therefore 
stands in a peculiar position, in which it differs from the 
other forms of social life: its compulsive and its preserving 
function is imperative for this sinful era, and, indeed, it 
cannot be avoided; but it is mainly negative in character. 

The general Lutheran view of the state at the present 
time regards the impulse which leads to the formation of 
the state as an integral part of the equipment of man, given 
by the Creator. The state is based upon the social nature 
of man; it is the product of the will to community. It is a 
social objectification of the impulse to order which is in¬ 
herent in all the activities and institutions of human life. 

Even the state is primarily a peculiar way of being united 
to one another in an order. Thus it is based upon the divine 
creation and belongs at the same time to the idea of man. The 
impulse and the ability to create states is inherent in human 
nature, that is, in the fact that man has been created as man. 
. . . Man cannot exist apart from the state. That is the mean¬ 
ing of the ancient statement that man is a “ political animal.” 5 

The state is the institution which orders the life of man in 
community. That which gives its peculiar quality to the 
ordering activity of the state, however, is the fact that it 
reflects the power and the justice of the Creator; it is this 
which constitutes the dignity and the immense responsi¬ 
bility of all political government. Thus the complex in¬ 
stinct of authority and obedience deeply rooted in the so- 
6 Wendland, Die Nation vor Gott, pp. 180-81. 


Lutheranism and the State 


99 

ciality of man is in itself not an effect produced by evil but 
is a gift of the Creator. In the Lutheran tradition one 
frequently hears it said that the state is an instrument of 
the fatherly rule of God. 

Political authority, therefore, has an organic relation 
with the various different associations in which the social 
tendency of man is fulfilled. It does not approach the other 
social institutions from the outside as an entirely foreign 
power. Thus the assertion that the state is based upon the 
rule of God as Creator means not only that every claim of 
the state to be a “ mortal god ” is disallowed, but also that 
its activity is connected with the various forms of social 
life. And since social life as a whole is involved in an un¬ 
ceasing process of dynamic change, it is likewise natural 
that the forms, institutions and obligations of political life 
should change with the changes in the historical process and 
should be constantly readjusting themselves to fresh ex¬ 
pressions of social life. 

It is characteristic of a large section of Lutheranism, es¬ 
pecially in Germany, that it interprets this intimate rela¬ 
tion between the political order and human society as a 
whole as a divine sanction of the national state (Volksstaat ). 
In a passage in which Althaus is trying to argue that the fact 
that this view goes beyond the traditional Lutheran con¬ 
ception of the state as authority ( Obrigkeit ) is necessitated 
by the changed historical situation, he expresses this idea 
in the following illuminating form: 

The state is the state of our own people (or nation), not 
only destined for it, but in its actual form born out of the very 
character of the people, ministering not only to the peace, but 
also to the self-knowledge and the development of the nation 
[Volk] in its own distinctive life. Its dignity is not only that 
of the order of law, as such, but it is also that of the history, 
the life and the vocation of this nation [Volk]. It demands 
and effects not only obedience to the law, but love, a heartfelt 


ioo Christian Faith and the Modern State 

devotion to the life which supports us and has been entrusted 
to us, to the inheritance of our fathers and the life of our chil¬ 
dren. Thus the political sphere fills and claims man as a 
whole. 6 

We will return to this point later. 

Thus the state is conceived as based upon the good di¬ 
vine creation. But only discursive reflection in the light 
of faith can distinguish this aspect of political life from the 
fact that in manifold ways the state testifies to the truth 
that man has fallen away from his Creator. Lutheran 
thinkers lay stress on the fact — though with varying de¬ 
grees of emphasis — that the state has a particular connec¬ 
tion with the diabolical realities of life. Gogarten says 
decidedly, “ Where evil is ignored it is impossible to know 
anything about the basis of the state and its majesty.” 7 
These words are inspired by the message of the Reforma¬ 
tion concerning the horrifying depths of evil in the world. 
Man’s secret longing to be his own God, his loveless desire 
for self-affirmation, pours forth from his heart and irre¬ 
sistibly permeates both his personal and his corporate life. 
Not only is man opposed to man in a state of permanent 
conflict, but the ruthless struggle for life and death be¬ 
tween social institutions and collective interests is evident 
manifestation that this world “ lieth in the evil one.” 
Apart from this realistic view the religious significance of 
the state cannot be fully grasped. In a chaotic world, where 
community, love and service are always mingled with their 
opposites, where the highest culture and the noblest en¬ 
deavors continually reveal the hybris of the individual and 
the collective ego, the political order is entrusted with the 
unique task of protecting humanity from self-destruction. 
To quote once more from the writings of two thinkers 

6 Die deutsche Stunde der Kirche, p. 28. 

7 Politische Ethik, p. 210. 


Lutheranism and the State 101 

whose contributions have had a great influence upon the 
modem Lutheran theology of the state: 

The state is that order by means of which man tries to secure 
his position against the forces of chaos and destruction which 
menace his existence within the world, and indeed, against the 
destructive forces which issue from his own nature. 8 

The state, that is, government in the form of law, according 
to Lutheran doctrine, although everywhere established and ad¬ 
ministered by man, is a divine order by means of which in a 
world of sin and conflict God preserves humanity from falling 
into chaos and makes life in community possible. 9 

Hence it would be inadequate, and indeed misleading, 
to consider the state solely as an institution which coordi¬ 
nates and furthers human interests and human activities, or 
even as the concrete social form of the will to commu¬ 
nity. The lack of fellowship and good will, and still more, 
the absolutely demonic will to self-sufficiency, conflict, do¬ 
minion at others’ cost, gives the state the quality of a pro¬ 
tective wall or a strait jacket. Since it checks the worst 
effects of social evil, it is a divine antidote to the menacing 
catastrophe of social disintegration. The positive task, 
namely, the furtherance of genuinely social tendencies and 
efforts, is therefore inseparable from the repressive task of 
the resistance of antisocial forces. And in face of this im¬ 
mense opposition to community and harmonious coopera¬ 
tion which is raging within society the political authority 
is forced to assume the form of compulsory authority in 
order somehow to be able to fulfill its task aright. In this 
empirical world the ultima ratio of the sword is a tragic 
but unavoidable necessity for the preservation of law and 
order. 

In the light of these considerations the derivation of the 

s Gogarten, Politische Ethik, p. 58. 

9 Althaus, Die Kirche und das Staatsproblem in der Gegenwart, p. 6. 


102 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

state from the fatherly rule of God (which has already been 
mentioned) stands out still more clearly. The harshness 
and suffering, the insoluble dilemmas and tragic conflicts 
of conscience which all political life involves, constitute a 
reminder, which cannot be ignored, of the “ fallen ” state 
of mankind. With a humble sense of his own weakness 
and sinfulness the Christian cannot help seeing the chastis¬ 
ing hand of God in the compulsory administration of law 
and the maintenance of order in public life. In the sword 
of compulsion he sees a divine instrument of vengeance 
wielded against man for his transgression of the divine will. 
But this is not the final word. The fact that God does not 
abandon humanity to its attempts at self-destruction but 
makes a certain measure of peace and order possible 
through the existence of the state is certainly a token of his 
long-suffering and his mercy. Behind the mask of political 
government the fatherly goodness of God is at work. 

The existence of the state is based upon the love and the jus¬ 
tice of God, and on the conscious or unconscious faith of hu¬ 
man beings (that is, in the numinous power behind the state), 
even when they only submit with reluctance to the authority of 
the state. For the Christian, however, this belief in a power 
behind the state becomes gratitude to God for the fact that the 
state thus becomes a “ means of grace,” by protecting the Word 
and the Sacraments, and by furthering the genuine exercise of 
one’s vocation. 10 

These words of a Swedish Lutheran, which suggest a very 
close relation between the political order and the constitu¬ 
tive functions of the church as these are conceived in the 
Lutheran doctrine, indicate the ultimate sanction of the 
state, namely, that its function of preserving order in hu¬ 
man society is not an end in itself, but t^kes place in the 
light of Christ. But before we study this question in closer 
10 Runestam, Die Kirche und das Staatsproblem in der Gegenwart , 
p. 117. 


Lutheranism and the State 103 

detail we must turn our attention to some aspects of the 
Lutheran conception of the state which have already re¬ 
ceived cursory mention. 

From the days of Luther onward the Lutheran tradition 
has always described the civil authority as the “ Obrig- 
keit.” 11 What does this mean? We have already alluded 
to the tendency to conceive the common life as a whole in 
terms of super- and sub-ordination, of the exercise of au¬ 
thority and obedient response. Now the specific character 
of Obrigkeit (authority) lies in the fact that it is a public 
office “ above,” and also in a certain sense “ over against,” 
all other offices and callings. Precisely because the state 
has a peculiar task it must claim supreme authority over 
social life. Without a stable government which can inspire 
loyalty and respect and, if necessary, weld together and di¬ 
rect the various conflicting forces, society would inevitably 
be exposed to the danger of anarchy. The fact that the 
state is, and indeed must be, Obrigkeit (authority) implies 
that it is the organ, or in other words the group of persons, 
which possesses the right of supreme command and final 
decision within the community. Part of the inviolable dig¬ 
nity of political authority lies in the fact that its right to 
govern is not derived from any earthly power but from God 
alone. 

The corollary of this conception of the Obrigkeit as an 
organ of sovereign and personal decision is the claim that 
in the last resort responsibility for the direction of the state 
does not belong to the nation, nor to public opinion, nor 
to any class or party; the state is responsible for the com¬ 
munity, in the sight of God and of his sovereign will. The 
subordination of the political authority to any partial func- 

11 Like the word Volk, Obrigkeit belongs to that class of words in the 
German language for which no adequate equivalent can be found in other 
languages, since it is impossible to suggest the peculiar associations and 
feelings which this word evokes in German-speaking countries. 


104 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

tion of society, whether that of finance or anything else, is 
accordingly regarded as a serious failure of the state in its 
God-given task, a failure which tends to denude it of po¬ 
litical substance. The supremacy of the government over 
the social forces, its power to differentiate and direct, if 
necessary even against the popular will, constitutes its 
moral responsibility. This insistence on the authoritarian 
character of the state, which has been described by a Lu¬ 
theran as “ self-evident for Christian teaching,” 12 corre¬ 
sponds with an insistence upon voluntary obedience and 
willing service as the main political virtue. In obedient 
submission to the rules and ordinances of the authority of 
the state, man recognizes that its authority is based upon 
a supra-human reality. 

There can be no doubt that this conception of political 
authority has frequently led to a persistent conservatism 
and to an acquiescence in existing conditions. The un¬ 
qualified assertion that the powers that be are ordained of 
God leads all too easily to toleration of every existing au¬ 
thority in all its ways. But such tolerance is not inevitable. 
Lutherans lay more and more stress on the fact that po¬ 
litical loyalty, if it is to remain personal, cannot be com¬ 
bined with any view of the state as absolute. Disobedience 
to the ordinances of the state when they cannot be recon¬ 
ciled with the demands of conscience, as well as resistance 
to obvious injustice and caprice, does not mean that obedi¬ 
ence is renounced or that the state is denied; rather it is the 
affirmation of the necessity for and the dignity of genuine 
authority. But the absolute refusal to countenance any 
rebellion against the powers that be, as well as emphasis 
on the fact that the citizen ought to accept without com¬ 
plaint the consequences of his conscientious disobedience, 

12 Wendland, Die Nation vor Gott, p. 187. 


Lutheranism and the State 105 

is further evidence that Lutheranism has a high sense of 
the value of political order as an absolute necessity. 

Thus this traditional theory of the Obrigkeit contains a 
twofold religious motive — although this idea receives var¬ 
ious differing interpretations and is sometimes confused 
with other motives and interests. On the one hand, it is 
insistence on the fact that even the political order of life 
must be regarded not as a product of human effort but as a 
gift from above, gratefully accepted as a manifestation of 
the fatherly rule of God; and, further, it is recognition that 
the world is “ possessed ” by a devil, a fact which makes a 
supreme and invincible authority and strict loyalty toward 
that authority an indispensable guarantee against social 
self-destruction. The Lutheran tradition has directed its 
chief attention to the significance of these religious motives 
for the legitimation of political authority, a legitimation 
which has often found a practical corollary in passive ac¬ 
ceptance of existing political conditions. It is obvious that 
this is a one-sided interpretation. It is hardly necessary to 
point out that these motives also provide a great stimulus 
to citizens of a state to cooperate cordially and intelligently 
with the authorities. 

As a rule Lutheran thinkers regard power and law as the 
constitutive elements of political authority, with the power 
of coercion as an inseparable element logically issuing from 
them. The Roman Catholic tradition interprets the po¬ 
litical realities as being more or less empirical variations of 
the unchangeable structure of the law of nature. What 
has already been said has made it clear that Lutheranism 
has a conception of the constitutive elements of politics 
different from that of either Thomism or modernist Prot¬ 
estantism. Its keener eye for the actuality of and the neces¬ 
sity for power in political life is closely connected with its 


106 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

dynamic view of history and its sense of the need for inde¬ 
pendent decision in political matters, owing to the frailty 
of legal organizations in a world rent by the conflict of 
demonic forces. 13 The state is, and ought to be, a concen¬ 
tration of social power. The exercise of power, which in 
certain cases extends also over the property and the life of 
the citizens, belongs to the nature of the state. 

Not without reason has it been said that this strong em¬ 
phasis on the element of power might well lead to a posi¬ 
tivist theory of law and a religious sanction of the political 
fait accompli; in practice this has frequently been the case. 
But the rejection of the law of nature, at least in its Roman 
Catholic form, does not in any way imply a denial of the 
fact that justice must be the normative principle of politi¬ 
cal authority. The arbitrary seizure and exercise of social 
power does not constitute political authority as such; the 
latter is inseparably connected with law and justice. As 
a rule, even in Lutheran thought, the preservation of a 
legal order is suggested as the primary purpose of the state. 

The extremely difficult question then arises: What are 
the criteria for a Christian judgment of right and wrong in 
the political sphere? The attempts to answer this question 
follow different lines of thought. Although the metaphysi¬ 
cal and theological frame of reference of the Roman Cath¬ 
olic doctrine of natural law is rejected, some thinkers affirm 
the existence of certain elementary moral and legal norms 
of universal and irreversible validity which must be real¬ 
ized by the state if it wishes to claim to be a genuine Obrig- 
keit (authority), norms apart from which it loses its raison 
d'etre. In spite of the great divergences in the sense of 
right and wrong which can be adduced at different periods 

is Lutheran thinkers also emphasize the fact that “ the fundamental 
task of the state is the administration of the law.” Althaus, Die Kirche und 
das Staatsproblem in der Gegenwart, p. 6. 


Lutheranism and the State 107 

and in different countries, working out in extremely dif¬ 
ferent and even contrasting types of legislation and jurisdic¬ 
tion, there is an instinctive consensus concerning not only 
the sacred dignity of the principle of right (or law: Recht ), 
but also, to a great extent, the content of this principle. 
And this natural sense of justice is simply the dawning of 
the perception of the divine law which is written deeply on 
the heart of man. This law is authoritatively confirmed 
and expounded in the second table of the Decalogue. This 
provides a valid formulation of the minimum of law which 
ought to be realized and enforced in the political commu¬ 
nity. 

Others, however, take a different view, and point to the 
relativity of all moral concepts and attitudes. The value 
that justice represents in the life of the community cannot 
be derived from a universally valid set of moral and legal 
norms, even if it were to appeal to a Christian sanction. 
The category of justice itself alone has absolute and uni¬ 
versal validity. 

All historical law is determined by politics, that is, it receives 
its concrete determination and its aim from the historical real¬ 
ity of the nation whose life it has to order. 14 

The individual elements which law contains (the positive 
law) are to a large extent simple moral duties, refracted, how¬ 
ever, in a particular way by concrete conditions of power, civili¬ 
zation and life. Hence the positive law is very largely deter¬ 
mined by historical conditions, and is thus subject to change, 
criticism and continued development. In all this the ideal of 
justice is the guiding principle, both as the standard of criti¬ 
cism and as the motive for the continued development of the 
law. This ideal does not signify an order which is normative 
and binding for all ages (“ natural law ”) which could be ex¬ 
pressed in definite general rules (“ rights of man,” equality, 
etc.). It can never be an empirical fact, but it is laid upon 
each succeeding generation afresh as the duty of the concrete 

14 Althaus, Die Kirche und das Staatsproblem in der Gegenwart, p. 6. 


108 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

fulfillment of the positive law in each new historical situation 
as it arises, with the aim of making it possible for human beings 
to live together in real community in the kingdom of God. But 
although it represents the absolute idea of law in a very frag¬ 
mentary and limited manner, the positive law still has a direct 
share in the inviolable character of law as such. Every breach 
of the law not only sins against the actual statute concerned, 
but also against law as a whole. 15 

Our first quotation illustrates a vital element in the 
newer Lutheran political philosophy, especially in Ger¬ 
many, namely, the widespread tendency to interpret the 
state in terms of the national community (Volksgemein- 
schaft) . Speaking generally, this tendency no longer 
means the maintenance of law and order as conceived in 
the traditional doctrine of Obrigkeit, but rather the dy¬ 
namic realization of the historical destiny of the nation 
(Volk) as the highest ethical principle of political life. In 
our present context it is only possible to outline the general 
argument. Its starting point is the assertion that the fact 
of nationality is based upon the will of the Creator. The 
nations whose free self-development and growth are the in¬ 
tegrating principle of all social life are the chief carriers of 
historical life; the development of their moral and cultural 
individuality, their responsible struggle for the realization 
of their own mission in response to the call of the Creator, 
is the main theme of history. The super-individual char¬ 
acter of the nation, its natural tendencies and its necessities, 
constitute the original fount whence the nature of the state 
is derived; to make the nation secure and further its in¬ 
terests, both within and without, is the will of God for the 
state. The state and its law are the organic form in which 
a nation realizes its historical self-consciousness. The rec¬ 
ognition of the ethical obligations which inhere in the 
natural bonds of the national community ( Volksgemein - 

is Althaus, Grundriss der Ethik, pp. 97-98. 


Lutheranism and the State 109 

schaft) or, to express it rather differently, “ the objective 
national spirit” ( Volksgeist) is accordingly the motive 
force and the critical norm of political activity in all its 
aspects, executive, legislative and judicial. 

Thus this conception of the state seeks the answer in a 
religious interpretation of the nation (Volk) as an order 
of creation. When we assume that the will of God for the 
common life is revealed in the historical events of the na¬ 
tion, the conclusion is inevitable that the political attitude 
of the Christian is also wholly determined by the obliga¬ 
tions of the national ethos. 

As we saw in the preceding chapter, there is a fairly large 
group of Lutherans which, even if with some reservations, 
holds this view. As a rule, however, where this extreme 
conception is rejected as incompatible with the genuinely 
Christian understanding of life, this transference of ethical 
reflection from the state to the nation does not constitute 
a final answer to our question. Since it rightly emphasizes 
the significance of the national factor and the sense of 
nationality for the Christian attitude toward the state, it 
only makes the answer dependent upon another unsolved 
and highly controversial question, namely, the Christian 
understanding of the individual nation and its divine 
vocation. 

Many other Lutherans therefore lay stress on the point 
that the close connection of a particular state with a par¬ 
ticular nation, which is presupposed in this argument, is 
only a historical contingency; hence it cannot determine 
the essential elements of the political ethos. To subordi¬ 
nate political sovereignty to the national destiny in this way 
means that the distinctive authority of the state as a divine 
institution is in danger of being lost. This view also tends 
to ignore another equally important issue in political ethics, 
namely, the common responsibility of statesmen and citi- 


i io Christian Faith and the Modern State 

zens for the establishment of peace and order in the inter¬ 
national as well as in the national sphere. 

This brief survey has indicated some of the chief features 
of the Lutheran conception of the state. Political author¬ 
ity, with its exercise of might and right, must be understood 
— in spite of the fact that it is sometimes terribly entangled 
with the demonic forces of this world — as a manifestation 
of the fatherly rule of God. The task of the state, which is 
to protect and further the interests of the personal life in 
community, gains its central importance through the fact 
that behind the state there stands the Father of our Lord 
Jesus Christ. The will of the Creator and Preserver for the 
political order has been revealed in the working of the 
Redeemer through his church. 

It cannot be denied that at this point the Lutheran tra¬ 
dition is often hesitating. Sometimes it has even gone so 
far as to assent explicitly to a dualism between Christian 
faith and political life, based on the fact that it has not 
always been able to maintain the paradoxical unity be¬ 
tween the Creator and the Redeemer. The sphere of po¬ 
litical activity and legal order, with its harshness and love¬ 
lessness, but at the same time with its peculiar greatness 
and dignity, was regarded as governed by immanental 
principles, while the life of pure love was relegated to the 
inner world of the heart. The majesty of divine power and 
justice, which operates in the state, was severed from the 
suffering and self-sacrificing love which is at the heart of the 
Christian message. Thus the relation between the king¬ 
dom of Christ and the political sphere was regarded as a 
tension of static parallelism and not as a tension of dynamic 
transformation. This view led to the tendency to obey 
without question and with complete fidelity the decisions 
of the state in all public matters, while freedom was claimed 
for the church within her own sphere. The recurring dif- 


Lutheranism and the State i 11 

ficulty in Lutheran political thought of formulating a ho¬ 
mogeneous and distinctively Christian view of the sphere 
of politics is due to this spirit and outlook. 

Within modern Lutheranism, however, there is a grow¬ 
ing emphasis upon the assertion that the will of God for 
the world as Creator and Preserver cannot be perceived 
apart from his redeeming act in Christ. The unfathom¬ 
able mystery of the incarnation, the death and the resurrec¬ 
tion of Christ reveals God to us as a God whose all-conquer¬ 
ing power and consuming holiness is expressed in a lavish 
and generous love toward the rebellious world. In God 
power and justice and love are one, in a paradoxical ten¬ 
sion. In the polarity of might and right, which constitutes 
the state as a divine institution, the loving God is secretly 
at work; in the seeking, forgiving and conquering love 
which constitutes the church as a divine institution, the al¬ 
mighty and just God wrestles with the powers of evil and 
of death. Thus God’s operation in the state is at the service 
of the community of love whose head and king is Christ, 
while, on the other hand, only under the influence of Christ 
can the divine intention of the state be perceived and real¬ 
ized. The relevance of the state for the gospel, in the whole 
extent of its influence upon the individual and the corpo¬ 
rate life, is therefore the final criterion for the Christian 
judgment on political matters. 

This trend of thought in modern Lutheranism, with its 
paradoxical interpretation of the state as an instrument of 
divine love , 16 has no desire to veil the contrast between the 
empirical realities of political life and the community of 
love by cherishing any illusions. Church and state remain 
different in their functions and in their methods. Even 
when the state is able to prevent the worst effects of social 

16 Cf. Runestam, Die Kirche und das Staatsproblem, pp. 116 ff., and 
Wendland, Die Nation vor Gott, p. 191. 


112 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

evil by its powerful control, and thus helps to promote a 
good life in community, it has no competence to exercise 
the office of the church, to proclaim in its witness and in its 
life God’s triumphant victory over the powers of evil. And 
the attempt to mold or to enforce religious conviction by 
political means is foreign to the spirit of the gospel. But 
precisely in its unique quality the presence of the gospel 
in the political order is both a blessing and a judgment. 
It does not mean a denial of political rule. It does not 
annul the demand that power must be restrained by jus¬ 
tice and equity in order that it may not degenerate into the 
caprice of the tyrant or into that demonic spirit which is 
the very antithesis of the gospel. Nor does it deny that 
right must be supported by compulsory power to prevent 
it from becoming ineffective and thus leading to anarchy. 
On the contrary, it makes this demand still more radical, 
since it drives home to the conscience of both the ruler and 
his subjects that the God who has revealed himself in Christ 
as sovereign and holy love is the true ruler of the state. 
The religious conviction that the sword of the state is 
wielded in the “ wrath of love ” (Luther) affirms its legiti¬ 
macy insofar as it is necessary for the proper functioning 
of the state; at the same time it helps us to distinguish those 
methods of coercion which are absolutely incompatible 
with the will of God. 

Thus “ justification by faith ” —which in the Lutheran 
tradition constitutes the center of the Christian faith — 
becomes the source and the principle of a political ethos 
which while waiting for the coming kingdom of God set 
up by God’s own act, where the purpose of the state and the 
church will be fulfilled and transcended, fights for a per¬ 
petual transformation of the political order which will pro¬ 
vide more suitable conditions for a true life, both human 
and Christian. 


IX 

CALVINISTIC VIEWS OF THE STATE 


he effects of the Calvinistic Reformation upon the 



-L political sphere, which both historically and geograph¬ 
ically have been immense, are so well known that they can 
be taken for granted. Calvin’s own attempt to set up a 
Christian state in Geneva itself; the influence of the Cal¬ 
vinistic spirit, in various directions, upon political develop¬ 
ments and constitutions — in Holland, Scotland and the 
United States of America, to mention a few striking ex¬ 
amples — its connection with democratic, liberal and in¬ 
ternational movements and aspirations, are all well known. 
Opinion upon these facts has been greatly divided. Some 
Christian observers have often criticized the Calvinist view 
as “ legalism,” “ moralistic activism,” or the “ misguided 
use of the Old Testament as a grammar of politics,” etc.; 
but these criticisms do not touch the heart of the question. 
These developments, which in many quarters nowadays are 
even gaining fresh impetus and a new religious depth, are 
expressions of a religion which desires to give powerful 
and convincing testimony in all spheres of life to the sover¬ 
eign will of God, and regards politics as a special field of 
Christian opportunity and responsibility. To the extent to 
which this motive has been effective the political history of 
Calvinism constitutes a challenge to other churches. 

As we have already seen, contemporary Calvinism is also 
taking an active share in the reconsideration of the social 
and political task of the church in the new world situation. 
It is well known that modernist Protestantism and strict 


1 *3 


H4 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

neo-Calvinism — in which again, for instance, the names 
of Karl Barth and Emil Brunner represent very different 
positions — hold very different and even opposing views 
on these questions. 

It would, however, be correct to say that wherever the 
Calvinist tradition exercises a living influence we can 
observe a tendency on the part of those who hold these 
views to come much closer together in their estimate of 
and practical attitude toward the state. For instance, Karl 
Barth’s uncompromising campaign — waged with pro¬ 
phetic fearlessness — to keep the gospel entirely free from a 
totalitarian philosophy of life as well as against the subor¬ 
dination of the organization and administration of the 
church to political ends, has won universal sympathy 
among Reformed Protestants — and naturally also among 
the members of other churches — quite apart from the 
fact that in other directions their religious views differ 
widely from one another. 

Another important element in this situation which we 
must not forget when we consider the general view of 
church and state within continental Reformed Protestant¬ 
ism is the following fact: The common experiences bom of 
the present struggle of the German church have brought 
Calvinists and Lutherans nearer to one another in an amaz¬ 
ing way; several of them have testified to this rapproche¬ 
ment in public confessions of faith and have given common 
witness to the strong consensus which exists among them on 
certain central points of the Christian faith, and also in 
their attitude toward the state. We may indeed hope and 
expect that this common process of wrestling with the prob¬ 
lems of church and state, and the new views which have 
been gained as the fruit of common tribulations and com¬ 
mon spiritual experiences, will prove a fruitful leaven in 
the experience of other churches as they wrestle with the 
same vital problems. 


Calvinistic Views of the State 115 

So we come back to the fact that the old denominational 
groupings do not present a true picture of the common 
elements and divergent views which exist within the politi¬ 
cal thought of Christianity at the present time. In order 
to simplify matters, we shall in the following presentation 
of the subject confine our attention mainly to some Swiss 
neo-Calvinist thinkers whose general position, so we may 
suppose, can count on considerable agreement within 
Calvinistic Christianity on the continent, even in quarters 
where the attitude toward the “ theology of the orders ” 
(which lies behind this view) would be only partially 
accepted, or possibly entirely rejected. Since at important 
points this position is closely connected with the Lutheran 
theory, which holds that the sanction of the state resides 
in its “ restrictive mitigation of social evil,” in order to 
avoid unnecessary repetitions it may be sufficient to note 
some of the distinctive features only . 1 

First of all a few words about the general approach. As 
we said at the beginning, the Reformed tradition has al¬ 
ways been greatly concerned with the political implications 
of Christianity. It has always regarded active cooperation 
in the work of shaping public order as a particularly im¬ 
portant Christian duty. It has educated its followers to 
be active citizens of the state to which they belong, impress¬ 
ing upon them that they have no right to regard the sphere 
of politics as morally irrelevant or as merely subject to its 
own immanent laws; in spite of the fact that political life 
presents peculiar difficulties to the Christian conscience, it 
is still under the control of God as sovereign Lord. 

This claim is being reiterated by contemporary Calvin¬ 
ism with renewed energy. In opposition to the prevailing 

1 For the prevailing tendencies of the political ethos in Anglo-Saxon 
Reformed Protestantism, cf. the instructive books by W. A. Brown, Church 
and State in Contemporary America, and A. E. Garvie, The Fatherly Rule 
of God. 



n6 Christian Faith and the Modern State 


tendencies to make the state into an absolute for which 
good and evil do not exist or to make it the obedient instru¬ 
ment of economic, national, racial or other ideologies, 
Calvinism maintains that the church cannot avoid having a 
definite responsibility for the state. The church has no 
right to be content with the mere permission of the state to 
provide for the spiritual needs of the faithful. The usual 
dualism which exists between a spiritual sphere and a 
temporal sphere supposed to be subject to its own ethical 
laws, is an error which has done a great deal to further the 
severance of the political forces from the standards of 
Christianity. The message of the church, on the contrary, 
has a bearing on all men and on all the aspects of human 
life, including that of politics. This active and almost 
aggressive attitude toward the ethical issues of the political 
order is well expressed in the following passage: 

The Christian church throughout the world must not allow 
herself to be pushed any further in the direction of a merely 
defensive attitude over against a political authority which is 
becoming more and more secular as time goes on. ... It is in 
accordance with the genuine and unadulterated Reformed tra¬ 
dition to recognize that cooperation in the life of the state is an 
integral part of the task which God has entrusted to the church 
in this world. . . . We believe that the divine command to the 
Christian church, the command contained in the Scriptures, 
lays upon her the responsibility for the formation of the state, 
in so far as the historical situation gives her any power of action 
at all in this respect. Among the different nations, wherever 
the Christian church has any possibility of cooperating with 
the political life of the country in question she must use all her 
influence to get God’s sovereign claims recognized, even in the 
system of legislation, in the administration of justice and in 
legal decisions . 2 

The original source and the guiding principles of this 
sense of political responsibility reside in the revelation con- 

2 Peter Barth in his paper in Totaler Staat und christliche Freiheit. 


Calvinistic Views of the State 117 

tained in the Scriptures. This emphasis on the revelation 
in the Scriptures, especially in the Old Testament, as 
normative for political life is also a familiar feature of the 
Calvinist tradition. When Christianity considers her po¬ 
litical mission afresh she must take the message of the Bible 
as her starting point. Only on this condition will she avoid 
the danger of allowing her political views to be simply the 
wholesale adoption of temporary political systems and 
ideologies. Only then will there be any hope of seeing the 
vicissitudes of the present situation in their right perspec¬ 
tive, and only then will there be hope of a reformulation of 
the Christian position in the light of fundamental Christian 
views. It is not denied that each situation is a fresh one and 
that personal political decisions must be taken here and 
now. But at the same time those who hold this view insist 
that this decision does not represent an isolated event. The 
message of the Bible throws light on the nature and the 
divine function of the political order which provides 
guidance for Christian politics always and everywhere. At 
the same time, in the ceaseless process of change which is 
always going on in the state we must not overlook its perma¬ 
nent structure. “ In the variety of forms in which it ap¬ 
pears, from the state of primitive times down to the state of 
the present day,” says Professor Max Huber , 3 “ a general 
sociological institution is formed which can be addressed as 
the state. This too is the state as it is understood in the 
Bible. The state is the supreme organization of power in 
human society which controls the life and property of its 
members. In some form or another this state is always 
present. Without it human society drifts into chaos, and 
chaos again forces men to reorganize the state.” 4 

3 At one time president of the International Court of Justice at The 
Hague. 

4 Die Kirche und das Staatsproblem in der Gegenwart, p. 56. 


118 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

Thus the Christian discussion of the problem connected 
with the contemporary state is no haphazard proceeding; it 
is not without firm guidance and control. However the 
opinions of individual Christians and groups may change, 
insofar as they claim to be genuinely Christian they must 
move within the boundary lines drawn once for all by the 
biblical revelation about God and the state. 

In this view, what is the religious and ethical significance 
of the state? Brunner suggests the reply to the question in 
the following unambiguous statement: “ That the Chris¬ 
tian affirms the necessity for the state is the correlate of his 
knowledge of original sin.” 5 Here, in point of fact, is the 
central point of this Reformed doctrine of the state; the 
various ways in which it is expressed are all related to this 
central tenet. 

Human society does not present the picture of organic 
and harmonious development. It is ceaselessly menaced 
by destruction. The Christian conception of man and of 
his world reveals the cause. For some unfathomable 
reason man seeks to sever his connection with God and to 
make himself the center of the world. This rebellion 
against God sets man against man and works havoc in so¬ 
ciety. Only against this background is it possible fully to 
understand the significance of the political order. 

At this point we must remind ourselves of the distinction 
between the “order of creation ” and the “ order of pres¬ 
ervation ” which was mentioned in an earlier chapter. At 
first sight this distinction may seem to be a merely scholastic 
speculation; in this context, however, its directly practical 
significance becomes evident. It implies that the life of the 
state lies upon a different plane from that of the family 
and the general cultural life of man. The latter are the 


s Der Staat als Problem der Kirche, p. 12. 


Calvinistic Views of the State 119 

result of God’s creative action. That is also true of the 
state insofar as it is the most inclusive form of social com¬ 
munity. But that which differentiates it from all other 
social institutions is the fact that it is secondary; its aim is 
to prevent humanity from destroying itself. 

In an impressive passage, in phrases which are evidently 
inspired by the desire to bring out the crucial point as 
forcibly as possible, Brunner reiterates his conviction that 
“ the existence of the state is justified solely and entirely by 
the fact of sin; that is, the state is a means of counteracting 
the destructive influence of sin upon life and society, by 
means of coercion, in order that it may provide the basis 
for a life which is at least in some measure human. The 
organized inhumanity (organized force or coercion) of the 
state is the means by which the essentially human quality 
of life is preserved.” 6 And Huber regards the distinctive 
characteristic of the state as an illustration of the profound 
truth expressed by Paul in the phrase, “ The wages of sin is 
death ” (Rom. 6:23). “ It is impressive to note that the 
state, which wields the sword, in its final consequences al¬ 
ways ends with death. The order of coercion by means of 
which the state maintains peace and order within the 
nation presupposes as an ultimate possibility the imposi¬ 
tion of the extreme penalty, the destruction of those who 
resist this enforcement of order.” 7 

But the state does not only stand in a peculiarly close 
relation to the evil element in society in the fact that it 
checks the worst results of this evil element. We must go 
a step further and point out something which shows still 
more clearly the paradoxical nature of the Christian view 
of the state. The study of political history shows very 
clearly and with abundant evidence, and the revelation of 

6 Die Kirche und das Staatsproblem, p. 12. 

7 Ibid., p. 57. 


120 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

Scripture affirms it as a mysterious method of divine provi¬ 
dence, that the state can fulfill its preserving function in 
society only if it is able to meet harshness with harshness 
and to assert a controlling force over against destructive 
violence. The distinctive quality of the state is the power 
of coercion. 8 

Hence it must be recognized that it is not only the do¬ 
minion of evil which makes the state an indispensable con¬ 
dition of human society, but that evil belongs to the very 
nature of the state itself. “ The compulsive character of 
the state — and this means what we call the ‘ state ’ — is 
not an expression of the will of the Creator.” 9 Compul¬ 
sion is sinful; it is utterly irreconcilable with the claims of 
love. It is true, of course, that this distinctive quality of 
the state is not always in evidence. The dim sense that 
behind political authority there stands a higher, super¬ 
human power, an awareness which exists everywhere, how¬ 
ever rationally the binding character of the laws may be 
explained; the psychological effects of the consciousness that 
behind all the decrees of the state there stands the ultima 
ratio of the sword; the various other methods by means of 
which pressure is brought to bear upon those who resist, 
which the machinery of the state has at its disposal — all 
these factors bring it about that very few of the actual con¬ 
flicts within the community need to be settled by the actual 
intervention of the coercive authority of the state. But 
nonetheless it is always a menace in the background. 

By this exclusive, or almost exclusive, insistence on the 
fact that the “ theological locus ” of the state is in the Chris¬ 
tian doctrine of sin, this whole view is in sharp opposition 
not only to all optimistic or idealistic philosophies, but also 

8 It is important to note this narrow conception of the state, because 
it determines, and to some extent explains, this doctrine of the state as a 
whole. 9 Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 445. 


Calvinistic Views of the State 121 

to most of the other schools of Christian political thought 
in our own day. This view, however, claims to do no more 
than to carry a stage further the classical lines of Christian 
thought about the state as laid down in the classic Christian 
doctrine of St. Paul, the Fathers and the Reformers of the 
sixteenth century. It insists that the Christian understand¬ 
ing of life in particular has no right to moralize or idealize 
the state, but that it ought to regard it soberly, as it is, in all 
its harshness. The rationalizations with which the brutal 
realities of politics are constantly justified by its supporters, 
or by well meaning Christians, must be seen through and 
denounced. For “ the state is of this world, it is indeed 
even the most concentrated form of this world; it is a hun¬ 
dred per cent secular. In the state the temporal aeon, the 
world which is passing away, reaches its zenith. Its relation 
to the kingdom of God is one of complete difference of 
nature and even of opposition.” 10 Some might suggest in 
reply that this pessimistic view may perhaps be regarded as 
an adequate expression of the primitive Christian attitude 
toward the heathen state, but in our Western civilization, 
where states have been exposed for centuries to a process 
of prolonged and profound Christian influence, the view is 
either mistaken or at least very one-sided. This objection, 
however, cannot be admitted. It overlooks the fact that in 
its essence the state has always remained the same. “ A 
Christian state is a sheer impossibility; a Christian state is 
as impossible as a Christian police force, a Christian prison 
or a Christian system of penal legislation.” 11 Thus this 
Reformed doctrine seems to see no connection between the 
political order and the gospel; they are mutually exclusive. 
Self-sacrificing love which pours itself out in service is the 
very opposite of dominating force. 

10 Brunner, Der Staat als Problem der Kirche, p. 4. 

11 Ibid. 


122 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

But this doctrine does not merely emphasize the evil and 
harsh aspect of the state; it also affirms the state as a divine 
order, as an instrument of the unfathomable love of God 
which transcends all human reason, and also uses methods 
which seem quite remote from his Spirit in order to achieve 
its ends. Without the protecting wall of the power of 
coercion humanity would be exposed to the danger of dis¬ 
integration. The husk of the state protects the growth of 
all the finer flowers of cultural, moral and religious life. 
It preserves humanity for its meeting with Christ, with all 
the blessing that this means. It creates free scope for the 
activity of the church and for the exercise of Christian vir¬ 
tues. The religious significance of the state lies therefore 
in this very fact: that it protects men from the socially dis¬ 
ruptive effects of their own selfishness and thus provides 
the indispensable framework for a truly human and Chris¬ 
tian life. Hence faith is compelled without hesitation to 
regard the exercise of political authority — however op¬ 
posed to divine love it may seem to be — as an instrument 
used by God in his providential government of the world. 

This point of view, so it is maintained, based on a bibli¬ 
cal realism, throws fresh light on the everyday realities of 
political life, and helps us to perceive more plainly the con¬ 
tradictory character of the state and to form a clearer judg¬ 
ment on it than the usual political philosophies and moral 
theories are able to do. 

The two main currents of political philosophy — that 
of positivism and that of idealism — give interpretations of 
the nature of the state which differ so widely from each 
other that it seems impossible to reconcile them. 

Positivism regards the state as the result of the socio¬ 
logical balance of power at any particular time. The state, 
its origin and its growth, cannot be explained either from 
the point of view of reason or from that of ethics. In the 


Calvinistic Views of the State 123 

irrational course of history states rise and decay and only 
struggle to attain the highest possible development of their 
power. The establishment of law and order is merely a 
utilitarian self-limitation imposed by the dominant social 
group. Suddenly the balance of social power breaks down; 
in outbreaks of blind destructive violence the existing 
order is destroyed and a new balance of power is established 
in which every group tries to “ make ” as much as possible 
for its own sacro egoismo, without any consideration for 
the claims of morality and justice. 

In contrast to this positivistic theory with its realistic em¬ 
piricism is idealistic political philosophy of various kinds. 
The state is not the enemy of the spirit; it is rather the su¬ 
preme and all-inclusive incorporation of the world-spirit. 
The brutalities of political power therefore do not belong 
to the nature of the state; they are unfortunate relics of a 
temporary stage of its historical development, or they are 
justified as absolutely necessary methods for the fuller his¬ 
torical realization of the moral idea. 

Emil Brunner maintains that insofar as these two the¬ 
ories claim to give a picture of the state as a whole they are 
erroneous. 12 At the same time it must be recognized that 
both of them contain a partial truth — which, however, 
they make into an absolute and thus distort the truth as a 
whole. The Christian view of the state is broad enough 
and deep enough to recognize the contradictory features 
in the picture of the state, with its twofold aspect, without 
trying to make them into a synthesis. For it alone is able 
to disclose the profound source of this incomprehensible 
ambiguity of the state, namely, the existential contradic¬ 
tion in man himself, a person who perverts his creature- 
hood. “ The gospel, like the message of the Bible as a 
whole,” says Max Huber, 

12 The Divine Imperative, pp. 442 ff. 


124 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

is filled with an utterly sure sense of reality, it is absolutely 
genuine and honest. Hence it continually admits the reality of 
sin and evil; this means that all optimistic phantasies about 
man are swept away; at the same time it does not fall into the 
other extreme of a paralyzing pessimism, for the gospel is full 
of the truth that man was created in the image of God and that 
he has a divine calling. All illusions about the possibility of 
what man can effect by his own unaided efforts, by human or¬ 
ganization, for the establishment of a world of fellowship and 
peace are excluded. For even in such action, even when man 
appeals to the gospel for support, wherever man is at work, all 
he does is tainted with evil. This very fact constitutes a special 
danger, since it is more difficult to recognize the presence of 
evil here than in the sphere of the naked struggle for power. 13 

Therefore the Christian ventures, or indeed is specially 
called, boldly to confront the demonic powers which are at 
work within all political life, and to show them up as they 
are. For only so is it possible to resist them effectively. 
Otherwise, if their smoke screens of conscious or uncon¬ 
scious rationalizations and flaming symbols are not swept 
away, they can carry on their nefarious activities quite un¬ 
disturbed. The Christian faith recognizes in all sobriety 
that all states have been born in sin. They arise out of 
wars, revolutions, ruthless enforcement of the will to power 
of a particular group. The states continue to live in sin. 
In no other part of human life are cruelty and tyranny 
so prevalent, and nowhere else have they such endless op¬ 
portunities as in the exercise of political power. Law is 
diverted from its high purpose and made subject to the 
self-centered interests of conflicting groups. Nowhere else 
do the diabolical depths of the state appear so plainly as 
in the cataclysm of war, which either causes man to recoil 
in horror or hypnotizes him into wild enthusiasm. But 

the hate and brutality which emerge in war are merely the 
intenser expression of feelings and thoughts which exist and 
13 Der Christ und die Politik, p. 14. 


Calvinistic Views of the State 125 

indeed are cultivated in time of peace. The way in which 
civilized nations are infected with this poison comes out very 
plainly in the cold-blooded way in which the possibilities of so- 
called “ chemical warfare ” are considered, methods of warfare 
which both in effect and in rapidity of action far outstrip all the 
horrors of previous wars and revolutionary terror, and degrade 
man to the purely material plane. 14 

From this point of view, therefore, “ every state represents 
human sin on the large scale; in history, in the growth of 
every state the most brutal, anti-divine forces have taken 
a share, to an extent unheard of in the individual life, save 
in that of some prominent criminals. In the state we hu¬ 
man beings see our own sin magnified a thousand times. 
The state is the product of collective sin.” 15 

The Christian ethic, however, must also take into con¬ 
sideration the other aspect of the state and must try to esti¬ 
mate its spiritual significance. Man tends to take the foun¬ 
dations of his existence for granted. But revolutions and 
civil wars suggest what a blessing lies in the fact that the 
state establishes a condition of comparative order and peace 
in the community and thus prevents complete chaos. Un¬ 
der the guiding and disciplining hand of political authority 
the nations have been led to develop their dormant capac¬ 
ities and to accomplish great historical tasks. The fulfill¬ 
ment of the vast responsibilities of high statesmanship and 
the loyal discharge of civil duties have evoked the noblest 
human virtues. The cooperation of the state has made 
possible the suppression of slavery, a juster distribution of 
social and economic privileges, large-scale charity in times 
of distress, etc., which otherwise would not have been pos¬ 
sible. Within the framework of the political order culture 
and religion have been able to flourish. Divine grace is 
at work within every state and uses it for the divine pur- 

14 Huber, Staatenpolitik und Evangelium, p. 11 

is Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 445. 


126 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

pose. Every Christian judgment on political matters, there¬ 
fore, is dialectic: it must always reflect the view that “ over 
every state there broods something of the light of the 
divine creation and a heavy cloud of anti-divine forces.” 16 

Let us now try to discover very briefly what conclusions 
are drawn from this Reformed conception of the state 
which will throw light on the individual elements in the 
state, namely, coercive power and law. 

From what has already been said it should be clear that 
— like the Lutheran doctrine of authority — this concep¬ 
tion also has a strong feeling for the actual existence and 
the moral necessity of powerful authority. The state not 
only has power, it is power. “ The fundamental character 
of the state is not right but might,” says Brunner. 17 It is 
true, of course, that might, in the broad sense of the word, 
is a universal quality of life. All social relations, from this 
point of view, are only different forms of relations of power. 
But what distinguishes the state from all other forms of 
power is its absolute supremacy, its final power of authority 
within a given community. And most of the power which 
is exercised in some way or other is placed under the con¬ 
ditions and according to the rules which are set by the 
supreme authority of the state. Without such a central 
point in the community — whatever its personal supports 
may be, and however it may be related to the community 
legally and constitutionally — the centrifugal forces would 
plunge into chaos. A social authority whose decisions shall 
be final is inevitable. Its distinctive quality is expressed in 
the fact that it can force those who resist to obey, and that 
finally it exercises the power of life and death over its citi¬ 
zens. Especially if the state is to achieve its main purpose, 
namely, to preserve society from disintegration, it must reso- 

16 Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 446. 

17 Ibid. 


Calvinistic Views of the State 127 

lutely confront force with force, and it must have sufficient 
force at its disposal so that there may be no suspicion of 
any inability on its part to maintain order. In order to 
prevent the devastating release of the forces of evil it must 
itself use evil, that is, force. In order to prevent the com¬ 
munity entrusted to its care from being destroyed, both 
from within and without, it must itself be able to destroy. 
The tragic character of this ethical dilemma of coercive 
power both for statesmen and for the ordinary citizen, as 
well as the terrible danger of this concentration of power in 
the state and its inherent tendency toward absolutism and 
totalitarianism, is emphasized in this school of Reformed 
thought in a way which clearly distinguishes it from much 
of the traditional thought of Lutheranism and often re¬ 
minds us of the spirit of the Eastern Orthodox view of the 
state. 

But this strong emphasis on coercive power as the differ¬ 
entia specified of the state, which we regard as characteristic 
of this point of view, does not exclude a broad understand¬ 
ing of the fact that political power neither may nor should 
build only upon force. 

It is essential that the state should possess authority, that 
is, that it should evoke from its subjects willing obedience, 
respect and loyalty. Sheer power and brutal force are in 
the long run self-destructive. A political regime which 
does not give the community the assurance that it is exer¬ 
cising its power for the good of the whole not only under¬ 
mines its own authority but exposes society to the danger 
of destruction. “ Where this kind of recognition of the 
state has been lost, so far as the state is concerned all is 
over. When things have come to this pass, no battalions 
and no machine guns will be of any use. Where the state 
is regarded merely as a human institution, established for 
utilitarian reasons only, it no longer has any real authority 


128 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

or power; for even physical force is effective only when it 
is combined with that spiritual power which is inherent in 
real authority.” 18 

The fear of possible coercion, or a rational appreciation 
of the utility of political government, or similar motives, 
cannot explain the nature of political authority. It is 
rooted in a general sense of common responsibility shared 
both by those who govern and by those who are governed; 
its ultimate source is religious. Therefore, in view of the 
conflicting tendencies of the present day which either un¬ 
dermine or deify political authority, it is the special duty 
of Christians to proclaim clearly that political authority 
possesses a divine sanction; hence it cannot be deified, but, 
nonetheless, it must not on any account be undermined. 

The fact that this school of Calvinist thought lays so 
much emphasis upon the element of might and force in the 
political order, however, must not lead us to the conclusion 
that for all practical purposes it leads to the justification of 
a Machiavellian position. Its emphasis upon the belief 
that the original source of political authority lies in a 
divine initiative and exists to serve a divine purpose leads 
definitely in another direction; moreover, this is attested 
by the position occupied in this body of thought by the 
principle of law. 

The exercise of political power is not an end in itself. 
Its sanction lies in the fact that by the establishment of a 
stable order of law it removes the danger of social chaos 
and thus creates the external conditions for the peaceful 
discharge of social functions. 

This insistence upon law is a characteristic element in 
the Reformed tradition and is closely connected with its 
whole view of life. It would probably be correct to say 
that even at the present day in the main it is Calvinist 

is Brunner, Der Staat als Problem der Kirche , p. 12. 


Calvinistic Views of the State 129 

thinkers, jurists and theologians who are making an inten¬ 
sive effort to think out the problem of law from the Chris¬ 
tian point of view, being persuaded that here we are con¬ 
cerned with one of the central problems of Christian 
responsibility in national and international politics. This 
is not the place to deal in greater detail with these efforts 
to create a Christian understanding of law in the conti¬ 
nental Calvinism of the present. As in the earlier chapters 
of this book, we must be content merely to indicate the 
general approach to the subject, illustrating it by the Swiss 
thinkers whom we have already mentioned. 

Brunner’s statements are very plain: “ The state exists 
for the sake of the law.” 19 “ The moral dignity and reli¬ 
gious justification of the state are dependent on the fact 
that the coercive power of the state serves the law. . . . 
The state is essentially a law-state. The preservation of hu¬ 
man life by means of coercive power is its raison d'etre ” 20 
Over against divergent interpretations he makes it clear 
in another context that the purpose of the state is “ law, not 
civilization, nor national unity.” 21 And Huber reminds 
us again of the basic premise of these convictions when he 
says that “ it is the duty of the state, as an order of law and 
of coercive power, to check the progress of that evil which 
would otherwise spread so freely, and to arrest its growth 
and influence.” 22 

What, however, is here meant by law? Law is a particu¬ 
lar way of ordering the life of society. But even in its 
mere power to create order it reveals certain formal char¬ 
acteristics which from the Christian point of view are not 
irrelevant, but must be affirmed as having a positive value. 
Law is a check on caprice. Both to individuals and groups, 

19 The Divine Imperative, p. 448. 

20 Brunner, in the Neue Schweizer Rundschau , Jan., 1934. 

21 Der Staat als Problem der Kirche, p. 17. 

22 Staatenpolitik und Evangelium, p. 13. 


130 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

and to the political authorities, it guarantees a certain per¬ 
manence and stability of action. If the order of law did not 
exist it would be impossible to foresee the future and thus 
all action would be paralyzed. In contrast with all the un¬ 
reliable and incalculable elements in life, law means reli¬ 
ability and security. Thus law contains a conservative 
element, a certain rigidity which is indispensable for it if 
it is to carry out its purpose. At the same time society is 
in a state of continual flux. New groups and classes emerge 
into the light of history and fight for a place in life, while 
others are suppressed; new ideals and ethical values re¬ 
mold the common mind. A changing situation is reflected 
gradually in a changing law, in order that the freedom of 
growth which law insures shall not be thwarted. 

Another essential element in law is its tendency to be 
as universal as possible. If law is not valid for all times 
and in all places, it defeats its own ends; that is, it fails to 
provide a certain degree of stability and security and the 
power to plan for the future of the race. Brunner has a 
passage on this subject which is worth quoting since it 
brings out very clearly the traditional Calvinist concern 
for the establishment not only of a national but of an inter¬ 
national order of law: 

The utmost universal validity possible is inherent in the 
very idea of law itself. The Christian’s primary interest in the 
state is not that a people should crystallize its national unity in 
the state, but that the state should actually establish law. 
Therefore it is not so much the concern of the Christian state 
to assert the utmost measure of sovereignty possible for the in¬ 
dividual state as it is to emphasize the claim that the sovereign 
states themselves should be bound by law to one another, and 
that there should be no anarchy in their relation to one an¬ 
other. Opposition to anarchy, to the brutal struggle for power, 
is indeed the one divine legitimation of the state. The same 
opposition, however, applies also to international anarchy. 


Calvinistic Views of the State 131 

which is the result of the absolute sovereignty of the individual 
state. Just as the internal authority of the state, that is, the 
power of the state over its own countrymen, groups and spheres 
of life, is based upon and limited by law, so is it also with power 
in the international sphere. The idea of international law 
springs necessarily from the Christian idea of the state, and the 
obligation to champion the system of international law against 
the brutal international struggle for power is the natural infer¬ 
ence from the biblical argument for the state. 23 

The question of the relation between law and human 
society takes us a step further in the understanding of law. 
To put it more precisely: Is law an organic expression of 
the basic unity, and of the common and freely accepted 
will to unity, within the community, or is it primarily an 
expression of broken unity, a restraining barrier between 
conflicting ends and interests? It is evident that the Chris¬ 
tian doctrines of community and of original sin are not 
without relevance for the answer to this question. 

If we believe in the essential goodness of the natural man, 
in the permanence of true community behind social con¬ 
flicts, we tend to regard civil law as a positive expression — 
of course more or less imperfect — of the divine order of 
persons and things, and to minimize, at least in theory, the 
necessity for coercive power in the maintenance of law 
and order. A further consequence is the harmonious cor¬ 
relation of law and love, and along with this an emphasis 
on the legal and institutional aspects of religion. 

Another main conception, which asserts that the aliena¬ 
tion of man from God denotes the radical corruption of 
the human heart and of human society issuing in desper¬ 
ate conflict and disintegration, will have a different view of 
law. Within this latter conception we may distinguish 
two points of view. 

23 Cf. his article in the Neue Schweizer Rundschau , Jan., 1934. 


132 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

Those who hold the first point of view are convinced 
that there is an impassable gulf between the Holy God and 
sinful man; they are convinced that true community has 
been wholly destroyed by the disruptive forces of evil. 
Consequently in this actual world law can under no aspect 
whatsoever be interpreted as rooted in God’s loving crea¬ 
tivity and as constituting an organic expression of social 
unity or of men’s pursuit of common ends. Its source is 
not in the fact of fellowship but in the fact of enmity. Law 
therefore must be understood exclusively as a restraining 
barrier between men and social groups which are hostile 
to one another; it merely checks the worst outbreaks of 
destructive evil. As such it is indissolubly connected with 
the dominating force of the state, even though it may not 
be actually identified with it. As the legal framework of 
society and the kingdom of divine love are diametrically 
opposed to each other, from the Christian point of view, 
the various empirical embodiments of law are, strictly 
speaking, irrelevant, save on the presupposition that they 
help to preserve the life of mankind. 

The second view holds that both these interpretations 
unduly simplify the issue, since each turns one aspect of 
a peculiar paradox into an absolute. The conviction that 
men’s efforts to establish law and order in this empiric 
world more or less directly reflect the eternal law of the 
universe is too optimistic in view of the devastating effects 
of evil in human society. The opposite conviction, namely, 
that the fallen world lives in radical separation from God, 
overlooks the fact that the sacred fire of the Creator still 
burns within the reign of law — however frail and sinful 
men’s efforts to establish and maintain it — and gives to 
law a numinous majesty to which men bow instinctively. 

This duality means that law shares in the logically in¬ 
soluble contradiction of human existence as a whole. It 


Calvinistic Views of the State 133 

must therefore be seen from a twofold point of view. The 
capacity and the obligation to live and work in a com¬ 
munity of mutual service, which the Creator gives to man, 
is made visible in the order of law. But man constantly 
distorts the divine purpose. He destroys community with 
God and with his neighbor, oversteps the boundaries of 
his creaturely nature, and usurps functions and privileges 
which belong to others. Here law is absolutely necessary 
as a barrier, as something which keeps man in his own place. 
In order to do this effectively law needs the sanctions of 
coercive power. Insofar as law is based upon man’s denial 
of community, on his lust for egotistical self-assertion, the 
coercive function of law becomes operative and forces man 
to an at least external fulfillment of duties which he refuses 
to perform voluntarily. Law is therefore a servant of free¬ 
dom and at the same time a check on caprice. It expresses 
both man’s dignity as a being created for personal fellow¬ 
ship, and his degradation when he greedily seeks his own 
good. 

If this paradox rightly indicates the meaning of law for 
human life, and its place in the divine economy, it has an 
important bearing on the political ethic. The guiding 
principles for Christian conduct cannot be identified with 
man’s own claims for unfettered self-development or with 
the claims of the community; nor are they to be found in an 
indestructible moral order. On the other hand, it would 
be incorrect to declare that Christian love has not an in¬ 
trinsic connection with the sphere of law, and therefore 
that Christianity has nothing positive or constructive to 
say to the burning questions of justice or injustice in hu¬ 
man life. The personal will of God, incarnated in Jesus 
Christ and living and acting in a community of redeemed 
sinners, is the ultimate criterion and the secret motive 
power in man’s unceasing struggle for higher justice. 


134 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

“ Love is the fulfilling of the law ” — law, that is, regarded 
not only in its religious and moral, but also in its juristic 
sense. 

This admittedly rather crude analysis of some basic types 
of the “ theology of law ” has already anticipated the views 
held by the group of Reformed thinkers with whom we are 
here particularly concerned. Broadly speaking, they may 
be said to follow the third line of thought which has just 
been described. The following extract from Brunner is 
illuminating: 

Law, as the delimitation of my rights, does not belong to the 
original order of creation, but love does, which certainly in¬ 
cludes that which justice requires, but goes still further. . . . 
Sin, however, alters this perspective. Under the dominion of 
love there is no need to delimit the spheres of law in a rational 
manner. For everyone guarantees the rights of the other per¬ 
son. Where, however, sin has intruded, every sphere of life, 
even the smallest, is menaced. This state of menace produces 
the following defensive institutions: first of all, “ the law ” as 
the sum total of the parity regulations of the spheres of free¬ 
dom, and second, the state as the protector of the law. 24 

The compulsive authority of the state is at the service of 
the legal administration. Hence this power—in spite of 
the fact that it is very questionable from the ethical point 
of view — receives both a conditional right and a definite 
limitation. Law for its part points to something higher, 
to a higher obligation: the norm of justice. Law is always 
a compromise between the actual situation — with all its 
inadequacies and interests — and the claims of justice. 
Where individuals and social groups exceed their rights 
and desire to enforce their own claims themselves, law must 
step in and erect a barrier which establishes a certain ex- 


24 Cf. his article in Totaler Staat und christliche Freiheit . 


Calvinistic Views of the State 135 

ternal balance — an “ emergency dike ” (Max Huber) 
which at least for the moment stems the tide of hatred and 
injustice and prevents it from rolling in and overwhelming 
the social life of mankind. But it is not only the function 
of law which is closely connected with evil; its own nature 
shows very clearly the fallen state of mankind. The fact 
that legislation and the administration of justice never tally 
with the supreme demands of justice is due not only to the 
fallibility or the lack of vision and frailty of its supports. 
Law is not only frequently obliged to make use of force as 
an auxiliary, in order to be able to maintain its universal 
validity against those who resist; all too often it is itself 
merely stabilized injustice and force. 

It is characteristic of this whole interpretation of law — 
and at this point it is evidently very different from the 
Roman Catholic view — that it assigns a merely subordi¬ 
nate and limited role to the principle of justice. Even if, 
for the sake of argument, we could imagine a state of affairs 
in which the legal organization of a society were to rep¬ 
resent a complete incarnation of the spirit of justice, this 
would still not remove but would indeed intensify the spirit 
of self-assertion which also emerges in the demand for a just 
delimitation of the various spheres of human activity. Be¬ 
hind this conception, which we have here stated in a rather 
pointed way, lies the conviction that justice and love can¬ 
not be understood in terms of harmonious cooperation or 
interpenetration. “ Love is not something higher as com¬ 
pared with evil or caprice, but it is something which differs 
from an order which, in itself, is perfect, and ought to be 
given its full value.” 25 

“ Love means going out to others, justice means the de¬ 
limitation of spheres of power and the protection of these 

25 Huber, Staatenpolitik und Evangelium, p. 19. 


136 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

boundaries. Love is concrete and personal, nondeliberate, 
nongeneral. Justice, on the other hand, is general, delib¬ 
erate, impersonal and objective, abstract and rational,” 28 
says Brunner, but he adds immediately: “ This lawful jus¬ 
tice is the presupposition of love. Love which has not 
passed through this stage would be arbitrary and subjective 
and sentimental; yet love, while passing through this stage, 
must rise above it. But even in this subordinate position 
the idea of justice, precisely insofar as it is an element of 
law, is of incalculable significance for the historical life.” 27 
For “ justice is both the surrogate and the protector of the 
order of love which has been destroyed by sin.” 28 Love 
and justice are dialectically opposed to each other. But 
love is closer to justice than it is to injustice. Love is genu¬ 
inely Christian only where it breaks through and tran¬ 
scends all the considerations of justice, but where it at the 
same time champions the realization of all that which jus¬ 
tice desires, namely, the possibility of a personal life in 
fellowship and responsibility, as willed by the Creator. 

One final quotation will sum up this Reformed view of 
the state and its functions in society better than many 
longer descriptions: 

The state is that order, appointed by God, which demon¬ 
strates to us most clearly that, in spite of all idealistic glamor, 
as the New Testament says, we are Jiving in a wicked world. 
Therefore to live as a Christian in tne state means above all to 
hope for the new world which lies beyond history — beyond 
history which always was and will be the history of states — for 
that world where death and killing, force, coercion, and even 
law will cease, where the only “ power ” which will then be 
valid is the power of love. It is the meditatio vitae futurae 
which makes it possible for the Christian to do his difficult 

26 Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 450. 

27 Ibid . 

28 Brunner, in Totaler Staat und christliche Freiheit. 


Calvinistic Views of the State 137 

duty in this political world without becoming hard; and it is 
this which prevents him from lapsing into irresponsibility out 
of the fear of becoming hard. Both his joyful readiness for 
service and his sanity in service spring from this hope. And 
these two words sum up the whole political ethic of the Chris¬ 
tian . 29 

29 Brunner, The Divine Imperative, pp. 481-82. 


X 

THE FUNCTIONS AND THE LIMITS 
OF THE STATE 

M odern man lives not only in an expanding universe 
but also in an expanding state. The contemporary 
state has totalitarian tendencies. On all hands, with vary¬ 
ing emphasis, this fact is being proclaimed in the modem 
world. In point of fact mankind is becoming increasingly 
conscious that it is involved in a process in which the po¬ 
litical order occupies a far larger and far more prominent 
place than formerly in the life of society as a whole. This 
process has certain peculiar and disquieting features which 
make it urgent for Christians in particular to try to exam¬ 
ine this statement and to form some opinion of the reality 
which lies behind it. Even if it cannot be asserted that 
there is any consensus at the present time about the mean¬ 
ing and the causes of this expansion of the state, yet its 
general features are so well known that it would be pre¬ 
sumptuous to enter into them here in any detail. Only a 
few observations will be made in order to give background 
to the following discussion on the functions and the limits 
of the state. 

Planning and centralization are two dominating tenden¬ 
cies in the social life of the present day. This is not the 
place to discuss the merits or the demerits of this phenome¬ 
non. It may be that in an era of mass production and uni¬ 
versal transition, characteristic of the period in which we 
are living — an era in which processes of disintegration and 
of reconstruction need to be guided in a certain direction 

138 


Functions and Limits of the State 139 

— an increased measure of planning and a greater measure 
of state control are inevitable. Within the sphere of social 
legislation, indeed, it is true that the cooperation of the 
state has made it possible to introduce certain measures 
which would otherwise have been impossible. However 
we may interpret this extension of the sphere of compe¬ 
tence of the state, the fact remains that increasingly the 
modern state is bringing larger sections of the common life 
under its control. The expansion of its authority is also 
made possible by the fact that it assumes or takes over func¬ 
tions which were previously exercised by other social 
agencies. 

This tendency is doubtless based, at least in part, upon 
the fact that with increasing social differentiation, and in 
many places also increasing social disintegration, the state 
has been compelled to take action in order to supply the 
need for unification and control. Were this all, the in¬ 
crease in the power of the state might be regarded as an 
emergency situation which, once the body corporate re¬ 
gains its health, would automatically disappear. But it is 
constantly becoming more evident that this transformation 
of the political order has other causes also. This great ex¬ 
tension of state control accompanies, and is at least in part 
the result of, a qualitative change in the nature of the state 
itself and in man’s understanding of its purpose. A state 
which behaves as though it were potentially omnicompe¬ 
tent usurps in practice, even if not in theory, the divine 
attribute of omnipotence. Whether the state claims to be 
an earthly absolute, or whether as an executive agent it 
shares in the glory of a particular class or culture or race, 
its expansion is no longer due simply to social and national 
necessities, but it becomes a divine imperative which de¬ 
sires to claim man and society exclusively for itself. The 
expanding state tends to develop symptoms of totalitarian- 


140 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

ism. It becomes aggressive and ambitious. In fresh out¬ 
bursts of tyranny, caprice and brutality, of a widespread 
depreciation of human life — phenomena which are in¬ 
creasing to a terrible extent — demoniac features of the 
state are emerging which constitute a grave menace both 
to Christians and to mankind as a whole. 

These totalitarian tendencies have been well described 
in the following passage by J. H. Oldham: 

The totalitarian state is a state which lays claim to man in 
the totality of his being; which refuses to recognize the inde¬ 
pendence in their own sphere of religion, culture, education 
and the family; which seeks to impose on all its citizens a par¬ 
ticular philosophy of life; and which sets out to create by means 
of all the agencies of public information and education a par¬ 
ticular type of man in accordance with its own understanding 
of the meaning and end of man’s existence. A state which ad¬ 
vances such claims declares itself to be not only a state but also 
a church . 1 

It would probably be true to say that, strictly speaking, 
these words describe a claim which is made in various 
quarters, or the possible goal of an important tendency in 
modern life, rather than a stage of social history which is 
actually in existence. Other tendencies which lead in the 
opposite direction also exist; but in an extremely stimu¬ 
lating passage Christopher Dawson has drawn attention to 
the fact that this totalitarian tendency is operative not only 
in countries like those which are most frequently men¬ 
tioned in this connection, but that it also exists in countries 
with strong liberal and democratic traditions. His proph¬ 
ecy that a totalitarian state in England would probably be 
humanitarian, democratic and pacifist is indeed thought- 
provoking . 2 This fact — that totalitarianism can also 

1 Church, Community and State, pp. 9-10. 

2 Cf. his book, Religion and the Modern State. 


Functions and Limits of the State 141 

flourish in countries over which the banner of freedom 
waves — is a warning against the assumption that the great 
expansion of state control and of totalitarian tendencies 
is causally connected with the war and its aftermath. 
Doubtless for the warring nations the war did bring about 
a great attempt to regulate all spheres of life along to¬ 
talitarian lines, to mobilize the community as a whole, 
and it is highly probable that in future wars this will hap¬ 
pen to a still greater extent. But even when we have fully 
recognized the significance of the war for the growth of the 
omnicompetent state, it is still clear, for everyone who is 
accustomed to look at events from a historical point of 
view, that the war should only be regarded as a process 
which accelerated a development whose sources lie far back 
in the past. Christopher Dawson’s profound observation, 
which refers to a possible future, also applies to reflection 
on the past. The liberal state of the last century had prac¬ 
tically begun to take over or to control many social func¬ 
tions which, according to its own ideology, would have 
developed best apart from state control. 

We may therefore rightly assert that the increasing ex¬ 
pansion of state control and state direction which we are 
experiencing today is the ripe fruit of a development which 
has been growing for at least a hundred years. Berdyaev 
and many other thinkers maintain that the roots of the 
present general and political situation lie much further 
back. In their view the Renaissance and the Enlighten¬ 
ment were the spiritual cradle of the self-sufficient and abso¬ 
lute type of humanity which, through the irony of history, 
has gradually become the slave of the political projection 
of its own apostasy, the absolute and totalitarian state. 

The perception of the fact that totalitarianism is a new 
name for a phenomenon which has actually existed for a 
considerable time, though it has added certain new fea- 


142 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

tures, means that it is possible to interpret our present situ¬ 
ation from a broader point of view; in so doing we are able 
to understand it better and to estimate its gravity. A po¬ 
litical situation which is the fruit of a long development, 
and is closely interwoven with similar developments in 
other spheres of life, cannot be changed in the twinkling 
of an eye by merely superficial measures. It can be changed 
only by a complete rebirth. Of course this fact does not 
eliminate Christian responsibility for the effort to throw 
light upon and remove the hidden economic and social 
causes of this situation. At the present time, however, our 
supreme need is to show as clearly as possible the religious 
meaning of this burning question of the functions and 
limits of the state. 

Today, therefore, this question has been greatly intensi¬ 
fied. The struggle to delimit the sphere of the state — 
above all in everything which affects religion — has been 
continually fought out, and the achievement of political 
freedom in the modern world is indeed a by-product of this 
struggle for religious freedom. It must, however, be ad¬ 
mitted that at the present time the Christian conscience is 
not greatly concerned with the question of the limits of 
political authority and its relation to the question of hu¬ 
man freedom; still less is it possible to speak of a common 
Christian mind in this connection. This seems all the 
more regrettable when we consider what the question of 
the right limits of state control and of the state’s exercise 
of authority means in terms of human welfare and human 
suffering. The extension of the power of the state even in 
those countries where we cannot speak of totalitarian tend¬ 
encies in the usual sense of the word but where to a large 
extent the social and the cultural life of the country seems 
to be coming under political control — this question ought 
to force itself upon the attention of every Christian in his 


Functions and Limits of the State 143 

personal experience of life. For not only in the exercise 
of political and legal functions of every kind, but even in 
the effort to fulfill the daily obligations of the common life, 
the Christian — whether he is conscious of it or not — has 
to express his conviction about the state in his continual 
contact with other political motives and ideals. Would it 
be exaggerated to maintain that in spite of the traditional 
acknowledgment of the divine sanction of the state our 
attitude in political matters finds its source of inspiration 
rather in Aristotle or Machiavelli, in Hegel or Rousseau, 
or in all of them together, than in Jesus Christ? 

Every conception of the sanction of the state and of its 
purpose in human society implies that all the questions 
which refer to its functions and limits are always inter¬ 
preted from a quite definite point of view. This is true 
also of the Christian understanding of the state. The pre¬ 
vious chapters of this book have shown us that the Chris¬ 
tian faith contains political implications which are of the 
highest significance. At the same time it will have become 
clear to us in a disquieting and even terrifying way that the 
Christian understanding of the state is terribly divided. 
Even in the discussion of the complex questions of the 
functions and the limits of the state the same divergences 
and the same common elements play their part. To try to 
describe these various attitudes in any detail with the aid 
of modem literature would lead us too far afield. We must 
be content therefore simply to indicate a few issues which 
appear to be of crucial importance in this particular field 
of the political ethic. Possibly the only merit of the follow¬ 
ing observations may lie in the fact that these issues do not 
represent the arbitrary choice of an individual, but that, 
to a great extent, within ecumenical Christendom they 
have shown themselves to be points at which Christian 
thought and endeavor in this field have been crystallized. 


144 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

The subject of this chapter, generally speaking, covers 
four sets of problems. Does the Christian understanding 
of life in general, and of the state in particular, imply a 
distinctive view of the character and range of the functions 
of the state in society? What standards and criteria does 
it contain for the Christian attitude within these various 
spheres of influence? What does it say about the limits of 
the state? And, finally (this is really the same thing, only 
it is looked at from the opposite point of view), what mes¬ 
sage has it to proclaim about the problem of freedom in 
the political sphere? Since these issues are really only dif¬ 
ferent aspects of one and the same subject we shall not 
make a rigid distinction among them in the following 
paragraphs. 

It is obvious that there is no authoritative Christian 
opinion on these very complicated questions. We might 
argue, indeed, on theological and on practical grounds, 
that from the Christian point of view it does not really 
matter at what point the state (according to its conception 
of the needs of the actual situation) actually defines its 
limits, presupposing of course that it fulfills its own distinc¬ 
tive purpose and by its powerful authority maintains peace 
and order within the community. From the Christian 
point of view, we might argue, the important thing is not 
that there should be a formal delimitation of the spheres 
controlled by the different corporate bodies within the 
community, but the general direction of state policy, the 
question whether it is hostile to the church of Christ, or 
tolerant, or friendly. It could be urged that from the 
Christian view the general ideological and ethical attitude 
of the state is the crucial point, and not any attempt to 
restrict state control in such a way that it leaves all the 
room possible for human independence, both individual 
and social. 


Functions and Limits of the State 145 

The important element of truth in this argument must 
not be overlooked. At the same time we might rightly 
reply in the following terms: It is precisely because the 
divergence, and indeed in many places the open conflict, 
between a state policy — increasingly influenced by secular 
and neo-pagan ideologies — and the Christian way of life 
has come out so plainly that the question of the limits of 
the state in reference to the church, as well as to human life 
as a whole, has become acute. The further the policy of a 
state departs from its God-given task in society, the more 
necessary it is that the church try to understand more fully 
the limits of a state’s authority; once it is clear upon this 
matter, it is then its duty to point it out clearly to those who 
guide the ship of state. 

What, then, are the functions of the state from the Chris¬ 
tian point of view? This question itself presupposes that 
the state is limited, both in its aim and in its functions; 
that is, that it cannot be equated with the community as a 
whole, but that it has to fulfill certain definite functions 
of its own within the community. “ God wills the diver¬ 
sity of institutions and associations,” says Luther and, as 
the preceding chapters in this book have constantly shown 
us, in this statement Luther is expressing a universal Chris¬ 
tian conviction. A totalitarian society is incompatible with 
the Christian view of life. Within this general statement, 
however, there are various different Christian interpreta¬ 
tions of human society, and accordingly of the relation of 
the state to other social forms. The Catholic doctrine of 
society, for instance, with its emphasis upon the organism, 
gives the state a certain position within an established hier¬ 
archy of social ends and functions. 

To the majority of Protestants this conception is unac¬ 
ceptable. They feel that this whole conception of the world 
and of society as a harmonious organism hierarchically or- 


146 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

ganized represents a theory which is remote from reality, 
since it does not allow for the actual operation of evil 
within the world and is also opposed to findings of sociol¬ 
ogy. But in spite of these differences, as well as many 
others, in all Christian traditions it would be agreed that 
the family, culture, etc., do not exist merely at the good 
pleasure of the state. The following quotation is very apt: 

Human beings do not enter into the relations between the 
sexes, into the community of labor or of culture, owing to the 
compulsion of the state, but because they feel a natural desire 
and need to do so. This desire has been created by God, al¬ 
though it has been sinfully distorted by man. The functions of 
marriage, of the family, of economics and technique, of culture 
and education are not primarily concerned with the purpose 
of the state at all save in the fact that the state creates the 
framework for these institutions. Since, however, all these 
functions are menaced by evil, the state intervenes in order to 
compensate for the disintegration in fallen human nature. But 
so far as all these orders are concerned its function is clearly a 
subsidiary one. It uses compulsion to maintain order wherever 
it may be required, as for instance, in the compulsory protec¬ 
tion of marriage, compulsory education, compulsory economic 
organization, compulsory support of the functions of culture 
(art, science, etc.). But in all this the state is merely making 
it possible for these various institutions to function; it is never 
a creator. Therefore these functions never belong to the state; 
the state merely protects them and keeps them in order . 3 

Catholic social philosophy speaks in similar terms of as¬ 
sociations— economic, cultural, religious, etc.—which 
have issued organically from the social nature of man and 
must be regarded as possessing ontological priority over 
the state. But in this form this assertion of the purely 
subsidiary character of the state in society is not the only 
one in the field. In contemporary Lutheranism in par¬ 
ticular there is another conception which regards the state 

3 Brunner, in Totaler Staat und christliche Freiheit. 


Functions and Limits of the State 147 

not only as an indispensable organization of the commu¬ 
nity, but as one which, alongside the church, is supreme 
over all other social units. 

It is obvious that all these different views of society must 
also very largely determine the prevailing conceptions of 
the functions and limits of the state. 

The Christian view of the state makes a far-reaching dis¬ 
tinction between its primary and its secondary functions. 
Speaking generally, we might say that in spite of all the re¬ 
ligious differences which lie behind the Christian view 
there is still a large measure of agreement about these so- 
called primary functions, but that there is great difference 
of opinion about the secondary functions. 

Throughout the course of history, as well as at the pres¬ 
ent day, Christendom has always held that the primary and 
distinctive task of the state consists in the establishment 
and preservation of order within society. It is true, of 
course, that when this fundamental statement is expounded 
interpretations vary. The more, for instance, the opera¬ 
tion of sinister and destructive forces in the community is 
emphasized, the greater will be the emphasis laid upon this 
primitive function of the state. The negative task of pre¬ 
vention of anarchy and chaos is more necessary for the 
existence of the community than the positive task of the 
establishment of justice. Hence the strong emphasis on 
the necessity for real sovereignty as well as on the authori¬ 
tarian character of the state in much of continental Prot¬ 
estant thought about the state. At the same time, however, 
it is evident that there is a growing moral sensitiveness 
about the use of force as a method for the maintenance of 
social order, a sensitiveness which is expressed in opposi¬ 
tion to the use of force in the terrible forms of modern war. 

Another common element in the Christian view of the 
state is the fact that the social order which the state is com- 


148 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

missioned to establish is generally described in detail as 
peace and justice. 

Traditional Protestant thought upon these questions, es¬ 
pecially on the continent of Europe, has been mainly con¬ 
cerned with the effort to secure comparative stability and 
cooperation within the internal political sphere, while in 
the international sphere it has understood “ peace in a 
rather negative sense as the exercise of power to secure the 
community against attack, rather than in the positive sense 
of the actual establishment of peace. To the honor of the 
Roman Church, be it said that it has always emphasized the 
universal international character of the state as a peace¬ 
maker. So far as Protestant Christendom is concerned, it 
can scarcely be contested that it has not felt sufficient moral 
concern for questions of international policy and the pos¬ 
sibilities of establishing an international order. 

In the present world situation with its strongly central¬ 
ized states — a situation in which international anarchy is 
a far greater and more terrible menace than internal chaos 
— an extension and deepening of the traditional political 
ethos at this point is urgently necessary. Even if the pres¬ 
ent tendencies toward extreme nationalism scarcely seem 
favorable to such an undertaking, we may still thankfully 
recognize that, particularly on the part of the ecumenical 
movement, this question is being investigated in a respon¬ 
sible manner and that promising movements are on foot. 

The theological argument which regards the state mainly 
as a protection against social chaos and the fear of anarchy 
has been a large factor in the tendency to interpret the 
ordering function of the state in terms of the social and 
economic status quo, and this in spite of the plain teaching 
of the Bible that justice is the will of God for all spheres of 
life. But there is no agreement in Christian thought about 
the meaning of justice as the standard and aim of political 


Functions and Limits of the State 


149 

action; hence at the present time thinkers of all kinds are 
wrestling earnestly with these questions . 4 

Thus, so far as the primary function of the state is con¬ 
cerned, ecumenical Christendom is confronted by three 
great ethical problems which call for much clear thinking 
and courageous action: the right use of force in Christian 
action; the struggle for international peace; and the promo¬ 
tion of social justice. 

Many Christians regard this work for order, peace and 
justice as the fundamental function of the state; others, 
indeed, would even regard it as the only one. The relation 
of the state to the various social forms does not consist in 
influencing them or in trying to create such forms, but in 
protecting and assisting them by means of its legal system. 
The modern state, however, takes very little notice of the 
considerations and concerns of the Christian ethos. The 
totalitarian state guides the whole community according to 
its own will and extends its control over culture, the na¬ 
tional ethos and the general philosophy of life. The prob¬ 
lems which this situation produces for the church have not 
yet been thought out from the Christian standpoint. In¬ 
deed, in all their seriousness and difficulty they have 
scarcely been realized or perceived by Christians generally. 
To try to discuss these difficult problems in greater detail 
would lead us too far afield. We would merely suggest the 
following question: May it be that the great conflict be¬ 
tween the church and the modern secularized or neo-pagan 
state will be fought out in this sphere of the secondary func¬ 
tions of the state, and within the sphere of education in 
particular? 

Thus we have again come back to the question of the 

4 For instance, the great social encyclicals of the recent popes, the 
social creed of the Federal Council of the Churches in America, and the 
message of the Stockholm Conference all testify eloquently to this fact. 


150 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

limits of the state. Primarily, the first thing we have to say 
is that the limits of the state are already defined by its sanc¬ 
tion and its task. However the functions of the state may 
be conceived in greater detail by the different Christian 
traditions, it is clear that the idea of a divine sanction of the 
state does suggest a final criterion by which all judgments 
on concrete situations and conditions should be tested. 
This process of wrestling with the problem of the limits of 
the state, however, especially from the Christian point of 
view, is so burdened with political and ideological con¬ 
siderations and interests that it is equally important, and 
indeed absolutely necessary, to consider the problem from 
a more comprehensive point of view. To do so is neces¬ 
sary because the other social spheres (the family, eco¬ 
nomics, etc.) must be taken into account; we must try to 
discover their distinctive and God-given functions within 
society and what this means for their relations with the 
state. In other words, we are here concerned with the 
ancient problem, theoretically insoluble, of the relation 
between authority and freedom. 

Here the Christian conception is fighting on two fronts, 
against both the individualistic and the collectivistic view 
of freedom. There is no doubt that the Christian view has 
been frequently distorted by such misinterpretations. 
Again and again this difficult problem is regarded as an 
antithesis; that is, the authority of the state and human 
freedom are regarded as opposed to each other. This view 
gives rise to the ethical demand that the state guarantee as 
far as possible the independence of the community in order 
that the community may develop freely. On the other 
hand, the passionate opposition to individualism in all its 
forms, which actuates wide circles of continental Protes¬ 
tantism at the present time, leads all too easily to the other 
extreme of the collectivist misinterpretation. So much 


Functions and Limits of the State 151 

weight is laid on the importance of the community as com¬ 
pared with the individual that personal freedom is rele¬ 
gated to the background. 

The central problem with which we are wrestling and 
must continue to wrestle in ecumenical Christendom is a 
twofold one: What freedom and independence must the 
church demand for the development of its own life in order 
that it may rightly fulfill its God-given task? Further, what 
standards does the Christian understanding of life set up 
to guide our attitude toward the different problems of the 
relation of the authority of the state to the individual life 
of the various social institutions (such as education, cul¬ 
ture, economic systems, etc.), and in what does the con¬ 
crete responsibility of the church and of Christians con¬ 
sist in this sphere? The great problem with which we are 
here concerned may be defined as follows: In ever new de¬ 
cisions we have to discover where to draw the line between 
the freedom which man needs for the fulfillment of his 
divinely given destiny, and that unrestricted caprice which 
springs from evil and threatens human social life with 
chaos. We must find the way which lies between the de¬ 
struction of political authority as a whole and the enforced 
control of all the social institutions by the state. At this 
point, that is, where we are concerned with the limits of 
the state — however remote at times this concern may seem 
to be from the central questions of faith — what we believe 
about the state and about life as a whole will emerge quite 
clearly. In the most practical questions of the functions of 
the state and its limits, as compared with other social func¬ 
tions, it must inevitably become plain whether Christians 
in all their action believe that the state is not merely a hu¬ 
man and utilitarian but a divine institution. 

The effort to gain a deeper understanding of the mean¬ 
ing of the state, an effort which is engaging the attention of 


152 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

so many Christian thinkers at the present time, shows very 
plainly that the church is both bewildered and divided. 
At the very moment when political problems are peculiarly 
urgent and insistent, it is painful and humiliating that this 
should be the case. Even in their attitude toward the state 
today there are wide differences of opinion among Chris¬ 
tians. This diversity, however, means that it is all the more 
necessary not to reject the honest convictions of any Chris¬ 
tian brethren, but to make an effort to understand the par¬ 
ticular Christian witness which lies behind their views, 
strange as they may seem to us. 

But although we frankly acknowledge the variety and 
uncertainty which characterize the Christian attitude to¬ 
ward politics, we must also thankfully admit that among 
those Christians who are wrestling with these problems cer¬ 
tain common convictions do emerge — convictions which 
are really very simple and self-evident, yet if they were 
actually lived out as vital realities in national and inter¬ 
national life they would effect a complete revolution in 
national and international politics. 

The central element in these convictions might perhaps 
be formulated thus: First of all, concern for the state is a 
vital part of the work of the church. Political action is not 
a matter of indifference to the Christian faith. The reality 
of our fellowship with God ought to be proved within the 
life of the state. The message of God’s saving will in Christ 
is not addressed to isolated souls living in some timeless 
sphere, but to mankind as a whole, and this whole includes 
the political aspect of human activity. 

Second, the concern of the church for the state is essen¬ 
tially, or at least primarily, with its “ soul,” that is, with its 
religious and ethical significance, its function within the 
divine economy, as revealed in the light of Christ. At the 
present time in particular, when the state is once more be- 


Functions and Limits of the State 153 

ing elevated to the level of an absolute and conflicting 
interests, forces and parties are trying to win the churches 
and individual Christians to support their selfish political 
purposes, it is more important than ever to emphasize the 
truth that even in the sphere of politics Christianity is con¬ 
cerned first and foremost with obedience or disobedience 
to God. For Christian life and thought on political mat¬ 
ters the essential criterion is not the utilization of the state 
for the furtherance of class interests, nor for the rigid or¬ 
ganization and, if possible, development of the national 
community, nor for the self-centered expansion of the au¬ 
thority of the ruling caste, nor for the victory of any par¬ 
ticular ideology. The concern of the church for the good 
of the state — expressed in intercession, loyalty, criticism 
and willing cooperation — is the result of a deep convic¬ 
tion that the political order has a special function to fulfill 
within the divine economy. The political ethos insofar 
as it desires to be genuinely Christian must be the human 
response to what God gives and demands through the po¬ 
litical order. 

The problem of the state brings us to the central ques¬ 
tions of the Christian faith and the Christian understand¬ 
ing of life. At this point, in view of the grave problems of 
our own day, Christian unity is imperative. Yet in spite 
of this fact there are profound divergences and mutual 
misunderstandings among Christians. Further, the vital 
necessity to formulate definite opinions about the great 
questions of national and international politics, coupled 
with a profound sense of responsibility to God, is produc¬ 
ing, as we know to our cost, fresh divisions among Chris¬ 
tian people, and even enmity and distrust. Our common 
worship and common action are constantly being hindered 
both by the external measures taken by the state and still 
more by these differences of view among Christian people. 


154 Christian Faith and the Modern State 

This situation might well drive us to despair were it not 
for the fact that wherever the way of loyalty to Christ is 
sought and found, the clouds lift and reveal the promise of 
dawn. This comes out plainly in the following passage 
from the pen of one of the Christian prophets of the present 
day: 

In our own church life and practice are we really listening to 
the voice of Christ in the attitude we adopt toward the realities 
and problems of the world in the midst of which the church is 
set? Is our relation to the state, for instance — is all our church 
life, thought and practice, really controlled and directed by 
Christ himself? Or, in this respect as in so many others, are we 
merely following policies controlled by views which, although 
perfectly respectable from the conventional point of view, have 
no connection with Christ? Yet if two or three different and 
separated churches, each in its own way, were to give themselves 
— in a spirit of penitence and willingness to repent — wholly to 
the effort to wrestle with this problem [of the state], in so doing, 
within these churches the one Church would automatically 
come into existence, and would also become a living and 
visible reality . 6 

s Karl Barth, Die Kirche und die Kirchen, pp. 21-22 (Munich, 1935). 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


The following list mentions some recent books which 

are of particular relevance for the issues raised in the pres¬ 
ent essay. 

Althaus, P. Kirche und Staat nach Lutherischer Lehre. 
Leipzig, Deichert. 1935. 

- Obrigkeit und Fuhrertum: Wandlungen des evan- 

gelischen Staatsethos. Gutersloh, Bertelsmann. 1936. 

Berdyaev, N. The End of Our Time. London, Sheed & 
Ward. 1935. 

- The Fate of Man in the Modern World. London, 

S.C.M. Press. 1935. 

Brown, W. Adams. Church and State in Contemporary 
'America. New York, Scribner’s. 1936. 

Brunner, E. The Divine Imperative: A Study in Christian 
Ethics (Eng. trans.). London, Lutterworth Press. 
1 937 - 

- Der Staat als Problem der Kirche. Berne and Leip¬ 
zig, Gotthelf-Verlag. 1933. 

Conference on Christian Politics, Economics, and Citizen¬ 
ship (COPEC), Commission Reports. Vol. X: Poli¬ 
tics and Citizenship. London, Longmans. 1924. 

Dawson, C. Religion and the Modern State. London, 
Sheed & Ward. 1935. 

Delekat, Fr. Die Kirche Jesu Christi und der Staat. Ber¬ 
lin, Furche-Verlag. 1933. 

Demant, V. A. God, Man, and Society: An Introduction to 
Christian Sociology. London, S.C.M. Press. 1933. 

155 





156 


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